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Abstract 
There is a single aphorism that aptly describes the fundamental shift in the relationship between 
the state and higher education in England in the past quarter of a century: it was once the role of 
Governments to provide for the purposes of universities; it is now the role of universities to 
provide for the purposes of Governments. Why this has occurred and the mechanisms that 
support this conceptual inversion have been explored in this dissertation in the context of the 
changing role of the funding body for higher education - the University Grants Committee (UGC), 
Universities Funding Council (UFC) and the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE). 
Through an historical approach, the case histories of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE describe and 
analyse the changing role of the funding body in the context of the development of a system of 
mass higher education in England, and increased state pressure on the management and 
strategic development of higher education. As the role of the state has changed from facilitator to 
interventionist in the external and internal affairs of universities, the role of the funding body for 
higher education has metamorphosed from being exclusively a provider of state funds to being 
increasingly a regulator of the higher education system. The relationship between the 
Government and the funding body is continuing to change with the Government seeking 
increasingly to influence the policy development and policy implementation role of the HEFCE. 
This dissertation explores why and how this has happened, and the implications for the HEFCE. 
In a global knowledge economy driven by a knowledge society, the contribution of higher 
education has become critical to economic competitiveness and social inclusion in England. 
Increasingly, the state has defined higher education as a form of personal and state investment 
that requires increased accountability and regulation. In order to keep politics out of the allocation 
of state funds to individual higher education institutions, the Government has created and placed 
a funding body between the Government and the universities and colleges of higher education. It 
is argued that the funding body acts as both an independent provider of state funds for higher 
education institutions, and increasingly as a regulator of the public investment in higher 
education. 
The product of the research is a critical review of the English funding body for higher education in 
the period 1945-2003 through which the author's interpretation of the data seeks to provide new 
insights to the role of the funding body in the relationship between the state and higher education. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and overview 
Introduction 
The past 40 years has witnessed the transformation of higher education in England. It has moved 
from a position in 1961 in which 6% of those aged under 21 participated in higher education to 
one where in 2003 around 43% of those between the ages of 18-30 participate in higher 
education. The Government target is to move towards a 50% participation rate for those persons 
aged under 30 by 2010 (NCIHE 1997; DfES 2003b). 
Until 1988 the Government funding for the university sector in all four countries of the United 
Kingdom was allocated by the University Grants Committee (UGC). In the academic year 
1987-88 the UGC allocated just under E1.5 billion to 44 universities (UGC 1990a and HMSO 
1987a). 
The Universities Funding Council was created by the Education Reform Act 1988 to provide 
funding for the university sector in Great Britain. The two universities in Northern Ireland were in 
future to be funded by the Department for Education, Northern Ireland (DENI). In the academic 
year 1990-91 the UFC allocated EI. 7 billion to 51 higher education institutions (UFC 1991 a). 
On the other side of the binary divide from the late 1960s onwards the polytechnics, and colleges 
of higher education, were funded by local authorities initially, then by the National Advisory Body 
for Local Authority Higher Education which was established in 1982, and finally by the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) between 19B8 and 1992. Created by the 
Education Reform Act 1988, the PCFC had responsibility for funding 84 institutions (polytechnics 
and colleges of higher education) and allocated El. I billion of public funds in 1989-90 
(PCFC 1990). 
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There is now one single funding body for higher education in England. The Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE) was created by the Further and Higher Education Act 
1992. As a non-departmental public body (NDPB), the HEFCE is funded by the Government and 
operates within the framework of Government policy articulated by the Department for Education 
and Skills (DfES). The HEFCE will allocate: E5.5 billion to the higher education sector in England 
in 2003-2004 providing funding for 132 higher education institutions (HEFCE 2003b). A 
chronological history of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE is set out in Appendix A. 
Within the changing structure of funding for higher education in England one feature has 
remained as a constant: the existence of a funding body balanced between the state and the 
higher education institutions acting as the buffer body between two forces, and designed to keep 
politics out of the funding allocations to individual higher education institutions. As the current 
funding body for higher education, how does the HEFCE view its own role? It is interesting that 
the HEFCE's image of itself in 2003 continues to be that of a mediator and buffer orgariisation 
between the Government and the higher education sector. Sir Howard Newby, the Chief 
Executive of the HEFCE stated on 15 July 2003: 
'in carrying out our role we act as a mediator between Government and universities and colleges. 
We robustly represent the needs of higher education to Government, and convey the views of 
Government to higher education. In many respects it is difficult for people to judge the 
effectiveness of our role in advancing the interests of higher education, because much of our 
advice to Government has to be given in confidence. The Council is responsible for developing 
and implementing policies within a broader policy framework set by Govemment. We are doing 
that through our own strategic plan, and working with Government in delivering the White Paper, 
The Future of Higher Education ' (Guardian 2003). 
Sir Howard Newby issued this statement following a survey by Market and Opinion Research 
International (MORI) commissioned by the HEFCE to review the '... relations between the HEFCE 
and universities and colleges' (HEFCE 2003e). The MORI survey included 25 universities, 
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17 higher education institutions, and 29 further education colleges with a higher education 
teaching responsibility, and was conducted in the period November 2002 to January 2003. In the 
MORI survey some 90% of respondents agreed with the statement that the HEFCE was an 
agency of Government, 51 % agreed that the HEFCE is primarily a regulatory body, and 62% 
agreed that the HEFCE is increasingly a planning agency (HEFCE 2003e). Therefore, there 
would appear to be a gap in perception between the HEFCE's view of its role and that articulated 
by the higher education sector. One of the aims of this dissertation will be to disentangle this 
ambiguity through a study of the changing role of the funding body. 
Aim of the dissertation and research questions 
This dissertation explores the relationship between the state and higher education and provides, 
through a series of case histories, a critical review of the role of the UGC, UFC, and the HEFCE 
in that relationship. The central purpose of this dissertation is to review critically, in the context of 
the academic literature and the evidence, the changing role of the funding body. Greater 
emphasis is given to a critical review of the role of the HEFCE, to reflect its key position as the 
sole funding body for all higher education institutions in England. 
The research questions addressed in this dissertation are: 
What has been the role of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE in the relationship between the State 
and Higher Education Institutions in England in the period 1945-2003, and how has this role 
evolved? 
0 To what extent has the HEFCE mediated Ministerial guidance over the period 1993-2003? 
The research questions are prompted by the review of the literature in chapter two covering the 
role of the HEFCE and its predecessor funding bodies in the relationship between the state and 
higher education institutions. Within Shinn (1986) and Shattock (1994) we have a detailed 
historical account of the role of the UGC but there is a considerable gap waiting to be filled on the 
role of the successor funding bodies, the UFC and HEFCE. A full historical study of both 
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organisations is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the material reviewed for this 
research, and the conclusions of the author, could be expected to play a part in any future 
understanding of the roles of the UFC and the HEFCE. 
Framework for the research 
The framework for the research relates to three inter-related strands of thought explored in the 
academic literature: 
0 Firstly, the transformation of higher education in England since the 1960s from an elite to 
a mass system of higher education with the consequent financial implications for the 
public funding of higher education; 
0 Secondly, in the context of the relationship between higher education and the 
development of a knowledge economy and knowledge society, an ever-increasing desire 
on the part of the state to manage and regulate the higher education system through 
financial levers; 
0 Thirdly, in the context of increasing state pressure on higher education, the 
transformation of the funding body from being less exclusively a provider of grant to 
increasingly a regulatory body for higher education (Salter and Tapper 1994; Shattock 
1994; Henkel 2000; Kogan and Hanney 2000; Delanty 2001; Scott 2001; Deem 2002). 
Research methodology 
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an interpretation of, and new insights into, the changing 
role of the English funding body for higher education in the period 1945 - 2003. In seeking to 
achieve the aim of the dissertation and answer the research questions, this study adopts a 
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qualitative research methodology through which the case histories of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE 
are used to provide an interpretative account of the changing role of the funding body. The 
research seeks to describe, explain and interpret the relationship between two of the key players 
within the state apparatus for the creation, implementation and funding of higher education policy 
(DfES and the HEFCE), and the consequent impact of that relationship on the funding and 
management of the higher education sector in England. The research is underpinned by an 
extensive body of primary and secondary research material which has been read, analysed and 
interpreted by the author in the context of the research questions. 
The author has not made use of any data in this dissertation that is not publicly available through 
the official documents and publications of Parliament, the Government or the funding bodies, or 
available on request from the funding body. All of the publications referenced in this dissertation, 
in respect of the funding bodies, are publicly available from the Public Records Office, the 
Knowledge Centre of the HEFCE, and the HEFCE website. 
The author of this dissertation has been an officer of the Department for Education, UGC and 
UFC, and is a serving officer of the HEFCE. Through this dissertation he has sought to produce 
an interpretative account of the role of the funding body (UGC, UFC and the HEFCE) by means 
of an analysis of official and publicly available documents, in other words documents that are 
available to all other researchers in this field of study. The author's proximity to the development 
of policy within the funding body will undoubtedly have had an impact on his understanding of the 
changing role of the funding body, and the changing relationship between the funding body and 
the Department for Education. However, the author has not sought to use his 'insider' knowledge 
of the activities of the funding body, Department for Education, or that of specific individuals, in 
support of his research objectives. The research is not a personal memoir. Specifically, the author 
has not sought to mirror the approach undertaken by Carswell (1985) whose study of the 
relationship between the Government and the universities in the period 1960-1980 is written from 
the perspective of a former civil servant, and is candid about his personal recollections of policy 
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formulation in the Treasury, Department for Education, and the UGC. Carswell's study was 
written after he had retired from public service. The author of this dissertation is still a serving 
officer of the HEFCE and has therefore sought to steer clear of personal recollections and write 
an 'inside' account: an interpretation influenced by his knowledge of the higher education system 
but reliant primarily on the empirical base of the publicly available primary research 
documentation. The author has reflected at the end of this dissertation (chapter 6) on the 
research process and specifically on the distinction between the 'insider' and 'inside' dimensions 
of the research process. 
The research methodology is based on a detailed reading and analysis of primary research 
documents in the public domain - official publications. The research is historical in that it charts 
the development of higher education policy, the role of the Department for Education, and the 
funding body, over time in the context of policy creation, policy development, and policy 
implementation. The historical approach combined with a detailed reading and analysis of primary 
documents supports the research objective of explaining and understanding change in higher 
education. The dissertation has sought to make use of those documents that chart the significant 
changes in the influence of the state (Government and funding body) as it has pursued a policy of 
seeking to exercise greater strategic and operational control over the management and funding of 
higher education. 
Although the research for this dissertation has not involved attributable or non-attributable 
interviews with any of the key players with a role in determining the funding for higher education, 
for example Ministers, senior civil servants, or the Chief Executives of the UGC, UFC and 
HEFCE, this specific deficit is balanced in part by the on the record statements provided through 
the oral evidence from the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, and the Chief Executive of 
the HEFCE, to the House of Commons Education and Select Committee Inquiry in 2003 into the 
future of higher education (Clarke 2003; Newby 2003). The author's decision not to use 
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interviews as part of his research methodology is covered later in this chapter in the section on 
'limitations to the research and ethical issues'. 
This dissertation incorporates historical research as part of the research methodology. Historical 
research is defined as involving '... the systematic search for documents and other sources that 
contain facts relating to the historian's questions about the past ... The essential steps 
involved in 
doing a historical project are as follows: defining the problems or questions to be investigated, 
searching for sources of historical facts, summarising and evaluating the historical sources, and 
presenting the pertinent facts within an interpretive framework' (Borg and Gall 1979, pages 373 
and 375). The interpretive tradition in historical research has been discussed extensively by the 
historian EH Carr who responded to his question 'What is History? by stating that history'... is a 
continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue 
between the present and the past' (Carr 1961, page 30). 
The starting point for the research in this dissertation is a review of both the academic literature, 
and the reports from the two major public inquiries into higher education from the 1960s onwards 
in England (Robbins 1963 and NCIHE 1997), as set out in chapter two of the dissertation. The 
literature review informed the aim of the dissertation, the research questions, and the research 
methodology. The literature review has a focus on the key texts that provide a commentary, 
analysis, and interpretation of the relationship between the state and higher education in England, 
and in particular the respective roles of the central Government Department with responsibility for 
higher education policy and funding, presently the Department for Education and Skills, and the 
role of the English Funding Body for Higher Education, presently the HEFCE. The texts and 
documents included within the literature review have been read by the author with the objective of 
drawing out the key themes that have been identified by academic commentators as 
representative of the changing relationship between the state and higher education. Through a 
reading of the literature, the author has gained an understanding of the methodological 
approaches used by other writers in their analysis and interpretation of the changing role of the 
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funding body, and the relationship between the state and higher education. A dominant theme 
within the academic literature is the way the authors underpin the empirical authority of their 
research through the location and analysis of a comprehensive range of primary documentation 
which includes official documents on higher education funding and policy published by the 
Government or the funding bodies. 
The literature review gives a prominent voice to the higher education community. Where there is 
additional evidence about the views of the academic community on the role of the funding body, 
for example in the MORI survey (HEFCE 2003e), then the data has been included in the 
dissertation, 
Researching the University Grants Committee (UGC) 
Although the 70 year history of the policies of the UGC has been covered in the texts by Shinn 
(1986) and Shattock (1994), it was essential for the author's understanding of the history of the 
UGC, and the changing role of the funding body over time, to undertake a selective but detailed 
reading of some of the key primary documents published by the UGC, particularly those 
documents that provide evidence about the changing relationship between the UGC and the 
Department for Education. The author also undertook a literature search to ascertain the research 
published about the role of the UGC. The author decided to concentrate on a detailed reading of 
the UGC annual reports from 1960 to 1989, a period that coincides with a significant expansion in 
student numbers and funding for higher education in England. The purpose of the detailed 
reading of these primary documents was to capture the views of the UGC in relation to its own 
role within higher education, and critically its perception of its level of independence as a buffer 
body between the Government and the higher education institutions. The annual reports helpfully 
provide in one place a comprehensive and reliable source of data on higher education funding, 
student participation, and staff numbers. All of the UGC annual reports were made available to 
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the HEFCE Knowledge Centre by the Public Records Office and therefore were readily available 
to the author. 
The UGC annual reports also provide an historical record of the role of the UGC in the creation 
and development of policies that underpin the annual funding allocations to higher education 
institutions. An advantage of using the UGC annual reports as a source of historical evidence is 
that these reports include from the early 1980s onwards the key exchanges of correspondence 
between the UGC and the Secretary of State for Education, which starts the process of the 
Government making public and transparent its changing role in the strategic management of 
higher education, and initiate the Government policy of providing the UGC and its successor 
bodies with 'letters of guidance' (often described as the annual grant or funding letters) as a 
means of linking the funding policies of the funding body with the Government's plans for the 
overarching strategic development of higher education. The author has used these primary 
research documents to inform his understanding of the changing relationship between the 
Department for Education and the UGC, and his understanding and interpretation of the critical 
points in the changing relationship. The UGC reports also helpfully provide a point of reference 
for the detailed reading of other public documents that have had a significant impact on the future 
development of the funding body, and in particular the independence of the funding body in 
relation to the creation, development and implementation of policies for the funding of higher 
education. 
Researching the Universities Funding Council (UFC) 
In comparison to the UGC, the history and role of the UFC has hardly been touched by 
researchers. It is not possible within the scope and scale of this dissertation to seek to construct a 
detailed chronological and narrative account of the role and policies of the UFC. Therefore, the 
author decided to focus on a particular aspect of the activities of the UFC which will serve to 
illuminate and exemplify the changing role of the Council, particularly in its relationship with the 
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Government, and the higher education community. To understand the reasons why the UFC was 
established it was essential to read initially the publicly available documents published by the 
Government: the White Paper (HMSO 1987) which preceded the Education Reform Act 1988, 
the legislation which created the UFC; and, the initial letter of guidance from the Secretary of 
State for Education to the first Chairman of the UFC (DES 1988). The author also undertook a 
literature search to identify research covering the role of the UFC. 
In reaching a decision about which aspect of the UFC to research in detail, and thereby which 
UFC documents to read and analyse, the author was influenced by the following factors: the 
views of Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, a former Chief Executive of the UFC, in his commentary on 
the abortive attempt of the UFC to introduce market forces into the funding and planning of higher 
education (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991), and the impact this policy had on the relationship between the 
UFC and the higher education community; the commentaries in the academic literature on the 
funding approach of the UFC, and the related tensions between the Chairman of the UFC and his 
Chief Executive; and, the author's own knowledge of the funding policies of the UFC from his time 
as an officer of the UFC. The author decided to use the funding and planning exercise of the UFC 
for the period 1991-92 to 1994-95 to demonstrate the significant change in the role of the UFC as 
it changed from being a provider of public funding to a purchaser of teaching and research from 
higher education institutions. To achieve this objective, the author read through the UFC annual 
report, and the Circular Letters published by the UFC over its lifetime (1988-1992) and then 
selected and read in detail all of the Circular Letters issued by the UFC in respect of the funding 
and planning of teaching. Therefore, the case history of the UFC includes a narrative of one 
specific but critical aspect of the planning and funding role of the UFC. This case history enabled 
the author to analyse and interpret: the way the Department for Education was able to influence 
the role of the UFC; the way the UFC defined its own role through its policies and funding 
mechanisms; and, the changing relationship between the UFC and the higher education 
institutions. All of the UFC Circular Letters, and UFC annual report, were made available to the 
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HEFCE Knowledge Centre by the Public Records Office and therefore the author had ready 
access to all of the published papers of the UFC. 
Researching the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
A literature search undertaken by the author confirmed his understanding that the history and role 
of the HEFCE was relatively under-researched. As with the chapter on the UFC, the author read 
initially the Government White Paper (HMSO 1991b) and Parliamentary legislation (FHE Act 
1992) that preceded the establishment of the HEFCE- To provide a structure for the analysis of 
the role and funding policies of the HEFCE, a decision had to be made initially about which 
publicly available documents the author would read and analyse in detail in order to answer the 
research questions for this dissertation. As with the case histories of the UGC and UFC, the 
author decided to adopt chronological narrative to provide the reader with an understanding of the 
way the role of the Department for Education, and the HEFCE, changed over time. 
The author's knowledge of the role and policies of the HEFCE, and its relationship with a range of 
stakeholders in higher education, particularly the Department for Education, and the higher 
education institutions, proved helpful in guiding the author's selection, reading, analysis and 
interpretation of primary documents published by the Government, Parliament, and the HEFCE. It 
should be acknowledged that the author's role as an officer of the HEFCE since 1992, and his 
current role within the Chief Executive's Office of the HEFCE, will undoubtedly have facilitated the 
process of locating key public documents about the role of the HEFCE in the context of the wider 
development of higher education in England in the period 1992-2003. In this context, the author 
had readily available to him all the letters of guidance (grant letters) and the singular letter of 
direction (DfES 2003c) to the HEFCE from the Department for Education. Working within the 
HEFCE, the author also had ready access to all the published papers of the HEFCE which 
included the Council's annual reports and circular letters. The task of reading and analysing the 
HEFCE documents was undoubtedly made considerably easier as a result of the author's 
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knowledge of all the key public documents on higher education, and ready access to these 
documents. The author's knowledge and understanding of the traffic of information between the 
HEFCE and the Department for Education, and between the HEFCE and Parliament, will also 
have facilitated the location and analysis of key public documents that provide an insight to the 
role of the funding body in the relationship between the state and higher education. 
Given the plethora of papers published by the Government and HEFCE in the period 1992-2003, 
the author has had to be selective in his reading and analysis. In the context of the changing role 
of the funding council, and the relationship between the Department for Education, HEFCE, and 
the higher education institutions, the author focussed on a detailed reading of the HEFCE annual 
reports alongside the annual letters of guidance from the Department for Education. The annual 
reports provide a synoptic overview of the policies and funding decisions of the HEFCE, and 
where necessary the author was able to take forward his investigation of individual policy 
initiatives through a detailed reading of specific Circular Letters. This approach enabled the 
author to make connections between, and an interpretation of, the relationship between the 
Government and the funding body, and thereby to identify the influence of various parties, and 
the roles played by the Government and funding body in respect of the strategic planning, funding 
and management of higher education. 
The research methodology described above was chosen with the expectation that it would enable 
the author to write an interpretive account of the changing role of the HEFCE through a detailed 
reading and analysis of a wide range of publicly available primary research documentation. The 
detailed reading and analysis of a very wide and rich source of primary material established the 
empirical underpinning for the author's interpretation of the changing role of the funding body as it 
metamorphosed from being exclusively a provider of grant to increasingly a regulatory body for 
the public investment in higher education. 
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Historical research and documentary analysis in educational settings 
In implementing the research methodology for this dissertation, the author has reflected on the 
methodological issues raised by other writers in the context of historical research in education, 
and the analysis of documentary sources. 
Andrew (1985) makes the point that the availability of authentic and reliable primary documentary 
evidence will inevitably influence the choice of research topic. Where there is a plethora of 
research material then choices have to be made and the sampling undertaken by the researcher 
can be guided in part by references and guidance in the secondary sources. For example, there 
could be instances where earlier commentators indicate a particular line of enquiry that might be 
further investigated should further documentary evidence become available. Often the research 
focus on specific 'significant events'will be guided by references in the secondary sources. 
Andrew emphasises that the selectivity of historical evidence can be guided by the theoretical 
perspective within which the research is conducted and argues that the facts of the past do not 
simply 'speak for themselves'. In reality, there is an interaction between the researcher and the 
documentary evidence. The researcher plays a critical role in the selection and interpretation of 
evidence. Andrew makes the point that: 
'... historical research demands both interpretation and some kind of theoretical framework on 
which to hang 'the facts'obtained from historical documentary material' (Andrew 1985, page 
167). 
The importance of locating and analysing valid and reliable primary documentary sources is 
emphasised by McCulloch and Richardson (2000) in their review of historical research in 
educational settings. The authors emphasise the importance of adopting a critical relationship to 
the documentary material with each document requiring careful assessment and interpretation in 
the context of the reason the document was produced, and the messages it was intended to 
disseminate. 
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Semel (1994) provides a reflective account of the methodological issues associated with 
researching the history of a school in which she was over a 25 year period variously a student, 
teacher, parent and researcher. Semel acknowledges the possibility of researcher bias but 
accepts that ultimately she had to treat her own perceptions about 'her school' as part of her 
evidence base alongside the evidence she collected through the reading and analysis of school 
documentation, and the data collected from interviews. 
In her study of evidence and proof in documentary research, Platt (1981) provides a list of issues 
that the historical researcher needs to take into account in documentary analysis: 
'(i) How to establish the authenticity of a document; (ii) whether the relevant documents are 
available; (iii) problems of sampling; (iv) how to establish the extent to which a document can be 
taken to tell the truth about what it describes; (v) how to decide what inferences can be made 
from a document about matters other than the truth of its factual assertions' (Platt 1981, page 33). 
In the context of the guidance from Platt (1981) on evidence and proof , the author of this 
dissertation had the significant advantage of knowing that the primary research documents used 
in this dissertation were all public documents. 
The product of the research 
This dissertation uses an historical approach to provide a critical review of the changing role of 
the funding body. This methodological approach has provided the author with new knowledge 
which he has used, in the context of the research framework derived from the literature, to 
provide an interpretation of, and new insights to, the changing role of the funding body, and the 
related changing relationship between the state and higher education. The product of this 
dissertation will have two audiences: firstly, there is the academic audience which will be 
interested in the new insights derived from the interpretation of the primary literature, and the 
critical use of that interpretation to examine the existing research frameworks in respect of the 
changing relationship between the state and higher education, and the changing role of the 
funding body; secondly, the dissertation has a purpose in holding a mirror up to the activities and 
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role of the HEFCE thereby providing an opportunity for the staff of the HEFCE to discuss critically 
the contemporary relationship of the HEFCE with the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), 
and the higher education sector. 
Limitations to the research and ethical issues 
This dissertation has a focus on the role of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE. While it refers briefly in 
places to the role of the Polytechnic and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) it is not possible 
within the scope and scale of this dissertation to describe and analyse the role of the PCFC. An 
area for future research, which is addressed in chapter six, is a comparative study of the funding 
approaches of the UFC and PCFC in the period 1989-1993. 
The author of this dissertation is aware that literature in this area of research has included within 
the research methodology empirical evidence based on extensive fieldwork involving structured 
interviews with key informants on policy changes and policy implications for higher education 
(Henkel 2000; Kogan and Hanney 2000). It is questionable, and indeed in the judgement of the 
author highly unlikely, that he would have gained access to interview Ministers or senior civil 
servants in the DfES. It is possible that, in view of the author's present role within the office of the 
Chief Executive of the HEFCE, a more formal approach to senior figures in the higher education 
community could have resulted in less open discussions than those that have taken place with 
the author informally under the non-attributable 'Chatham House Rules' on occasions such as the 
HEFCE annual conference, a gathering that includes the heads of higher education institutions in 
England. 
The author did not seek to interview senior figures associated with the funding body to take 
account of their perspective on the changing role of their organisation. He made this decision for 
two reasons: firstly, the views of the recent Chief Executive's of the funding bodies - 
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Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, Sir Graerne Davies, Sir Brian Fender, and Sir Howard Newby - are in 
the public domain through speeches (Swi n nerton -Dyer 1991), the annual reports of the funding 
council (1994-2001), and in the case of Sir Howard Newby in his oral evidence to the House of 
Commons Education and Skills Select Committee, and his public statement on the role of the 
HEFCE (Guardian 2003 and Newby 2003); secondly, there could be a danger that the proximity 
of the author's employment to these individuals, in his various roles as Clerk to the Funding 
Council (UFC and HEFCE) and presently as Executive Assistant to the Chief Executive of the 
HEFCE, might impact on the objectivity and independence of the interviews. 
Although the dissertation makes use of a wide range of data in the public domain, the author has 
not, with one exception, when reference has been made to the draft HEFCE strategic plan for 
2003-08 considered by the HEFCE Board of Council in September 2002 (HEFCE 2002c), made 
use of publicly available UFC and HEFCE Board of Council papers. These documents provide 
evidence of the path of progress of public policy making at a very fine level of specificity. 
However, the strength of the documents used by the author, such as circulars and annual reports, 
is that they represent the public policy of the funding body. 
The author's location within the Chief Executive's Office of the HEFCE, and his previous roles 
within the Department for Education and Skills, UGC and UFC provide an interesting vantage 
point from which to view the funding body relationship with both the wider academic community 
and central Government, This dissertation seeks to inform not only the author's professional 
practice but also to inform debate within the Executive of the HEFCE on the present and 
prospective role of the Council. The research is prompted by the author's personal and 
professional interest in the role of the funding body. It is the author's knowledge of the key 
participants in, and documentation on, higher education that is arguably one of the strengths of 
this dissertation. 
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Is the author'too close to the action' to take an impartial and objective view of the topic under 
research? The author has been a participant in higher education policy making in the past 
15 years but could not for the purposes of this research be described as a participant observer as 
he has'not undertaken any systematic recorded observations of his life in higher education either 
within the Department for Education or in the UGC, UFC and HEFCE. However, the author's 
participation in higher education as a public servant will inevitably have shaped his interpretation 
of events. The author has sought throughout this research to maximise his objectivity by basing 
any conclusions or judgements exclusively on the evidence that is in the public domain. 
The author has not made a secret of the fact within the HEFCE or elsewhere that he is 
undertaking this research. This open approach has, as a result, provided many opportunities for 
the author to discuss on an informal basis the issues raised in the research with colleagues within 
the HEFCE, and more widely within higher education. From an ethical perspective, the author has 
reflected on the danger that an employee of the HEFCE might be Viewed as the author of a 
hagiography about the role of the Council and has therefore sought to be as objective as possible 
in his selection of research material, and the conclusions he draws from that material. 
Organisation of the research 
This dissertation is composed of six chapters. The first chapter describes: the aim of the study 
and the research questions; framework for the research; research methodology; the product of 
the research; the limitations to the research and ethical issues; and the organisation of the 
research. Chapter two provides a review of the academic literature covering the relationship 
between the state and higher education, and the changing role of the funding body in that 
relationship. Chapters three, four, and five provide case histories on the role of the UGC, UFC 
and HEFCE. Chapter six provides a discussion of the findings of the research in relation to the 
research questions; offers the author's perspective on the contemporary and prospective role of 
the HEFCE; relates Berdahl's (1959) five tests for university autonomy to the contemporary role 
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of the HEFCE and its relationship with the higher education institutions; and, finally suggests 
some areas for further research. 
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Chapter Two 
A Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
In the past 44 years there have been a number of key texts which have reviewed the relationship 
between the state and higher education in England. The purpose of this chapter is to review 
these key texts, drawing out the main themes and ideas as a way of informing the aims of the 
dissertation, the research questions, and framework for the research. 
The literature review has a focus on the texts which analyse specifically the relationship between 
two key organizations within the state apparatus for the strategic management and funding of 
higher education - the Department for Education, and the funding body for higher education 
(UGC, UFC and the HEFCE); the impact of that relationship on the changing role of the funding 
body; and, the consequences for the funding and management of the higher education sector. 
This approach has been taken for two reasons: firstly, the central purpose of the dissertation is to 
focus on and review critically the changing role of the funding body; secondly, it is not possible 
within the scope and scale of this dissertation to review the wider literature on the changing role 
of the state in civil society, and specifically the role of the state both in relation to the development 
and decline of social democracy, and the funding and management of public services in England 
since 1945 (Codd, Gordon and Harker 1997; Dale 1989; Dale 1997; Hill 1997). 
The key themes are: 
0 The funding body as a benign organization (Berdahl 1959; Shinn 1986) 
The funding body as a safeguard for institutional autonomy and academic freedom (Robbins 
1963; Clark 1983; Carswell 1985; Neave 1988b; NCIHE 1997) 
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0 The funding body as a buffer organisation between the state and higher education (Berdahl 
1959; Shinn 1986; Shattock 1994) 
0 The economic ideology of education in support of increased state control over higher 
education (Salter and Tapper 1994) 
0 The changing role of the funding body from provider to regulator (Henkel and Little 1999; 
Henkel 2000; Kogan and Hanney 2000; Kogan et al 2000; Scott 2001; Delanty 2001; Deem 
2002) 
0 The changing role of the state from facilitator to interventionist (Neave 1988a; Neave 1988b; 
Neave and Van Vught 1991; Neave and Van Vught 1994; Neave 1998). 
The funding body as a benign organisation 
Shinn's historical analysis (1986) of the role of the UGC in the period 1919-1946 is based on a 
literature review of a range of primary material which includes: UGC papers; documents from the 
archives of a number of universities; Parliamentary; and, Government publications. Shinn's study 
describes how Treasury grants were distributed to universities in England from 1889 to 1919 
through a series of ad hoc Government committees and argues that it was the catalyst of the First 
World War (1914-18), and the recognition of the importance of the university sector to the 
economic development of the nation, that prompted the formal creation of a funding body to 
allocate state funding on a systematic basis to universities. Shinn argues that the UGC was 
created by the Government in 1919 as a funding body to separate state funding from state 
control. For Shinn the UGC operated Janus like, listening to both the Government and the sector 
in the process of the creation and development of a university system in England. Shinn 
describes the arrangement: 
'Between the two, as the key component, buffer, catalyst, crutch or channel, came the UGC to 
amass information, to disburse monies, to make one party acceptable to the other, to impose an 
objective and informed layer between politician and academic, central Government and local 
community, the state and the individual ... The interface between Government and the UGC was 
vital to success since it involved the transmission of Government views to the universities and 
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university needs to the Government ... the UGCs position of strength was 
founded in part on the 
volume and the objectivity of the data it carried' (Shinn, 1986, pages 59,280 and 283). 
Berdahl's (1959) historical approach to the study of the British universities and the state is based 
on an analysis of the papers of the UGC and Government. Berdahl reviews the issue of the 
delicate balance between the role of the state as the national provider of public funding and the 
independent role of universities as they exercise their right to academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy. The crucial issue for Berdahl is 'to distinguish between universities being influenced 
and their being determined by outside considerations' (Berdahl 1959, page 6). 
Berdahl uses five tests for institutional autonomy. He argues that autonomy exists where the 
governing bodies of universities have control over the following functions: 
'The admission and examination of students 
The curricula for courses of study 
The appointment and tenure of office of the academic staff 
The allocation of income among different categories of expenditure 
The final authority in determining the proper subjects of research' (Berdahl 1959, page 162). 
Berdahl's (1959) analysis of the state and higher education relationship tested against these five 
areas of activity concludes that as a general principle the state did not, in the period up to the late 
1950s, seek to influence or control the universities in any of these five areas of activity. For 
Berdahl the role of the UGC was to reconcile the twin forces of national planning and university 
autonomy and any natural tendency of the universities to act solely in their own interests or to 
soften or slow the pace of change would be mitigated by the catalytic effect of the UGC as both a 
stimulating and mediating influence. The overall tone and mood of Berdahl's analysis is to portray 
the UGC as a benign agency that managed the development of a university system in a way that 
suited both the Government and the universities. 
Both Shinn's (1986) and Berdahl's (1959) analysis reflects the growth of a system of higher 
education in Great Britain that is defined by the autonomy of the universities, independence of the 
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The funding body as a safeguard for institutional autonomy and academic freedom 
The Robbins Report (Robbins, 1963) abuts the period described by Berdahl (1959). Robbins 
commented on the machinery of Government appropriate for a national system of higher 
education consistent with the need for institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Robbins 
takes a similar view to Berdahl (1959) arguing that notwithstanding the increased funding from 
the State over the 20th century, the Government had not interfered with the internal affairs of the 
universities. Robbins accepted that individual universities would be unlikely to locate their mission 
and ethos in relation to national needs and priorities and therefore it was reasonable that 
Governments should seek to exert pressure to effect change in the national interest. Robbins 
believed that this process of ensuring that the universities took account of the needs of 
Government could be managed, with the mechanism of the funding body, within a process of 
discussion and persuasion. For Robbins one of the key safeguards for institutional autonomy and 
academic freedom was the creation of the UGC: 
'... the device of interposing between the Government and institutions a committee of persons 
selected for their knowledge and standing and not for their political affiliation. In this way it is 
possible to ensure that the measures of co-ordination and allocation that are necessary are 
insulated from inappropriate political influences ... The 
Government is thus advised by a body 
which, though appointed by the Government, is independent of ministerial and departmental 
control and is composed chiefly of persons with an intimate knowledge of university life and its 
conventions' (Robbins 1963, pages 235-6). 
A similar view was taken in the next Government sponsored review of higher education in the late 
1990s. The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education chaired by Lord Dearing (NCIHE 
1997), commenting on the relationship between higher education institutions and Government 
concluded: 
We are wholly convinced and firmly commend to the Government that there should continue to 
be an arm's length relationship between Government ... and the higher education system, so as to 
assure the autonomy of institutions within a broad framework of public policy ... we conclude that there should continue to be intermediary bodies, such as the present Funding Councils'. 
(NCIHE 1997, page 349). 
30 
Carswell's (1985) study of the relationship between the Government and the universities in the 
period 1960-1980 is written from the perspective of a former senior civil servant who worked on 
university funding within the Treasury, then as an official within the Department for Education and 
Science, and at the end of his career as Secretary to the UGC. His historical analysis is based on 
a review of Government and UGC documents, as well as his own personal experience of life in 
Whitehall. Carswell describes the UGC as a mediator between the Government and the 
universities. He accepts that it is the legitimate role of the Government to set the macro-level 
policy in relation to the planning and funding of higher education but it is then for the UGC, as an 
honest broker, to manage the process of allocating grants to individual universities and colleges. 
Carswell's (1985) overall assessment is that at the time he left the UGC in the late 1970s there 
was little evidence to support the argument that Government action had encroached significantly 
on institutional autonomy and academic freedom. The exception was the Government's decision 
to cut the subsidy to universities for the overseas student fee in 1964-65. Traditionally, it had 
been for the universities to set the fee rate for home and overseas students. This was the single 
instance for Carswell of Government action in breach of university autonomy. 
In his comparison of national systems of higher education, Clark (1983) argues that in those 
circumstances where higher education is viewed as a private arrangement between the university 
and the student then it is possible to make the case to remove the influence of the Government. 
However, he argues that it is inevitable that where higher education is defined as a public good 
through public financing then the Government will have a larger voice in determining the purpose 
and structure of higher education. Clark's argument is that if you have a system of major public 
funding for higher education then the best mechanism for managing such a national system of 
higher education is to have a buffer body such as the UGC. Clark's observation on Britain was 
that the universities had discovered a formula for taking funding from the state without taking 
orders from the state. 
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Clark's view of the UGC is that: 
'Equally important is the buffering of control provided by intermediary bodies ... In its golden age (1920-1965), the British University Grants Committee came close to the ideal ... Holding intermediate powers between the university people and Government officials, the UGC clearly 
protected one from the other. There were many informal features of trust and friendship, and 
common background among political, administrative and academic elites, that helped make the 
committee work as well as it once did. But it is the form, the primary structure itself, that has been 
the most important invention in twentieth-century higher education in buffering central control by 
intermediate bodies' (Clark 1983, page 268). 
Neave's (1988b) historical analyses of models of university autonomy across Europe, identifies 
university autonomy in Britain as being identified with a model of institutional independence 
based on the legal independence from the state as well as self-government and self-regulation. 
He argues that the relationship between the state and higher education developed within a 
framework in which the facilitatory state provided funding for the purposes of the universities and 
within this model, the UGC acted as the buffer body that managed funding allocations within a 
'zone of negotiation' between the state and the higher education sector. The key point for Neave 
is that the universities, through the machinery of the UGC, controlled the 'zone of negotiation'. 
Neave argues that with the movement in Britain to mass higher education, the state started a 
process of redefining the boundaries between the state and higher education: the facilitatory state 
precedes the evaluative state which in turn transforms into the interventionist state. Neave argues 
th at: 
'... the type of 'public service' that the universities were expected to perform was no longer subject 
to negotiation, It had been set down in Government statements of priority ... In the case of 
national priorities it was non-negotiable ... What has happened since 1981 is a massive reversal 
in 
the purpose of the zone of negotiation. Instead of being an extension of the university into central 
government, it has become a 'zone of penetration' of central government into the university 
world... ' (Neave 1988b, pages 44 and 45). 
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The funding body as a buffer organisation between the state and higher education 
Shattock's (1994) analysis of the role of the UGC in the management of British Universities is 
informed by his knowledge of the higher education system viewed from his vantage point as a 
former Registrar at the University of Warwick, and his role as an adviser to the UGC. 
Shattock's (1994) historical account of the role of the UGC in higher education in Britain in the 
period 1919 to 1989 uses as primary material the papers of the UGC, and Government 
documents relating to higher education over this period. Shattock's argument is that the UGC 
went through a number of phases over its lifetime (1919 to 1989). Shattock views the UGC as a 
'buffer organisation' in the period 1919-1963 with the UGC managing an elite system of higher 
education with a broad measure of support from the universities and the Government. He argues 
that the UGC reacted to pressures whether from the Government or universities and it had no 
imposed or self-generated role as a policy making body. For Shattock the next stage in the life of 
the UGC is marked by the period 1963-1979 covering the post-Robbins period until the election of 
the Conservative Government in 1979. Shattock views the UGC as moving from a 'buffer' 
organisation or'shock absorber' to having a more strategic and planning role in higher education 
as a consequence of the growth in public expenditure on higher education. Shattock views the 
UGC as moving from being a relatively passive organisation or reactive body to one with a role in 
the planning of the higher education system. It is Shattock's argument that the failure of the UGC 
to build on the momentum of its initial role in shaping the future policy direction of higher 
education led ultimately to its demise in 1989. 
Shattock (1994) argues that in the period 1979-1983 the UGC to some extent regained the 
initiative as it took responsibility for managing the funding cuts imposed by the Conservative 
Government in the early 1980s on higher education as the Government implemented a general 
policy of cutting back on public expenditure. Shattock argues that the incremental and stable 
approach to funding was simply no longer sustainable in the 1980s and the UGC was forced to 
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make hard choices between individual universities. For Shattock, it was the severity of the cut in 
1981 to the UGC grant that thrust the UGC irrevocably into the political spotlight. The tension 
between the Government and the UGC is summarised by Shattock: 
'... Government did not want a UGC that that would be assertive about the universities' financial 
needs; it believed that it was Government's job to define national needs; and it did not want a 
UGC that claimed it was not 'the servant of Government' or one that would 'guide and encourage' 
universities to change. It wanted a new body that would be legally separate from Government but 
strictly accountable to it, a body that would use funding mechanisms much more decisively than 
in the past to ensure that the changes that Government wished to see took place' (Shattock 1994, 
page 140). 
The analysis of the role of the UGC by Berdahl (1959), Shinn (1986), and Shattock (1994) 
presents us with an image of the UGC as a buffer organisation between the state and higher 
education. In a sense there is a contradiction in this image: the UGC was always a part of the 
state apparatus for funding higher education; the UGC was funded entirely by the Government; 
and, the staff of the UGC were civil servants. But the important point is that the UGC viewed itself 
as independent and owned by neither Government nor the higher education institutions. Shattock 
(1994) argues that the independence of the UGC started to break down with the arrival of the 
Conservative Government of 1979 which engaged in a strategy of reducing public funding for 
higher education (Kogan and Kogan 1983) and used the UGC as an instrument for the 
implementation of Government policy. Shattock (1994) argues that there is a sea change in the 
role of the UGC from the early 1980s onwards as the funding body was viewed more 
transparently as a part of the state apparatus for the funding and management of higher 
education. 
The economic ideology of education in support of increased state control over higher 
education 
Salter and Tapper's (1994) study of the relationship between the state and higher education is 
based on their analysis of a range of primary material including publications from Government, 
Parliament, and the funding bodies. Salter and Tapper's analysis of change in higher education is 
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guided by their theory of educational change which seeks to understand change in the context of 
'... the ideological struggle between the economic view of higher education and the traditional 
liberal view of the role of the university' (Salter and Tapper 1994, page X). 
Salter and Tapper (1994) argue that the combined impact of the Education Reform Act 1988 and 
Further and Higher Education Act 1992 has changed irrevocably the relationship between higher 
education institutions and the state, with state pressure, through the medium of the funding body, 
becoming an inevitability. Salter and Tapper argue that in order for the state to be able to 
exercise control over the universities it had to take control of the 'economic ideology of 
education'. They argue that education is promoted by the Government as an economic resource 
that has to be managed in the national interest, and the state, therefore, has a right to ensure that 
education has as its primary objective the improvement of the country's economic performance. 
They argue that once the 'economic ideology' argument had been established, the state used this 
foothold as the justification for an expansion of bureaucratic power. Salter and Tapper's (1994) 
analysis views the last two decades of the 20th Century as one of increasing state control over the 
funding, planning and management of higher education. Salter and Tapper structure the state 
and higher education relationship hierarchically arguing that: 
'There are thus three levels to the current relationship between the state and the universities: the 
parameters which are under the control of the state, the management of those parameters (which 
includes translating them into precise operational procedures) as carried out by the funding 
bodies, and the autonomy of the individual universities which is exercised within the framework of 
the above two levels of control' (Salter and Tapper 1994, page 202). 
For Salter and Tapper (1994) the UGC had to be replaced because the desire of the Government 
to manage and control higher education meant it needed a stronger base on which to exercise its 
authority. They argue that the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, which created a unified 
system of funding for higher education in England through the HEFCE, provided the platform for 
the apparatus of the state (Government and HEFCE) to exercise increased control over the 
universities and colleges of higher education. Salter and Tapper have little to say about the role of 
the UFC other than commenting briefly that as it existed for such a relatively short time it was 
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difficult to make a definitive judgement about its role although there was some evidence that it 
was actually unsuccessful in imposing its will on the higher education sector. It is the assumption 
of the author of this dissertation that Salter and Tapper had in mind the failed attempt by the UFC 
to introduce a market mechanism into the teaching funding exercise for the period 1991-92 to 
1994-95. This important issue is covered in detail in chapter four of this dissertation. 
An argument that is not prominent in Salter and Tapper's (1994) analysis but arguably of 
relevance is the proposition that the state could have justified its pressure on higher education 
through the argument that in a situation of escalating public funding for higher education since the 
1970s, the state had the democratic right and responsibility to decide on the most effective and 
efficient use of public funds. Therefore, state funding on education generally, and on higher 
education in particular, becomes simply a matter of political and budgetary judgment rather than 
an ideological position adopted by politicians. 
The changing role of the funding body from provider to regulator 
The changing role of the funding body from provider to regulator is analysed within the research 
on the changing relationship between the state and higher education by Henkel and Little (1999), 
Henkel (2000), Kogan and Hanney (2000), Kogan et al (2000), Scoft (2001), Delanty (2001), and 
Deem (2002). 
Henkel and Little (1999) argue that through a combination of ideological and economic forces 
there has been a collective movement across the world which has resulted in a significant change 
in the relationship between the state and higher education institutions since the early 1970s. 
Henkel and Little describe the relationship between higher education and the state as changing 
from one of an 'exchange relationship' to one of 'sponsorship-dependency'. 
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Henkel and Little (1999) locate change in higher education as driven by political and economic 
forces: the political is driven by the democratic imperative, and the forces of social demand and 
social aspiration; the economic recognises higher education as a tool of investment for the state 
and individuals. Henkel and Little argue that within a knowledge society, the production and 
transmission of knowledge generates considerable power and influence and therefore the state is 
forced to manage to a far greater extent its relationship with the universities as knowledge 
producers, Although Henkel and Little argue that the power relationship between the state and 
higher education has changed over the past quarter of a century, the authors recognise that 
academics still have considerable influence over the way the state seeks to manage higher 
education through, for example, both the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and Teaching 
Quality Assessment (TQA) exercise which are managed through a process of peer review within 
which academics review and assess the performance of other academics. 
Henkel's. (2000) study of policy change in higher education has a focus on '... the implications of 
policy changes for academics, their values, agendas and self-perceptions, in other words for, their 
academic identities' (Henkel 2000, page 9). Henkel's research is in part reliant for its empirical 
base on the interviews conducted by Kogan and Hanney (2000) but based substantially on the 
extensive fieldwork by the author including 327 interviews in 11 higher education institutions and 
7 subject areas. Henkel identifies the 'massification' of higher education as the single greatest 
driver for change in the state and higher education relationship. Henkel cites Martin Trow's 
categorisation of educational systems, within which a mass higher education system is defined by 
an annual participation rate (APR) of between 15% and 33%, and universal higher education at 
between 33% and 40%. If we use Trow's taxonomy of elite-mass-universal higher education, 
then by this definition we have already reached, at 43% in 2003 in England, universal higher 
education in England (Trow 1970; WES 2003b). Henkel argues that in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s there was a reconceptualisation of the relationship between the state and 
the market as the Government wanted to reduce overall public funding for the higher education 
sector and introduce some measure of market forces into the system. Henkel argues that to some 
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extent this was achieved by the introduction of performance indicators in the form of the RAE and 
TQA which would inform student choice. Henkel's conclusion is that since the early 1980s we 
have seen radical changes in the relationship between the state and higher education supported 
by changes in the legal framework, and the management of the higher education system at the 
macro level by the Government or its agencies, in particular the funding body. Henkel concludes 
that: 
'In the terms of Clark's (1983) triangle of co-ordinating influences, it had been pulled towards the 
state and the market, and away from the academic profession. A major shift had occurred in the 
exchange relationship between higher education and the state. The state had asserted its power 
as the paymaster. Government not only took command of the externalist arena of higher 
education policy but also asserted its right to intervene in the values and regulation of the 
internalist arena ... by the mid-1990s it had established a framework of law, regulation, incentives, 
rewards and sanctions within which higher education institutions were to operate ... Traditional 
academic values now had to compete with a multitude of values and objectives - economy, 
efficiency, utility, public accountability, enterprise and various definitions of quality'. 
(Henkel 2000, page 47). 
The analysis by Henkel (2000) and by Kogan and Hanney (2000) is informed by just under 400 
interviews of past and present informants from the world of central Government (Ministers and 
civil servants), the funding bodies, and the higher education sector. The interview data is 
annonymised in the text of both books and their analysis is supported through a review and 
interpretation of primary material including Government and funding body documents. 
Kogan and Hanney (2000) define the role that universities play within the wider state apparatus. 
They suggest that there are many organisations that are funded by the state and each has a 
particular relationship with the state because of the nature of the funding relationship. They argue 
that in the case of some institutions such as the army and police we would expect to see a close 
relationship between the ideas and wishes of the state, as represented by the Government, while 
in other cases such as the academic sector and the judiciary we see a different relationship 
through which these two groups have a large measure of independence within a democratic 
state. Kogan and Hanney argue that the unique relationship between the state and higher 
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education flows from the role of universities as knowledge creators and knowledge 
communicators and unless this role is undertaken by academics without undue restriction then 
the very essence of the collegiate nature of higher education will be lost and ultimately the state 
as well as higher education will be the loser. 
Kogan and Hanney (2000) argue that there has been an increasing tendency for the state to seek 
to exercise control over the externalities of higher education and examples of this include the 
development of the evaluative state through which universities are held accountable for the 
quality of their teaching (TQA) and research (RAE). They argue that the evaluative state is linked 
to the growth of a new public management of the public sector in which the universities receive 
public funding against the production of specified targets such as increased student numbers. 
Kogan and Hanney's (2000) analysis supports the argument that since the early 1980s higher 
education has been increasingly subject to state control through the Government, and its agent 
the funding body, with higher education institutions shifting from a position of autonomy and 
freedom to one of accountability and regulation. A particular strength of the analysis by Kogan 
and Hanney (2000) is the colour they bring to the changing world of higher education through the 
use of interviews. This is particularly illuminating in respect of the role of the UFC and the tension 
in the relationship between Lord Chilver and Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, and the potential this 
provided for the DES assessor John Vereker (now Sir John Vereker) to influence the policy 
making process of the UFC (Kogan and Hanney 2000, page 169). 
In their comparative study of higher education in England, Norway and Sweden, Kogan et al 
(2000) describe the system of higher education in England as being managed by two forces, 
each acting as tectonic plates that rub up against each other to create friction and energy, They 
argue that on the one hand there is the central-policy making of the Government and funding 
bodies, and on the other the universities and colleges which control the internal structures of 
higher education having clear responsibility for the award of degrees and appointments to 
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academic posts. Kogan et al locate change in the English system of higher education over the 
past quarter of a century within a framework that is bounded by: changes in ideology within the 
successive Conservative Governments of the 1970s and 1980s; the impact of an increase in 
student numbers over this period with the consequent funding implications for the Government; 
the drive for accountability and new public management promoted by the Conservative 
Governments; and, the decline in the autonomy and overarching authority of the higher education 
sector to manage, control and direct the higher education system. 
In the context of the contemporary role of the university in the knowledge society, Delanty (2001) 
argues that the state is becoming '... increasingly a regulatory agency and less exclusively a 
provider state... ' (Delanty 2001, page 8). This analysis chimes with the views of others (Salter 
and Tapper 1994; Henkel 2000; Kogan and Hanney 2000; Scott 2001; Deem 2002) who argue 
that the last two decades of the 20th century has seen an inexorable increase in the regulatory 
role of the state in the management and funding of higher education. 
Scott (2001) argues that institutional autonomy has been eroded by the imposition of increased 
accountability imposed by the Government through its agencies, in particular the HEFCE. 
Professor Scott writes from a particularly interesting vantage point as Vice-Chancellor of Kingston 
University, and as a member of the HEFCE Board of Council (2001-). Scott argues that higher 
education is increasingly managed and controlled by the HEFCE. Scott argues that the funding 
council controls the fee structure for undergraduate students and links funding to specia 
initiatives to ensure the delivery of political directives. Scott concludes that higher education 
institutions have become increasingly accountable to the agencies of the Government, with the 
HEFCE increasingly an instrument of the Government. 
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The changing role of the state from facilitator to interventionist 
In their publications on the relationship between the state and higher education, Neave and Van 
Vught (Neave 1988a; Neave 1988b; Neave and Van Vught 1991; Neave and Van Vught 1994; 
Neave 1998) argue that the role of the state in Western Europe has, since the 1960s, undergone 
a number of stages of progressive development from facilitator to evaluator to interventionist. 
They argue that this is an international phenomenon with different forms of Government action in 
different countries. They state that the facilitatory state reflects the commitment of the state to 
underwrite the full costs of higher education such as in the post-Robbins expansion of higher 
education in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Britain. In the context of Britain, and the 
development of a mass system of higher education, the authors conclude that the imposition of 
the evaluative state, stimulated through the combined impact of the Jarratt Report (CVCP 1985), 
Croham Committee (Croham 1987), and Education Reform Act 1988, facilitated the steering of 
higher education by the state through its agent, the funding body, to ensure compliance from the 
higher education sector, Neave and Van Vught argue that the funding body has become an 
instrument of state control as it evaluates the quality of research and teaching, and links the 
evaluation of research to funding at the level of the institution. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the key texts and ideas covering the relationship between the state 
and higher education, and the role of the funding body. It is the comprehensive nature of the 
primary material used by the authors, and the interview data provided in Henkel (2000) and 
Kogan and Hanney (2000), which forms the empirical authority for the arguments and conceptual 
frameworks advanced in the literature. 
There are many areas of common agreement within the literature in respect of the changing role 
of the funding body in the relationship between the state and higher education including the 
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arguments that: the role has changed in parallel with the growth of higher education in England; 
the growth in Government funding has operated alongside an increase in the interest of the state 
in the management and funding of higher education; in a global economy that is driven by the 
creation, exchange and dissemination of knowledge, the universities and colleges of higher 
education have become key institutions in the survival of the state; social inclusion and economic 
competitiveness have become key twin objectives for the state in the knowledge economy and 
knowledge society; and, higher education has become too important to be left exclusively to the 
higher education institutions with the consequence that higher education is increasingly, from the 
early 1980s onwards, managed and regulated by the state through the Department for Education, 
and by the agent of the Government, the funding body. 
It is argued in the literature that in a system of mass higher education, the role of the state 
develops from being exclusively a provider of funds to being both a provider and regulator for the 
higher education system in England in which the higher education insti. tutions are increasingly 
required to deliver against national priorities. The medium through which the Government 
translates its requirements of higher education is the funding body, an organisation that has 
developed from its traditional role as a buffer body and, as the literature suggests, is now 
arguably demonstrating the characteristics of a regulatory body for the higher education system. 
The funding body is therefore no longer exclusively a provider of funds but increasingly a 
regulator of higher education. 
Although there are references in the literature to the increasingly regulatory role of the state, as 
exercised by the Government and its agent, the HEFCE, there is no systematic attempt in the 
literature to describe and review the mechanisms by which this regulation takes place. If the role 
of the funding body is moving from being less exclusively a provider of funds for higher education 
and increasingly a regulator of the higher education system then we need to understand how this 
change has taken place. 
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The literature is strong on the role of the UGC (Shinn 1986 and Shattock 1994) but there is very 
little by way of parallel historical analysis on the changing roles of the UFC and HEFCE. The fact 
that so little attention is paid to the role of the UFC is a significant gap in our knowledge of the 
transition from the UGC to the HEFCE. Although the HEFCE has been in existence for just over a 
decade, there is also little in the literature by way of an analysis of the changing role of the 
HEFCE, and in particular the relationship between the HEFCE and the Department for Education 
and Skills. Therefore, there is a gap in our knowledge and understanding of the changing role of 
the funding body. 
The relationship between the HEFCE and the DfES is particularly important because it provides a 
key to understanding which part of the state apparatus for the funding and management of higher 
education has the dominant role. This has implications for the independence of the HEFCE in the 
relationship between the Government and higher education. Does the HEFCE have a distinctive 
and independent role through a mediation of the policies of the Government or might the 
contemporary role of the funding body be better described as less of a mediating and buffer body 
and more of a delivery unit for the Department for Education and Skills? 
This dissertation seeks to take forward the analysis of the state and higher education relationship 
in the context of the argument in the literature that the higher education sector has become less 
autonomous and increasingly accountable to the funding body. The funding body is perceived by 
many researchers (Salter and Tapper 1994; Henkel 2000; Kogan and Hanney 2000; Scott 2001) 
as an instrument of control within an evaluative and regulatory state and less as an independent 
provider of funding for the higher education sector. Why is it that the HEFCE (Newby 2003; 
Guardian 2003) and the Government (Clarke 2003) still advance in public the proposition that the 
HEFCE is an independent buffer body that is owned by neither the higher education sector nor 
the Government? Through a critical review of a wide range of primary material this dissertation 
seeks to provide a new insight to, and an understanding of, the space between the rhetoric and 
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the reality of the role of the funding body in the relationship between the state and higher 
education. 
The literature argues that the funding body was established by the Government for two purposes: 
firstly, to provide the mechanism for the allocation of state funds to universities and colleges of 
higher education; secondly, to keep the politics out of the allocation of funds to individual 
institutions to ensure institutional autonomy and academic freedom. The funding body was the 
buffer body between the Government and the institutions. In the past 25 years in England the 
Government has progressively exerted pressure on the higher education sector to deliver a mass 
higher education system. And the higher education sector has been by and large a willing partner 
in this compact as long as the additional funds were made available by Government to support 
the expansion. One of the key concerns of the higher education sector has been the intensity by 
which the Government drove down the unit of resource to bring higher education to a point of 
near financial collapse in the late 1990s (NCIHE 1997). 
In the context of increasing state pressure, the literature argues that the facilitatory state has 
metamorphosed into the evaluative state which in turn has transformed into the interventionist 
state. In parallel, the funding body has metamorphosed from being exclusively a provider of funds 
to being both a provider and regulator. 
The proposition in the literature that the role of the funding body has developed from provider to 
regulator is not developed in the literature. Therefore, there is an opportunity, through a critical 
review of the roles of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE to explore the argument that the role of the 
funding body has changed from being exclusively a provider of funds to being a regulator of the 
public funding for higher education. 
The next chapter provides a critical review of the UGC in the first of three case histories of the 
role of the funding body for higher education. 
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Chapter Three 
The role of the University Grants Committee (1919-1989) 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the role of the first funding body for higher education, the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) and seeks to answer the question why it was that by the late 1980s the UGC 
was considered by its last Chairman, Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer to be so '... out of keeping with 
the spirit of the age' (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991, page 226). After all, the UGC was a model 'widely 
admired abroad, and copied in other Commonwealth countries' (Croham 1987, page 20, para 
3.3). And yet after 70 years of service to the higher education community it disappeared with very 
little resistance. How did the UGC manage its role as the 'buffer' between the state and higher 
education institutions? 
The UGC was conceived in a minute in 1919 and lasted seventy years. The UGC was 
established by the administrative convenience of a Treasury Minute on 14 July 1919. A Treasury 
'Minute' is a rather formal term for what is known in the lexicon of Whitehall as a memorandum. 
With the establishment of the Universities Funding Council (UFC) in 1989 under the Education 
Reform Act 1988, the UGC passed into history as part of the administrative machinery for 
managing the payment of grants from Government to higher education institutions in Britain. The 
formal minute of 21 June 1989 was signed by Kenneth Baker as the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science and reads: 
'Sections 131 and 134 of the Education Reform Act 1988 provided for the establishment of a new 
Universities Funding Council to succeed the University Grants Committee established by the 
Treasury Minute of 14 July 1919. The Universities Funding Council was established on 
1 November 1988 and took over full funding responsibilities from the Committee on 1 April 1989. 
Accordingly, the terms of office of the last members of the Committee expired on 31 March 1989 
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but, to provide for the ordedy winding up of the Committee's affairs, the Secretariat will continue in existence until 14 July 1989' (UGC 1990b, page 8). 
The UGC was wound up on 14 July 1989 some 200 years after the fall of the Bastille in France. 
The coincidence of timing was viewed by the Committee's last Chairman, Sir Peter Swinnerton- 
Dyer, as a symbolic gesture by the Conservative Government. In August 1989 a workman arrived 
at the UGC to take down the pictures of the ten former Chairmen of the UGC that lined the 
corridor to the UGC boardroom. 
UGC 1919 - 1945 
What were the key features of the UGC in the period 1919-1945? It was essentially a funding 
body established by Government to distribute grant to institutions. Although the Government 
controlled the membership of the Committee, its members were drawn primarily from the higher 
education sector. Shattock (1994) describes the early role of the UGC as essentially 'reactive' to 
the demands from universities and colleges. From its inception, the UGC was acquiring an 
unrivalled knowledge of the funding of higher education in Britain. The authority this gave to a 
Government funded organisation should not be underplayed in any assessment of the role of the 
UGC or its successor bodies. 
The fact that responsibility for the UGC lay initially with the Treasury provided two sources of 
comfort for the fledgling UGC: firstly, the Treasury was the key department in the allocation of 
resources throughout Whitehall; secondly, the Treasury had no specific expertise to offer in the 
field of higher education and therefore the UGC could hold the primary and unchallenged position 
as the lead body of opinion and expertise on the university system. 
In the inter-war period (1919-45) the early period in the life of the UGC is often associated with 
Berdahl's (1959) description of the UGC as a 'benign' organisation that played an important role 
in the development of the university system but a role limited in scope and ambition. Shinn's 
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(1986) study of the UGC reflects an organisation that did not believe it had a role to define the 
activities of the institutions it supported through its funding. 
It is often remarked in many facets of life that organisations or systems define themselves or are 
defined by others. The universities defined themselves through their traditions of academic 
independence and institutional autonomy. The UGC established itself as an enabling organisation 
that supported rather than planned the activities and direction of the universities and colleges. 
And this is an important distinction. The fact that the UGC allocated Government funding did not 
lead the UGC to move to the conclusion that it had the right or responsibility to manage the higher 
education sector. 
UGC 1945-1963 
We see in the immediate post-1 945 period a more pronounced coming together of two very 
powerful forces in higher education, the UGC and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP), with a common purpose of working in partnership to persuade the 
Government that the higher education sector needed ever-increasing amounts of public funds to 
maintain the quality of research, and to support the growth in student numbers. It is important to 
explore this concept of partnership (Shattock, 1994). In many respects it was a partnership of 
convenience between two organisations, the UGC and the CVCP, which had a common purpose 
and agenda notwithstanding the separate and distinct functions of each organisation. Both 
organisations were concerned with extracting as much money as possible from the Government 
for higher education: the former because it believed the universities needed adequate funding to 
maintain quality and growth; and, the latter because it was the representative body (pressure 
group) for the university sector. Within these arrangements, the UGC operated as the 'critical 
friend' to both the Government and the universities. 
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Within the framework of a post-war consensus, the UGC did not need to play the role of mediator 
between the Government and the university sector. There was nothing to mediate: the 
Government was willing, within the constraints of the budgetary process, to provide ever 
increasing funding to the universities (Shattock 1994). 
In the post 1945 mood of growth in the welfare state and development of the higher education 
sector, the Government wanted the UGC to play a more active role in identifying the future needs 
of the university sector. The Government needed advice from the UGC to ensure a congruence 
between 'national needs' and the capacity of the universities to meet the needs of the state. The 
role of the UGC in this period is summarised by Berdahl (1959) when he writes of the triple role of 
the UGC in ensuring university autonomy, supporting national planning, and ensuring the probity 
of public funds. 
The UGC operated as an intermediary between the Government and the universities. It was able 
to explain the needs of the sector to the Government while at the same time pulling off the trick of 
keeping the universities content with the annual allocation of grant. It had the respect of both 
sides of the equation. But perhaps more importantly, neither the Government nor the universities 
had a better way of allocating public funds to higher education. If the UGC had not existed then it 
would have had to be invented by the Government. 
There are a number of turning points in the history of the development of higher education in 
Britain. The creation of the UGC after the First World War (1914-18) linked the imperative of 
using the intellectual resources of the universities to support the development of the economy. 
The higher education system took another step change forward after the Second World War 
(1939-45) with the growth in student numbers linked to the development of the welfare state and 
widening of the social base of students having the opportunity to participate in higher education. 
Another key turning point was the Robbins Report published in 1963. The UGC had the 
responsibility to work with the university sector to deliver the growth in student numbers 
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recommended by Robbins. The Robbins Committee estimated that there were 216,000 students 
in full-time higher education in Great Britain in 1962/63 and recommended that the Government 
should fund 390,000 in 1973/74 and 560,000 in 1980/81 (Robbins 1963, page 277). 
UGC 1963-1979 
The Robbins recommendations represented a considerable challenge for the Government, the 
UGC, and higher education institutions. The UGC Chairman at the time (Sir John Wolfenden, 
1963-1968) writing in 1970 described the period as follows: 
'Over recent years the UGC has gradually but visibly moved from being a buffer to becoming a 
strategist ... If through ... dramatic and rapid changes the former relationship between Government and the universities was to endure, if, that is, there was not allowed to develop a 
direct control by the Government of the activities of the universities, then the passive buffer must 
come to life and undertake some positive and planning initiatives' (Shattock 1994, page 5). 
The impact of the Robbins Report on growth in higher education brought with it a change in the 
constitutional arrangements for the management of the UGC within Whitehall. Since 1919 the 
UGC had reported directly to Treasury Ministers and officials. On 6 February 1964, the Whitehall 
responsibility for the UGC was transferred to the newly created Department for Education and 
Science (DES). The UGC and the university sector therefore came squarely within the ambit of 
educational policy-making with university funding having to fight its corner against all other parts 
of the educational system. 
Even in the midst of step change growth in higher education in the 1960s the UGC still did not 
see itself as a 'manager' of the university system. In the UGC review of university development in 
the period 1962-1967, the UGC reflected on the arguments for and against having full or part-time 
members on its governing Committee and concluded that: 
'... the concept of full-time membership implies a degree of 'management' of the universities 
which would fundamentally alter the relationship between them and the State and the functions of 
the Committee itself (UGC 1968a, page 4). 
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This same report (UGC 1968a) reflects the very close relationship between the UGC and'DES. 
The UGC officials had regular meetings with the senior civil servants at the Department. And the 
DES had an assessor at all of the main UGC Committee meetings. However, the Croham Review 
(Croham 1987) of the UGC pointed out that the role of the assessor from the Department for 
Education was constrained as they were excluded from some crucial parts of the UGC business: 
'... because the placing of items of business on the closed agenda denied them access to the 
accompanying papers, they were less well informed than they should be. Exclusion is confined to 
two main areas of business: the preparation of advice to the Secretary of State, where the 
purpose is both to avoid inhibiting discussion within the Committee and to demonstrate to the 
universities an independence from Government interference or pressure, and the affairs of 
individual institutions, again to safeguard the UGC's independence of action' 
(Croham 1987, page 23). 
In its publication on university development in the period 1962-67, the UGC emphasised its 
independence by posing the rhetorical question, 'Whose side is the University Grants Committee 
on? 'And the UGC responded: 
'We are not on any'side'. We are concerned to ensure that a vigorous and creative university life 
prospers in this country without interference from the Government of the day and at the same 
time to ensure that the tax paying community, represented by Parliament and the Government, 
gets a proper return for its money in this field of considerable expenditure. Nobody supposes - 
certainly we do not - that these twin tasks are easy to perform. But we do believe that these two 
objectives represent our role and function, and we expect that the years will see our successors 
develop them further in accordance with the Committee's history of organic evolutionary 
development' (UGC 1968b, page 192). 
From 1964 onwards the UGC came within the ambit of the newly created DES. It is arguable that 
this change was of greater concern to the universities than the UGC. The former had become 
used to having the Treasury determine the budget for the university sector and were concerned 
that bringing the university demands alongside those of, for example, the schools sector could 
ultimately be to the disadvantage of higher education. In its commentary on university 
development over the period 1967-1972, the UGC was quick to downplay such fears arguing that 
the DES was well placed to argue for its own budget within Whitehall. The language of the 
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periodic UGC commentaries on university development (UGC 1968a and UGC 1974) reflect the 
tone of the relationship between the UGC and the Government. When commenting on the 
decision of the Government to set firm targets for student numbers, not only in aggregate but also 
between arts and science subjects and between undergraduates and postgraduates, the UGC 
reported: 
'But while we should not necessarily agree with, and must occasionally regret, Government 
decisions on these matters we should not claim that they are matters outside the Government's 
proper competence' (UGC 1974, page 52). 
Following the publication and implementation of the Robbins Report (1963) the UGC was drawn 
into a planning framework to ensure that growth was managed actively in the creation of the new 
universities. Shattock (1994) has argued that one of the failures of the UGC in the period 1963 to 
1979 is that it took a very narrow view of the role of the universities and university education. It 
failed to link the development of the university sector with the changing needs of the economy 
and society. The consequence was: 
'Moreover, by not encouraging attempts to break out of the traditional university model, it left the 
whole system vulnerable to changes in the political climate and to the charge that it was no longer 
in tune with the needs of the times. It may be argued that the UGC was in no position to initiate 
policy when a policy vacuum towards higher education existed in Government itself. The fact 
remains that despite calls for more positive approaches in the immediate post-war period, the 
UGC remained a largely reactive body preferring the system to be tidy rather than innovative'. 
(Shattock 1994, pages 11/12). 
Following the publication of the Government's White Paper in 1972 -'Education: A Framework 
for Expansion' (HMSO 1972) the UGC provided the universities with the grant allocation for the 
period 1972-1977. In making the allocations, the UGC accepted that the level of resources 
represented a real cut of 2% for the university sector. In the publication on university development 
for the period 1974-75 the UGC decided to go public on: 
,... a general account of the university system as we have found it during an eventful year in which 
many difficulties have had to be faced ... 
In periods of economic stringency priorities change and 
the balance may perforce shift from the optimum. We consider it appropriate to state at the outset 
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of this Annual Survey that this balance may become so far displaced as to be permanently 
damaged and preclude return to full symbiosis when circumstances permit' (UGC 1976, page 4). 
The UGC used its annual review of higher education for 1974-75 (UGC 1976) to explain publicly 
that it did not wish to be seen as the overlord of the university sector with universities subordinate 
to the UGC. The impact of inflation over the period 1973-75 had imposed considerable 
economies on the university sector. The UGC did not believe that it was possible to maintain 
academic standards in the face of inflation running at nearly 30%. A continued campaign of 
economy in the university sector had the consequence of posts being frozen and the prospect of 
insolvency for some institutions. The impact on universities was sudden and drastic. The UGC 
reported low morale which would not serve the country well in a situation in which the 
Government was looking to the university sector to deliver national needs through economic 
growth and social mobility. 
No longer able to meet emergency funding from its reserves, the UGC found itself unable to 
support the development needs of the university sector. The sector inevitably looked to the UGC 
for support but the UGC found itself unable to respond through lack of funding from the 
Government. Within its annual reports for the mid to late 1970s the UGC speaks with two voices: 
as a servant of the Government and as a passionate and committed supporter of the university 
system. By the mid-1970s the system of planning university funding some five years in advance 
had effectively collapsed. Annual financing and short-term decision making was now the mode of 
operation for the UGC. Inflation effectively cut the unit of funding per student and the UGC 
acknowledged that it was forced to accept the 'justified grievance' of university staff (UGC 1976 
and UGC 1977). 
The mid-1 970s marked a downturn in the fortunes of the university sector flowing from the 
previous three decades of continuous growth. In recognising the seriousness of the situation the 
UGC commented: 
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'Universities are conscious now not only of difficult but of novel problems which cannot be solved 
by improvisation. At the same time the financial system which permitted and encouraged forward 
planning has been seriously damaged by successive short-term decisions related to changing 
national pressures. As a result there is a deep and damaging sense of uncertainty which can only 
be removed by the restoration of a longer planning horizon' (UGC 1977, page 9). 
For the UGC, and the university sector, the period from the mid-1970s onwards was one of 
sudden change and shock. No longer were the universities protected from the ravages of inflation 
or cutbacks in public expenditure. It was as much a shock to the universities as the UGC. The 
UGC did not wish to preside over a system that was declining in terms of the unit of funding for 
teaching and research and yet it had no alternative but to allocate the funds it received rather 
than the funds it deemed necessary to maintain and improve quality and standards for teaching 
and research. 
The mood of the UGC as understood from a reading of its annual report for the academic year 
1979-80, is one of a recognition that the 'Universities were in a new situation' (UGC 1981, page 
5). The UGC and the universities had previously understood that the expansion in higher 
education would be fully funded. All bets were now off on this assumption. This was a new 
situation for the UGC, and the university sector. While acknowledging that the universities had 
historically found solutions to their own problems, the UGC also acknowledged that the 
Committee had a unique role in providing a synoptic view of higher education and was therefore 
well placed to give advice to the university sector, particularly at time of financial stringency. The 
UGC was forced to engage in 'scenario planning' in concert with the universities. 
UGC 1979-1989 
The Government cuts to the university sector, following the arrival of the Conservative 
Government of 1979, were a shock to the sector, as well as the UGC. The university sector had 
faced budget cuts earlier in the decade but nothing on the scale of cuts now experienced (Kogan 
and Kogan 1983). The UGC's assessment was that the cumulative effect of the cut in grant for 
home students plus the withdrawal of subsidy for overseas students would lead to an 11 % 
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reduction in universities' general income in the period 1980-81 to 1983-84. The 11 % reduction 
was over four times the 2.5% that the UGC believed was the critical line of reduction that could be 
managed and absorbed by the university sector. 
The UGC was concerned not only by the scale of reduction in funding but also by the speed of 
reduction. In a bold statement the UGC announced: 
'The Committee has always announced that there are no absolute standards by which to 
determine an appropriate level of public financial support for the universities, This must be a 
matter for political decision. The system can in principle operate effectively within a wide range of 
levels of support. The problems now facing the university sector are due to too rapid a rate of 
change from one level to another' (UGC 1982, page 6). 
What was to be done? The UGC decided that in order to manage the cuts in public funding it had 
to change its role. In a sense the UGC had always had to make choices between competing 
claims for funding. But this was materially different. In the past the UGC had managed growth so 
that the sector was receiving ever-increasing grants from the UGC. Now the UGC had to make 
hard choices which resulted in substantive reductions in income from the UGC to some 
institutions (Kogan and Kogan 1983; UGC 1984b). The UGC had at its disposal a mass of data 
about the university sector and it used this information, and the resources of its subject 
committees which were composed of academics, to undertake thecomplex task of comparing 
competing claims' (UGC 1982, page 8). The UGC started by making allocations based on the 
basis of subject-based decisions which were then reviewed and moderated in the light of the 
overall impact on individual institutions. 
The period 1919 to 1979 represented substantially a period of growth in higher education with 
expansion fully funded. The incoming Conservative Government in 1979 reversed that trend. The 
UGC's submission to the House of Commons Select Committee for Education, Science and the 
Arts in November 1981 captures the pain that the UGC felt in managing such a swift and dramatic 
change in fortune for the university sector. The cutbacks and nature of the discussions between 
the UGC and the universities were 'unique in the history of the UGC'(UGC 1982, page 24). 
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The key point is that the UGC was prepared to make the cuts in as rational and transparent a way 
as possible to keep the university show on the road. The UGC main Committee did not resign en 
masse nor did Sir Edward Parkes resign as Chairman of the UGC. The Committee accepted the 
responsibility to make the best of difficult circumstances. From the moment the UGC accepted 
responsibility for managing the cuts in recurrent grant in 1979-80, it implicitly accepted 
responsibility for actively managing and for re-shaping the university system to cope with the cuts 
in Government funding. 
The UGC assessment of the state of the university sector in 1981-82 includes an exchange of 
correspondence between Sir Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Education and Science and 
Sir Edward Parkes, the QGC Chairman. It is an important exchange of views because for the first 
time we have the Government making explicit the terms on which it will fund higher education in 
the future. Joseph expected universities to continue to control their costs. The university sector 
would have to come to terms with continuing reductions while maintaining 'that which is most 
valuable in the present system' (UGC 1983, page 32). The letter from the Secretary of State for 
Education to the UGC argued that reductions in grant needed to be applied selectively, 
universities should be given help by the UGC to restructure, and there should be a preference in 
funding towards the natural sciences and technology. Universities needed to have a focus on the 
contribution they could make to commerce and industry, and the production of wealth 
(UGC 1983, page 32). 
The letter of 14 July 1982 from Sir Keith Joseph to the UGC Chairman (UGC 1983, page 32) is 
significant in the relationship between the Government and the UGC. This letter was the start of 
the public process of the Government telling the funding body explicitly what it should do. It did 
not tell the UGC how to do it and that is the distinction. The Government would set the tone and 
direction of change and it was up to the UGC to deliver change while holding the higher education 
sector together. 
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Sir Edward Parkes replied for the UGC on 24 November 1982. He wrote: 
'Suggestions have been made in various quarters that your letter of 14 July represents a 
significant change in its [UGC] relationship with Government, with the possibility of future 
intervention in its affairs and those of the universities. The Committee itself does not regard the 
letter as a departure from existing practice, although that practice has not been made explicit 
hitherto. It accepts that there are broad strategic requirements concerning the expenditure of 
public money for which it is appropriate for Ministers to take explicit responsibility ... It is glad that 
you uphold the principle that responsibility for judgements on these allocations lies with the 
Committee, just as the Committee wishes to uphold the principle that the universities, as 
autonomous bodies, are responsible for managing their own affairs' (UGC 1983, page 38). 
Both the Government and the UGC agreed that the time was ripe in late 1983 to start the process 
of developing a long-term strategy for higher education. Sir Keith Joseph made it clear to the 
UGC in a letter of 1 September 1983 that it was the view of the Government that in future the 
universities should be less dependent on public funds and that generally the Government 
intended to reduce the share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) allocated to public expenditure. 
The Government's planning assumptions for the university sector indicated three modelling 
scenarios: level funding; a reduction of 5%-10% between 1984-85 and 1989-90; and, a further 
5% reduction in the next five-year period to 1994-1995 (UGC, 1984a, page 40). 
The UGC started the consultation process with a letter to all universities in November 1983 just 
one month after the appointment of Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer as Chairman of the UGC. The 
UGC sought views on the way higher education should be developed into the 1990s. In August 
1984 the UGC submitted its advice to the Secretary of State for Education in a report, 'A Strategy 
for Higher Education into the 1990s' (UGC, 1984b). This report from the UGC argued that the 
severity of the Government cuts after 1981 had done great harm to the higher education system. 
The report also signalled the intention of the UGC to develop a more selective approach to the 
funding of research. The report conciuded that: 
'The Committee's aim in July 1981 was to minimise the damage to the system caused by the cuts 
imposed by Government. But those cuts were so severe that great harm has still been done. 
Academic planning has been disrupted, morale has been impaired, thousands of young people 
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have been denied a university education, confidence in Government has been shaken and will be difficult to restore ... in this advice we have pressed for adequate resources and an adequate 
planning horizon. Without them the prospect is of further disruption and decline ... The UGC stands between Government and the universities as it has done for 65 years ... We are not the servants either of Government or of the universities. As one half of our task we shall continue to 
assert to Government the needs of the universities for resources which will enable them to 
provide teaching and research of the highest quality as they must always aim to do. As the other half of our task we shall guide and encourage universities towards the changes which we are 
convinced they must make, and are willing to make, in order to serve the national interest into the 
1990s and beyond'(UGC 1984b, page 44). 
This report from the UGC provides a clear indication of the UGC's view of its relationship with the 
Government and the universities. It felt comfortable floating between the two forces, owned by 
neither. The UGC would not accept, perhaps naively, that it had become an explicit arm of 
Government. It clung vigorously to the image of independence but it acknowledged that it had a 
clear role in managing change in higher education. And the UGC, under the leadership of Sir 
Peter Swinerton-Dyer, believed that it had a responsibility to rebuke the Government, if it felt the 
Government had been unfair to the university sector. 
The Jarratt Committee 
A key turning point for university development was the establishment of the Jarratt Committee by 
the CVCP in 1984 to '-promote and co-ordinate a series of efficiency studies of the management 
of universities... ' (CVCP 1985). The Jarraft Committee was established by the CVCP in part to 
provide authoritative guidance and advice to universities on strategic planning in the context of 
Government cuts in the funding for the higher education sector, but also to seek to separate the 
university sector from the wide ranging efficiency studies taking place throughout Whitehall in the 
mid-1980s. In one sense it was a safety valve put in place by the CVCP as the representative 
body for the universities (Scott, 1995). Jarratt was a successful businessman and Chairman of 
Reed International PLC and his presence as the Chairman of the CVCP review of the efficiency 
of universities would inevitably carry weight in Government. 
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The Jarratt Report (CVCP 1985) argued that despite the catalyst of the cuts in public funding for 
higher education, universities had not been engaged in essential strategic planning. Universities' 
planning horizons were too limited and they needed to bring the functions of planning, resource 
allocation and accountability together within a corporate planning process. The report also 
commented on the role of the UGC. Jarratt took the view that the UGC needed to become pro- 
active in the new policy environment. The future funding of higher education looked uncertain and 
the higher education system needed a new focus on leadership and vision to cope with the 
management of change in higher education. Jarratt argued that the UGC was uniquely placed to 
deliver value for money from the university system through its central role in promoting and 
encouraging good management practice. However, there was a sting in the tail. Jarratt 
concluded: 
Whether the UGC as now constituted and staffed can carry out these roles must be seriously 
open to doubt. We recommend that Government should commission an investigation into the 
role, structure and staffing of the UGC. We do not think that the UGC can reasonably be asked to 
do this for itself' (CVCP 1985, page 33). 
The Croham Committee 
The Jarratt recommendation was the catalyst for the review of the UGC undertaken by a 
Committee appointed by the Government and chaired by Lord Croham. The Croham Committee 
was established in July 1985 with the following terms of reference: 
'To review, within the context of expected developments in higher education, the University 
Grants Committee's constitutional position and role in relation to the Government and to the 
Universities, its membership, its internal structures and working methods, and its secretariat'. 
(Croharn 1987, page 5). 
The Croham Committee Report was published in February 1987 (Croham 1987) and supported 
the case for an intermediary body such as the UGC on the grounds that the Government required 
independent policy advice from a professional 'expert' organisation. The Croham Committee 
recommended that the UGC should be reconstituted as a University Grants 
Council and that it 
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should have a substantial proportion of non-academic members on its governing Council to 
represent the wider national interest. The new UGC should have a non-executive Chairman, 
someone with substantial experience outside of the academic world. 
The UGC main Committee in 1989 had 15 out of 19 members with a higher education or 
education related background, and three representatives from the world of business and industry 
(UGC 1990). The main Committee membership included, as the UGC Chairman, Sir Peter 
Swi n nerton -Dyer, a former Vice Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. UGC Main Committee 
members were appointed by the Secretary of State for Education. The Main committee of the 
UGC had traditionally been dominated in terms of numbers by persons with experience of higher 
education. 
Croham (1987) was concerned about the inability of the UGC to take action in respect of the 
financial performance of an institution. Croham clearly had in mind the unfolding financial crisis at 
University College Cardiff (UCC) in early 1986 which led ultimately to a merger of UCC and the 
University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology (UWIST). On the financial crisis at UCC, 
the UGC was subsequently criticised by the Public Accounts Committee for'not taking earlier and 
more positive action and for taking too passive a role until it was too late' (Shattock 1994, page 
127). Croham's message was that the UGC would not know whether or not an institution was in 
financial difficulties and in danger of collapse. Even if the UGC had the necessary financial and 
management information from the institution, it was not necessarily the case that the UGC had 
the right blend of professional staff to interpret the information correctly. 
The Croharn Report (1987) included the recommendations that: the Department of Education and 
Science should appoint a non-voting assessor to the main Board of the newly constituted UGC; 
the Council should be free to appoint its own staff; and financial relations between the 
Government and the UGC and between the UGC and the universities should be governed by a 
financial memorandum. 
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In the White Paper'Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge', published in April 1987 
(HMSO 1987), the Government accepted the broad thrust of the recommendations from the 
Croham Committee (1987). The Government announced in the White Paper its intention to 
introduce legislation to establish a new funding body for higher education to be named the 
Universities Funding Council (UFC). 
The tone of the White Paper (HMSO 1987) was that although Britain had a higher education 
system among the best in the world it could not afford to rest on past achievement. There had to 
be a much closer link between the economic requirements of the country and the products of the 
university system. Just as the planning arrangements and funding control for the universities 
would reside with the new UFC, the polytechnics and colleges would transfer from local authority 
control to the central funding of the PCFC. Both the UFC and PCFC would be established by 
legislation and their governing Councils appointed by the Secretary of State for Education. The 
key features of the White Paper were enshrined in the Education Reform Act 1988. The UFC was 
established on 1 November 1988 and assumed full responsibilities, in succession to the UGC, on 
1 April 1989. Lord Chilver was appointed as the first Chairman of the UFC. Lord Dearing was 
appointed as the first Chairman of the PCFC. 
The UGC was created on 14 July 1919 and met for the first time on 16 July 1919. It had its 541st 
and last meeting on 30 March 1989. For administrative reasons the UGC was formally wound up 
on 14 July 1989. 
Conclusion 
The UGC was the first intermediary funding body for higher education created by the Government 
as a mechanism for allocating public funds to the higher education sector. It lasted 70 years and 
gained an international reputation for its management of the university system. It was commonly 
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perceived as a 'buffer' organisation between the Government and the Universities. The UGC did 
not believe this to be an uncomfortable position. On the contrary, it took pride from the fact that it 
was owned by neither side of the higher education equation. The UGC was fundamentally a non- 
political organisation and indeed was established to keep the politics out of the funding 
allocations to the higher education institutions. 
The UGC saw itself as working in partnership with the higher education institutions. While not a 
pressure group for the sector, the UGC had a responsibility to represent the needs of the higher 
education sector to the Government. If the Government wanted to expand the number of students 
in higher education in the university sector then the UGC was ready and able to give the 
Government the price of that commitment. The UGC was strongly committed to maintaining 
quality and standards by maintaining the unit of funding per student (unit of resource). This was 
an arrangement that worked well for the UGC, Government and universities until the ravages of 
inflation hit Britain in the mid-1970s. 
The Government cuts in funding for higher education in 1981 forced the UGC to move from its 
position as the honest broker to an all-powerful arbitrator of funds to the university sector. 
Notwithstanding the criticism it received for its role in making choices between institutions, the 
UGC did manage to hold the higher education sector together at a time of considerable financial 
crisis throughout the 1980s (Kogan and Kogan 1983). 
The last Chairman of the UGC, Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, argued that the UGC was abolished 
because it was out of keeping with the spirit of the age. And Sir Peter is as good a witness as any 
other of this period of considerable change in higher education. He was in the 1980s perhaps the 
biggest player in the higher education system. He tried with some success to move the UGC 
more overtly in the direction of a strategic body, with the advice to the Government in 1984 on the 
strategic development of higher education into the 1990s (UGC 1984b). 
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The UGC was prepared to make and defend hard choices in the allocation of funds to individual 
institutions but it also believed it had a responsibility to make public its views on the damage the 
cuts were having on the higher education system (UGC 1984b). The jagged edge relationship 
between the Government and the UGC was not something the Government was going to find 
acceptable. The financial crisis at University College Cardiff was a contributory factor in the 
demise of the reputation of the UGC. It had not seen the crisis coming, and arguably did not have 
the right staff in place to anticipate the financial collapse in Cardiff, or indeed at any other higher 
education institution (Shattock 1994). 
The UGC was part of the Government machinery and totally dependent on the Government for its 
funding. The UGC has always been staffed by civil servants on secondment from the Department 
of Education. Could these staffing arrangements have affected the behaviour of the UGC? 
Shattock (1994) has argued that for most of its life the UGC was a policy free zone and therefore 
there was no reason why civil servants on secondment to the UGC from their parent Department, 
the Department for Education, should have had any confusion of roles. The UGC was always part 
of the state apparatus. 
Although the UGC was part of the state apparatus for the funding of the university sector, it 
considered itself to be independent of its political masters. The Government was determined to 
move into the age of mass higher education in the 1990s with the pro-active private and public 
support of an organisation that was managed in a way that supported and delivered Government 
policy while ensuring that no institution of higher education went bust, or indeed looked likely to 
go bust. The Government wanted active management of the university sector. And the UGC 
looked unlikely to deliver that objective. 
If the UGC had taken a more pro-active approach to the management of the higher education 
system and been seen to be a more willing servant of the Government, would it have survived? It 
is a question that is impossible to answer categorically. It would have seemed odd for the 
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Government to centralise the funding for the polytechnics and college sector within the legislative 
framework for the PCFC and not provide a similar structure for the universities. Moving to a mass 
system of higher education while disagreeing openly in public with the UGC was not an option 
that the Government was ever going to find acceptable. The Government wanted a fresh 
approach to funding for higher education and it wanted a funding body that was more obviously 
an agent of the Government. The spirit of the age in the new public management of the 1980s in 
England demanded a funding body that took funding and orders from the Government. 
The next chapter reviews the role of the UFC, the successor funding body to the UGC- 
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Chapter Four - 
The role of the Universities Funding Council (1989-1993) 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the role of the UFC and examines how the funding body moved from being 
a provider of grants to being a purchaser of teaching and research on behalf of the Government. 
The abortive attempt by the UFC to introduce market forces into the funding and planning of 
higher education is reviewed in this chapter. The UFC was established on 1 November 1988 by 
the Education Reform Act 1988 and assumed its full responsibilities, in succession to the UGC, 
on I April 1989. 
The period 1989-93 represents an interim phase for higher education in England: a phase in 
which the polytechnic side of the binary divide was brought under one funding body - the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) - and funding for the university sector was 
provided by the UFC. These two funding structures for higher education represent staging posts 
on the way to a unified system of funding for higher education in England with the creation of the 
HEFCE. 
The Government wished to create a single funding body for the polytechnics and colleges of 
higher education, the PCFC, to take these institutions out of the control of local authorities and 
arguably it would have been illogical to create a PCFC without a corresponding statutory body for 
the university sector in the United Kingdom. Ministers argued during the passage of the 
Education Reform Act 1988 that a funding body established by statute would have more 
independence than a body established through a Treasury memorandum. Sir Peter Swinnerton- 
Dyer believed this to be a somewhat disingenuous explanation from the Secretary of State for 
Education, Kenneth Baker, given that the newly created UFC suffered considerably more 
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interference from Government than he had encountered in his time as Chairman of the UGC 
(Swi nn erton -Dyer 1991). 
While the UGC lasted for seventy years the UFC and PCFC both lasted for just five years and 
were dissolved on 31 March 1993 under the provisions of the Further and Higher Education Act 
1992. The HEFCE was established under section 62 of the FHE Act 1992 and it assumed its full 
responsibilities for distributing grants for teaching and research to higher education institutions in 
England from 1 April 1993. 
Through a review of the funding policies of the UFC for teaching set out in this chapter, it appears 
that the UFC wished to be seen as a new organisation that was conceptually different from its 
predecessor, the UGC. The key difference that will be reflected in this chapter is the way in which 
the funding body moved from a position of being a provider of public funding to a purchaser of 
teaching and research from universities and colleges. The funding body became a purchaser on 
behalf of the Government. And the role of purchaser was an important step in the transformation 
of the funding body from a provider of grant (UGC) to a regulator and manager of the higher 
education system (UFC and HEFCE). 
In some respects the story of the relatively brief life of the UFC is one of the relationship between 
strong personalities. The new Chairman of the UFC was Lord Chilver who had spent most of his 
working life as an academic leading to his appointment as Vice-Chancellor of Cranfield 
University. When appointed as Chairman of the UFC in 1988, Lord Chilver had retired as a 
Vice-Chancellor and was employed primarily as Chairman of English China Clays PLC. The 
former Chairman of the UGC, Sir Peter Swin ne rton -Dyer, became the first Chief Executive of the 
UFC. Sir Peter was still the senior officer within the UFC but he no longer chaired the UFC 
Council meetings, and his relationship with Government could be mediated through his new 
Chairman, Lord Chilver. The role of the assessor from the Department of Education and Science 
(DES) Mr John Vereker (now Sir John Vereker) was also influential in the development of the 
65 
UFC. The assessor's role was to represent the Secretary of State at UFC Council meetings. This 
meant that the assessor would offer advice and guidance at the UFC Council meetings but would 
also act as a conduit in the relationship between the UFC Executive and the DES. The subtlety 
of this relationship allowed the Government to operate at arms length for the purposes of 
university autonomy but in reality allowed the DES to guide and manage higher education policy. 
The point is well made by Swinnerton-Dyer when, after his retirement, from the UFC he stated: 
'Ahe UFC has suffered far more nit-picking interference from DES civil servants in the last two 
years than the UGC did in the previous five' (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991). 
In starting its life, the UFC was guided by, and operated within, both the overarching context of 
the Government White Paper'Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge' (HMSO 1987b), and the 
letter of guidance of 31 October 1988 (DES 1988) from the Secretary of State for Education and 
Science, Kenneth Baker (now Lord Baker). Another key contextual document in the development 
and expansion of student numbers in higher education into the 1990s is the speech by Ken Baker 
on 5 January 1989 (Baker 1989) which signalled the Government's acceptance of a significant 
increase in participation in higher education from 15% to a target of 30% by the end of the 1990s. 
The 1987 White Paper (HMSO 1987b) underlined the critical role of higher education in the 
economic and social development of the nation. The key objective of the White Paper was to 
develop a higher education system that could respond effectively to meeting the needs of the 
economy. To support this objective the Government proposed: increased and widened 
participation in higher education; more selectively funded research; greater links between higher 
education institutions and industry; and, an emphasis on measuring quality and efficiency in 
teaching and research. 
The letter of guidance from the Secretary of State on 31 October 1988 to the UFC Chairman, 
Lord Chilver (DES 1988), is historic because the 'letter of guidance' has served as the primary 
mechanism since 1988 for ensuring that the Government has been able to link its overarching 
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framework for higher education policy with the funding bodies' policies. The letter of guidance is 
essentially a letter of instruction from the Government to the funding body. The role of the funding 
body is to translate and mediate the letter of guidance in a form that delivers funding mechanisms 
and polices that are acceptable to the higher education institutions and would be considered fair 
and equitable if challenged by institutions under the judicial review procedure. In the words of the 
Secretary of State, the purpose of the letter to Lord Chilver was: 
'... to provide broad guidance on the functions of the Council; on Government policies which are 
relevant to the exercise of these functions; and on particular matters to which I shall expect the 
Council to have regard ... I will write further to the Council, from time to time as necessary, about the Government's higher education policies and about the public funding it intends to make 
available for the universities' (DES 1988). 
The letter of guidance provided an opportunity for the Government to establish a new relationship 
with the funding body and in turn this would enable the funding body to establish a new 
relationship with the higher education sector. The key to this relationship lay critically within the 
section of the letter of guidance that dealt specifically with 'funding arrangements'. The new 
arrangements required the UFC to: 
'... develop funding arrangements which recognise the general principle that the public funds 
allocated to universities are in exchange for the provision of teaching and research and are 
conditional on their delivery. Whether this principle of exchange is embodied in agreements or 
through conditions attached to grant, and to what level of detail, will be for the Council to 
consider'(DES 1988, paragraph 24). 
This section of the letter of guidance provided the bedrock for the future relationship between the 
Government, funding body and the higher education institutions. Funding would be provided for 
specific activities and deliverables. The funding for research and teaching would be identified 
separately by the funding body in the grant letter to universities. Funding was no longer 
unconditional but conditional on delivery. The principle of 'something for something'was created. 
Thus, the Government moved from being a provider of funding to higher education institutions to 
more transparently being an investor in higher education. The funding body thus begins its 
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metamorphosis from a provider of grant to a regulator of the Government's investment in the 
higher education system. 
The concept of investment in higher education by the Government and the funding body brings 
into play an entirely different relationship between the state and higher education. Investment 
does not necessarily imply an arrangement through which funding is guaranteed. Rather, funding 
becomes increasingly selective relative to the needs of the investor and the ability of the higher 
education system to deliver. 
The Government used the creation of the statutory UFC as a break point in the state and higher 
education relationship in order to establish new rules of engagement between the funding body 
and higher education institutions. Although the UFC would be given a free hand in the allocation 
of funds to specific institutions, the funding allocations would be made within the Government's 
overarching policies for public funding generally and higher education specifically, 
Under the provisions of the Education Reform Act 1988, the Council of the UFC would consist of 
no more than 15 members, including the Chairman, and members would be appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Education. In making these appointments the Government was required to 
ensure that between six and nine of the members should have experience of, or be engaged in 
the provision of, higher education (ERA 1988, section 131). The membership of the UFC Council 
reflected some change from the overwhelming dominance of the academic sector on the Main 
Committee of the UGC. On the UFC Council in the period 1990-91 there were eight out of 
fourteen members with senior academic backgrounds in higher education and there were five 
members with private sector experience and responsibilities. Lord Chilver, as Chairman of the 
UFC, had been previously the Vice-Chancellor of Cranfield University and a senior academic. 
Therefore, although the UFC Council was smaller in number than the UGC, it still included a 
majority of members (9 out of 14) with experience of higher education (UFC 1991 a). 
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The UFC had been established by the Government with a duality of purpose: it needed to take a 
much more pro-active approach to the management and funding of higher education to ensure 
the financial sustainability of the university sector; additionally, it was clear from the initial letter of 
guidance from the Secretary of State for Education that the UFC needed to ensure that public 
funds were provided in exchange for teaching and research. The developing ethos of the UFC 
was to manage the higher education sector in the context of the strategic framework provided by 
the Government (DES 1988). 
The circular letter has traditionally been the mechanism by which the funding body (UGC, UFC 
and HEFCE) communicates its policies to the higher education sector. The UFC issued its first 
circular letter on 18 January 1989 (UFC 1989a). This circular dealt with the development of a 
financial memorandum between the UFC and the higher education institutions. The UFC was 
subject to a financial memorandum from the DES and in turn, and as required by the DES, the 
UFC would impose a similar requirement on the sector. Through the financial memorandum, the 
UFC auditors exercised a right to receive and analyse a university's financial control procedures. 
Therefore, the UFC used this mechanism or regulatory tool to follow the UFC grant and to take a 
view on the overall viability of the institution as a recipient of the continued investment of public 
funding. 
By April 1989 the UFC Council had decided to relocate its headquarters from London to Bristol 
and to share the same premises in Bristol with the PCFC. The fact that at this early stage it had 
been decided to co-locate the UFC and PCFC served to pave the way for a unified funding body 
for higher education just a few years later, 
The UFC approach to funding and planning in the period 1991-92 to 1994-95 
The rest of this chapter has a focus on one aspect of the development of a critical area of policy 
within the UFC, the Council's approach to funding and planning. This is a key area of the UFC's 
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work and provides an insight into the way the UFC sought to develop its own policies within the 
context of the demands of Government and needs of the universities. There is nothing more 
critical than the funding role of the UFC and this case history illuminates the UFC attempt to 
include an element of competition into the funding allocations to institutions over the four year 
planning period from 1991-92 to 1994-95. It was the first attempt by a funding body to use public 
funding to engage the higher education sector with market forces. In the words of Sir Peter 
Swinnerton-Dyer: 
'... In respect of teaching, the first attempt to bring in market forces was the 1991-95 planning 
exercise;, that was Lord Chilver's brainchild (though probably with Ministerial guidance) and the 
rest of the Council had very little say. As you all know, the failure of that was acknowledged last 
November and it took desperate improvisation on the part of the office to announce the 1991-92 
grant at the usual time. Lord Chilver blames the failure on lack of co-operation from the 
universities in not tendering at cutthroat prices; but I do not myself see how the Exercise could 
ever have been made to work' (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991, pages 226-227). 
This . is a damming statement from the person who was Chief Executive of the UFC at the time of 
the planning exercise. How did it come to this state of affairs? A new funding body established to 
manage a new era for higher education finding itself in difficulties when required to undertake its 
most basic function - the allocation of the annual grant to universities. 
Through a circular letter dated 1 June 1989 (UFC 1989b) the UFC informed the sector that for the 
four year planning period 1991-92 to 1994-95, the Council intended to include an element of 
competition. The nature of the competitive element had yet to be worked through by the UFC but 
this was early notice of a prospective change in the way the Council allocated funding for 
teaching. 
The next letter on funding and planning was issued by the UFC on 25 July 1989 (UFC 1989c) and 
confirmed that funding for the planning period would be determined on a competitive basis, with 
student number allocations influenced by institutional performance, and success in achieving 
stated objectives. Funding for teaching would be based on competitive bidding for student 
numbers against a set of offer prices set by the UFC. It was intended that student numbers would 
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flow to those universities which submitted lower price bids. However, price would not be the only 
factor in the allocation process as the Council would also need to take into account whether a 
tender by an institution considerably below the offer price had implications for the quality of 
service that a university could subsequently deliver. Although the UFC wanted universities to bid 
against each other to create a market situation for teaching allocations, the UFC needed to 
ensure that cheapness did not lead to a loss of quality. 
Universities would also be able to admit students beyond the numbers funded through the UFC 
grant. Therefore, universities could admit students on a fees-only basis, the fee being that paid by 
the local authority direct to the university. Fees-only students did not attract the UFC funding 
contribution and would therefore be taken by a university at a lower rate of funding. This had 
consequences for the overall unit of resource per student. The funding of research would 
continue to be a; Ilocated on the basis of quality as evinced through the RAE. The UFC letter (UFC 
1989c) acknowledged that a great deal more work needed to be done by the UFC Executive to 
ensure the effective implementation of the guiding principles for the competition for student 
numbers. 
What was the UFC trying to achieve? It was seeking to move away from a model in which the 
funding body maintained the unit of resource per student. To support the expansion of higher 
education, which was a Government objective, universities were being encouraged to increase 
the number of student places at a reduced unit of resource. And the method of allocating the 
additional student places would be on the basis of a bidding competition. So if an institution bid 
below the offer price and was able to persuade the UFC that this would not lead to a decrease in 
quality then that institution could be allocated a greater share of the available student places. This 
method of allocating student places had never been attempted before in the university sector. 
And the Chief Executive of the UFC did not believe the idea had been thought through 
adequately or indeed that the UFC Council fully realised the consequences of their policies on 
this issue (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991). It was this tension that played out in front of the UFC Council. 
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It can be assumed from what he has said subsequently in public that this policy was not 
supported by the UFC Chief Executive (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991). It is inconceivable that Lord 
Chilver would have gone down this policy road without the support of Ministers and thereby the 
support of the DES assessor on the UFC, John Vereker. 
Circular letter 39/89 issued on 12 December 1989 (UFC 1989d) explained how the UFC intended 
to distribute the recurrent grant for teaching and research over the four-year planning period 
1991-92 to 1994-95. The bids from universities for student numbers in teaching were requested 
by 22 June 1990 alongwith an institution's planning statement and financial forecasts for the 
same period. 
The Government's strategic approach to university funding, and the UFC's funding mechanisms 
to deliver this strategy, are described in circular letter 39/89. Through this letter (UFC 1989d), the 
UFC informed the sector of the guide price for each student in each academic subject area. Each 
guide price represented the maximum level of public funding taking account of the combination of 
UFC funds and the tuition fee element provided separately by the local authority. Not all subjects 
could be included in the bidding process as the student numbers for Medicine, Dentistry, and 
Veterinary Science, were determined centrally by the Government. The UFC would assess the 
bids in the context of an institutions' planning statement and financial forecasts. Issues of quality 
would also be taken into account as would advice from the UFC's academic subject advisers. 
In reaching a judgement on the bidding process, the individual institution had to first work out 
what made economic common sense, and then come to a considered view on what other 
institutions were likely to do in their bid. Such was the complexity of the bidding process for the 
universities. The rules of the exercise explained that only in very exceptional circumstances 
would the UFC be prepared to consider bids above the guide price. The confusion that reigned 
within the sector as a result of circular letter 39/89 is best exemplified by the fact that between 
mid-December 1989 and 1 May 1990 the UFC had sent out eleven separate notes of clarification 
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to the original bidding letter. The higher education institutions submitted their tender bids for 
student numbers by the June 1990 deadline and then waited in anticipation of the UGC decision. 
The next communication from the UFC to the universities on the funding and planning exercise 
came on 23 October 1990 in the form of Circular Letter 29/90, and was signed by the Secretary to 
the UFC, Mr F Scott. It is worth quoting this relatively short letter in full as it provides the UFC 
response to the tender bids. 
The letter from the UFC reads as follows: 
'Dear Vice-Chancellor and Principal, 
Funding and Planning Exercise 
I am writing to let you know the position reached on the Funding and Planning Exercise. 
The total number of student places offered by universities is consistent with DES projections and 
the Council's own planning assumptions. However, although universities bid for expansion, the 
Council was disappointed by the scale of economy offered by universities' bids over the 4-year 
period. The Council is unable to accept this position. The Council is committed to increasingly 
effective and efficient use of resources and wishes to consider the options further. 
The Council is mindful that universities would not welcome delay in the announcement of grant 
for 1991-92 and has concluded that, as a first priority, it should take all practical steps, following 
the public expenditure announcement in November, to secure the despatch of grant letters in 
February. The Council has therefore decided to concentrate at this stage on 1991-92 and the 
February letter will be confined to that year. Decisions about the Council's approach to the 
remainder of the planning period will be taken later' (UFC 1990). 
This was a considerable setback for the UFC as the higher education institutions had decided not 
to co-operate with the bidding process. In its first battle with the universities, the UFC had been 
spectacularly unsuccessful. 
Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer wrote to the universities on 25 February 1991 to inform them of their 
grant for 1991-92 and to let them know that the Government had decided to impose an efficiency 
gain of 1.5% on the unit of teaching resource for 1991-92 (UFC 1991 b). What could not be 
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achieved through the competitive bidding process was to be achieved in part by a straight cut in 
funding imposed by Government and implemented by the UFC. 
The UFC had still to deal with the long-term issue of the allocation of student numbers beyond 
1991-92 and it established a working group of UFC Council members chaired by one of the UFC 
Council members, Professor John Barron, Master of St Peter's College, University of Oxford. In 
the light of this review, the UFC published on 28 March 1991 its plans for the three academic 
years 1992-93 to 1994-95 (UFC 1991c). The UFC decided to abandon the strategy of seeking 
competitive bidding for all student numbers and instead restricted the bidding competition to the 
margin of growth in numbers. Therefore, the competition was restricted to the annual added 
growth. This represented some 7,000 student places in 1992/93 against a baseline of 311,000 
student places. The main determining factor in the future competition for additional student places 
would be the success of universities in attracting fees-only students. Hence, the UFC was able to 
meet in part the wishes of the Government to make a direct link between expansion and 
efficiency. 
So the battle between the universities and the UFC ended with lessons learnt on both sides. The 
universities realised that if they stuck together they had the power to thwart the wishes of the 
UFC. But they took this action knowing surely that the competitive bidding strategy was not 
supported within the UFC Council by Sir Peter Swinnerton-Dyer (Swinnerton-Dyer 1991). The 
lesson the Government took from this episode was that if it wanted to increase student numbers 
at a reduced unit cost then it needed to impose 'efficiency gains' each year and instruct the UFC 
to implement the saving thereby reducing the unit of resource per student. 
Conclusion 
The work of the UFC really falls into three periods of activity. Initially, the business of the Council 
had a focus on trying to create a new organisation in the shadow of the UGC. It had a mixture of 
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former DES staff on secondment mixed with incoming new staff from outside Whitehall. in the 
light of the UCC funding crisis (Shattock 1994) the senior management at the UFC had to create 
the core of staff needed to analyse and audit the financial returns from the universities. But most 
critically the UFC had to perform its central function of allocating grants to universities. 
The story of the UFC can be viewed as an attempt by the Government and the funding body to 
make a swift break away from the stability and rationality of the UGC. The UGC had striven 
throughout its lifetime to bring order to the funding of higher education. The inflation of the 1970s 
ripped through the UGC policy of rational and stable planning. Critically, the new approach to 
funding for teaching, introduced by the UFC, was a bold attempt to make a clean and radical 
break with the UGC's planning mode of operation. The higher education sector managed on this 
occasion to thwart the wishes of the Government and the funding body. The short life of the UFC 
is significant for a number of reasons: it established the culture of a new relationship between the 
state and higher education in that the state was no longer exclusively a provider of funds but in 
parallel an investor in higher education. Investors makes choices and within the complexity of the 
public investment in higher education the Government wanted both a funding and regulatory body 
to deliver national priorities, principally a mass higher education system, but not at elite system 
prices. 
The latter period of the UFC between June 1991 and 1993 had a focus on: the merger of the staff 
of the UFC and PCFC to create a single funding body for higher education in England; the 
creation of a common system of funding for teaching and research for the range of institutions 
funded previously by the UFC and PCFC; and the combined sector RAE in 1992. Reading 
through all the circular letters of the UFC for its period of office one is struck by how routinely it 
carried out most of its business. The competitive bidding fiasco hangs like a shroud over the rest 
of the UFC business. On 24 July 1991 the Secretary of State for Education and Science 
appointed Sir (now Lord) Dearing as Chairman of both the UFC and PCFC. He succeeded Lord 
Chilver as Chairman of the UFC on I November 1991. 
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The next chapter reviews the role of the HEFCE in the period between 1993 and 2003 as the 
Government used the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 to bring together the two principal 
funding strands of higher education (UFC and PCFC) into a single funding structure for higher 
education with the creation of the HEFCE. 
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Chapter Five 
The Role of the Higher Education Funding Council for England (1992-2003) 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the role of the HEFCE and reflects on the relationship between the 
Government and the funding council over the period 1992-2003. It also describes the way the 
HEFCE has operated increasingly as a regulatory body for higher education as a means of 
delivering Government objectives for higher education. The key issue that will be explored in this 
chapter is the significant change that has occurred in the relationship between the state and 
higher education in the past decade. The last chapter concluded with a victory for the higher 
education sector as it saw off the UFC's attempt to introduce market forces into the funding for 
teaching. And yet a decade later the evidence set out in this chapter is that the regulatory powers 
of the HEFCE have created a compliancy culture within higher education. How this transformation 
has taken place is discussed and analysed in this chapter. 
The relationship between the HEFCE and the Department for Education and Skills 
The Government published in May 1991 a White PaperHigher Education: A New Framework' 
(HMSO 1991 b) which proposed a single funding structure for universities, polytechnics, and 
colleges of higher education, and the creation of separate funding councils for higher education in 
England, Scotland and Wales. Both the UFC and PCFC were dissolved on 31 March 1993 by the 
1992 Further and Higher Education Act. The HEFCE was established on 6 May 1992 and 
assumed its full responsibilities for distributing grants to universities and colleges in England on 1 
April 1993. 
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In a plenary session at the HEFCIE annual conference on 14 April 2003 at the University of 
Warwick, the question Was posed by a Vice-Chancellor whether in its relationship with the DfIES 
the HIEFCE had like Icarus flown too close to the sun and was in danger of losing its 
independence and buffer role between the Government and the higher education institutions. In 
part the question was sparked by the flurry of activity on the strategic development of higher 
education in the early months of 2003 preceding the HEFCE conference, and the perception that 
the HEFCE/DfES relationship was a great deal closer than had previously been the case. As in 
other spheres of life perception is often everything. But in this case did it reflect reality? 
The 2003 conference followed fast on the heels of a number of strategic developments: the White 
Paper'The Future of Higher Education' published in January 2003 (DfES 2003b); the publication 
of the HEFCE draft Strategic Plan in March 2003 (HEFCE 2003a); and, the publication in the 
week prior to the conference of the WES consultation document on the remit of the proposed new 
'Office for Fair Access' (OFFA)(DfES 2003d). 
The cumulative force of these three key documents had prompted the question in the minds of 
some at the HEFCE conference whether a new stage had been reached in the relationship 
between the Government and universities and colleges within which the traditional role of the 
funding council as a mediator of Government policies, and buffer organisation, was less obvious 
than had been the case in previous years. 
The draft HEFCE strategic plan (HEFCE 2003a) followed the publication of the Government's 
strategic vision for higher education and to a number of observers at the HEFCE conference the 
close symmetry between both documents indicated a measure of collusion between the WES 
and the HEFCE. The publication of the HEFCE document had been delayed since Autumn 2002 
to ensure that it chimed with the overarching framework for the future of higher education 
described in the White Paper (DfES 2003b and HEFCE 2002c). While it was accepted that the 
HEFCE had a statutory responsibility to provide advice to the Government on the needs of the 
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higher education sector, there was some concern at the HEFCE conference that the Council was 
increasingly part of the machinery of Government and this new role would inevitably reduce the 
ability of the HEFCE to operate at arms-length from Government policies. On the other hand, 
some argued that it made sense forthe funding council to be seen to shape and influence 
Government policy as it was well placed to do on behalf of the higher education institutions. 
The content of the White Paper (DfES 2003b) was at a level of specificity that had not been seen 
previously in statements by the Government. For example, the Government stated its intention to 
create 20 new Knowledge Exchanges to support links between higher education and business, 
and in the section on learning and teaching the Government referred to the creation of 70 Centres 
of Teaching Excellence and 50 National Teaching Fellowships. 
What lay behind the question at the HEFCE conference was the perception that the higher 
education institutions had lost their champion in the state and higher education relationship. 
Other voices at the conference posed a different set of propositions. The Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 guaranteed the constitutional independence of the HEFCE in its relationship 
with the Government. It was accepted that the HEFCE developed polices and funding 
mechanisms in the context of the national priorities articulated by the Government. The HEFCE 
had to operate within the overarching strategic and funding framework articulated by the 
Government but it was the funding council that ultimately had responsibility for managing the 
higher education system through its regulatory and funding mechanisms. And crucially, the 
funding council had a duty to consult the higher education sector as it developed and 
implemented its policies. Therefore, far from becoming the Government's poodle, the HEFCE 
was in fact a guide dog for the Government, and the higher education sector. The point was also 
made at the conference by the HEFCE Executive that a great deal of advice to the WES is 
provided by the HEFCE in confidence and therefore not visible to the higher education sector. 
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Within the longueurs of the HEFCE annual conference some delegates wondered whether or not 
the latest White Paper represented the 'apotheosis of the dilettante' (Balogh 1968) with the 
officials and their Ministers at the DfES gaining the commanding heights in the battle for the 
future shape and direction of higher education. It was the subtlety of the relationship between the 
Government and the HEFCE that delegates to the conference were searching for in seeking to 
understand the contemporary role of the HEFCE. Letters of guidance would provide a clue to the 
way the HEFCE and DfES operated at the public level but in reality the heart of the relationship 
lay behind the hidden curtain of policy making. Perhaps it would be best, some argued, for the 
HEFCE to be more open about the nature of its relationship with both its parent department the 
WES in particular, and Whitehall in general. The wider Whitehall relationship is important given 
the role of a number of Government departments in the funding and delivery of higher education. 
The relationship between the WES and the HEFCE operates in many respects within a 
framework of legislation and negotiated influence that will vary on the nature of the topic under 
discussion. Although the Secretary of State for Education and Skills does have the statutory 
power to state the terms and conditions under which funds will be allocated to the HEFCE, in 
reality this statutory duty is discharged through a range of mechanisms that reach the HEFCE as 
'letters of guidance' rather than as 'letters of direction'. The power of the annual 'letter of 
guidance' (grant letter) from the DfES to the HEFCE has never been tested in court but has 
traditionally operated as the key public document underpinning the relationship between the DfES 
and the HEFCE in respect of strategic development of, and related funding for, higher education. 
The HEFCE/DfES relationship is also regulated by a financial memorandum which describes the 
arrangements under which the Department for Education and Skills will provide funding to the 
HEFCE. This document is paralleled by a financial memorandum between the HEFCE and each 
higher education institution setting out the terms and conditions for HEFCE grants. The DfES also 
has an assessor present at each HEFCE Board of Council meeting. This is a role undertaken by 
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a senior official (usually a Deputy Secretary) and the assessor has the right to participate in the 
discussions of the HEFCE Council but has no formal vote. 
The HEFCE Board of Council is a blend of voices from the higher education sector, public sector, 
and business community. All members of Council are appointed by the Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills, usually for a period of three years. The 1992 Further and Higher Education 
Act provides for the appointment of up to 15 members to the HEFCE Council of which one shall 
be the Chairman (FHE Act 1992, section 62). The Act requires the Secretary of State for 
Education to appoint between 8 and 12 members of the HEFCE Board of Council with some 
experience of higher education (FHE Act 1992 section 62). Within the composition of the HEFCE 
Board of Council for 2001-02 nine of the fourteen members have a direct link with higher 
education either as a senior academic or senior manager in higher education, or as a member of 
the Governing Board of a higher education institution. The other five members have links with 
other public service professions or the world of business and commerce. The HEFCE Board 
membership for 2001-02 includes three women and eleven men (HEFCE 2002b). Candidates for 
HEFCE Board membership are identified by the DfES, partly by public advertisement in the 
national press. 
There is only one example since 1992 of what could be described as a 'letter of direction'from 
the DfES to the HEFCE. Such a letter was requested by the HEFCE and sent by the Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills to the HEFCE Chairman, David Young, on 25 February 2003. The 
purpose of the letter was to confirm the Government's intention to provide additional funding from 
2003-04 onwards to the very best 5* research rated departments. The letter indicated that the 
Secretary of State 'had in mind some E20 million to be distributed among the departments you 
(HEFCE] will identify... ' (DfES 2003c and Appendix D). In his oral evidence to the House of 
Commons Education and Skills Select Committee in March 2003, the HEFCE Chief Executive, 
Sir Howard Newby, made the point that the original advice from his Board of Council on the 
allocation of funding for research in 2003-04 had been varied by Ministers (Newby 2003). 
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The letter of guidance of 22 January 2003 had asked the HEFCE to 'submit its proposals [on 
support for research] to Ministers before implementation' (DfES 2003a, paragraph 15). The 
HEFCE interpretation of the letter of guidance was such that the Board of Council had decided 
not to allocate additional funding for the very best 5* departments in 2003-04 but to delay the 
process until 2004-05. The subsequent letter from the WES confirmed the intent of Ministers to 
allocate funding to the strongest research departments from 2003-04. On this solitary occasion, 
the DfES indicated its intent through a letter of direction. Therefore, the HEFCE Board had 
proposed a different funding strategy, which it submitted to the DfES, and the WES then indicated 
formally that it wished the HEFCE to adopt a different funding approach. 
How much should we make of all this? An allocation of f-20 million in any academic year to 
institutions does not in absolute or relative terms represent a great shift of resources. In fact: E20 
million is a relatively insignificant sum of money within a research budget of just over F-1 billion 
and an overall HEFCE budget of nearly f-5.5 billion. That the HEFCE should ask the DfES for a 
letter of direction on this occasion could indicate that it anticipated a backlash from the higher 
education sector on a research funding policy that was already highly selective at the top range of 
research excellence. 
A former Minister for higher education, Robert Jackson MP, has described the DfES/HEFCE 
relationship as operating within an 'informal constitution' with 'nods and winks' as the code of 
operation (Jackson 2003). Pushing the imagery a little further the Secretary of State for Education 
and Skills, the Rt. Hon Charles Clarke MP, stated in his oral evidence to the House of Commons 
Education and Skills Select Committee in March 2003, that 'there are different classes of nods 
and winks. I think HEFCE is an Athenaeum type nods and winks operation ... with other bodies it 
is different' (Clarke 2003). 
It is interesting that the rhetoric of ministers past and present is to support the image that the 
funding body operates independent of Government. What are we to understand by Charles 
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Clarke's reference to 'an Athenaeum type of nod and wink' (Clarke 2003) arrangement between 
the Government and the HEFCE? The Athenaeum the Secretary of State had in mind is the 
exclusive club in London which is a gathering place for the 'good and the great' of the British 
establishment. In a sense Charles Clarke may have been reflecting the clubbish and cosy 
relationship between his Department and the HEFCE. 
Establishing the HEFCE (1992-1997) 
Constitutionally, the HEFCE is a non-departmental public body established by the Further and 
Higher Education Act 1992. The creation of the HEFCE continued the tradition of establishing an 
intermediary body between the Government and the higher education sector. Under the Further 
and Higher Education Act 1992, the Secretary of State for Education is debarred from making 
terms and conditions of grant which refer to specific institutions; particular courses of study or 
programmes of research, including the way they are taught, supervised or assessed; student 
admissions; or the selection and appointment of academic staff (FHE Act 1992 section 68). In the 
context of the legislative framework it is worth noting that in the YES review of the HEFCE in 
March 1999 the Department concluded that: 
'The option of abolishing the HEFCE and arranging for its functions to be exercised by the 
Secretary of State through his officials within the Department for Education and Employment or 
an agency of that Department was ruled out on the grounds that the original case for a buffer 
body still stands, namely the need to avoid political involvement in decisions on allocations to 
autonomous institutions which might involve issues of academic autonomy' (DfEE 1999a, 
paragraph 1.3c). 
It is worth spending a moment on the White Paper which preceded the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 and hence the creation of the new funding framework for higher education in 
England. The White Paper, 'Higher Education -A New Framework'was published on 20 May 
1991 (HMSO 1991 b). This document abolished the binary line (the distinction between 
universities and polytechnics) and established a single funding framework for higher education in 
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England. Similar unitary funding bodies were created for Scotland and Wales, When the White 
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Paper was received by the distinguished American commentator on higher education, Professor 
Martin Trow, he imagined he had only received an executive summary such was the paucity of 
argument and analysis in the 42 pages of the document (Trow 1992). The driving force and 
rationale behind the Government policy was given away in paragraph 17 of the document: 
'The Government believes that the real key to achieving cost-effective expansion lies in greater 
competition for funds and students. That can best be achieved by breaking down the increasingly 
artificial and unhelpful barriers between the universities, and the polytechnics and colleges' 
(HMSO 1991b, page 12 paragraph 17; see also paragraph 105) 
By 1991 one in five young people had some experience of higher education. The Government 
confirmed in the White Paper (HMSO 1991b) its intention to raise participation rates to one in 
three by the year 2000. The document stated that the Government would continue to set the 
strategic direction for the development of higher education while the funding council would 
continue to have autonomy and freedom to determine the allocations to individual institutions. 
On the day of inauguration of the HEFCE, the Secretary of State for Education, The Rt. Hon John 
Patten MP wrote to the HEFCE Chairman, Sir Ron Dearing, to: 
t provide broad guidance on the functions of the Council; on Government policies which are 
relevant to the exercise of those functions; and on particular matters to which I shall expect the 
Council to have regard'(DfE 1992a). 
The letter from John Patten encouraged the HEFCE to develop a methodology to link funding to 
the Council's assessment of teaching quality. It is worth noting that the HEFCE has never in its 
11 years of existence explicitly made a direct connection between the quality assessment of 
teaching and funding. The closest connection would be a commitment to withdraw funding from a 
university or college where quality had been demonstrated to be unsatisfactory. The general 
guidance from John Patten to the HEFCE in respect of the quality assessment of teaching is 
noteworthy. This was always going to be a contentious issue for the HEFCE. Teaching quality 
assessment had been within the purview of Her Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI) for the polytechnic 
sector while the university sector managed its own teaching quality predominantly through the 
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peer review process of internal and external examiners. Patten acknowledged that the HEFCE 
should determine its own methodology for the assessment of teaching but suggested that the 
Council could make use of the former HMI who were no longer gainfully employed within his 
Department following the abolition of the binary line, 
The Chief Executive of the HEFCE, Sir Graeme Davies, had no desire to employ lock stock and 
barrel the former HMI and duly informed the Department. Subsequently he came under pressure 
to recruit the former HIVIls but he resisted on the grounds that the university sector would be 
unlikely to accept the former HMls as peer reviewers and he needed only a few former HMI to 
manage the peer review process. The Department was subsequently unwilling to direct the 
HEFCE to employ the former HMI (Kogan and Hanney 2000, page 172). 
Overall, the tone and content of the inaugural letter from John Patten to the HEFCE (DfE 1992a) 
is relatively benign. It continued and confirmed existing arrangements in respect of the financial 
memorandum between the Department and the HEFCE and between the HEFCE and each 
higher education institution. The inaugural letter paved the way for the annual letter of guidance 
from the department to the HEFCE. The purpose of the letter of guidance was to set out the 
funding settlement for the next three years. Therefore, the first letter of guidance to the HEFCE 
Chief Executive, Professor Graeme Davies on 12 November 1992 (DfE 1992a and Appendix B) 
stated that the number of students in higher education had been growing faster than projected in 
the recent White Paper (HMSO 1991 b) and therefore the Government had decided that there 
would be a period of funding consolidation for the three year period 1993-94 to 1995-96 (DfE 
1992b). The Government expected the sector to make 'efficiency gains'while maintaining 
financial viability. 
The first annual report of the HEFCE (HEFCE 1993) reflects the complexity of the merger 
between the UFC and PCFC to create a unified funding structure for the new integrated sector of 
higher education in England from 1 April 1993. To bring together both sectors was no mean 
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achievement and we should not lose sight of the role of the funding council in managing the 
higher education system both in times of complexity and stability. There was no blueprint offered 
by the Government to the HEFCE as it took responsibility for merging the UFC and PCFC 
sectors. 
The HEFCE funding methodology for teaching continued the UFC and PCFC 'core-plus' 
arrangements through which institutions were guaranteed a very high percentage of their 
previous year's funding as long as they maintained their student numbers. The plus element was 
subject to competitive bidding for additional student numbers. The attraction of this funding 
approach was that it provided a high measure of stability in the higher education system with 
institutions better able to manage their budgetary planning. Any perturbations in the system were 
managed in the short-term by the provision of safety net funding for some institutions. 
The first HEFCE annual report (HEFCE 1993) was cautious about the prospective link between 
high quality teaching as evinced through the quality assessment process and funding for 
teaching, and indicated that it would be easier for the Council and the sector to accept 
withdrawing funds for unsatisfactory provision than to provide additional funding as a premium for 
teaching assessed through the TQA as excellent. Funding for research was based on the 1992 
RAE judgements and continued the policy of selective funding by reference to quality 
judgements. 
The second 'letter of guidance' received by the HEFCE on 30 November 1993 (DfE 1993) once 
again focussed on student numbers. The steady increase towards the Government's one in three 
participation target by the year 2000 was a major concern for the Treasury and the language 
changes in the correspondence between the Department for Education and the HEFCE. The 
grant letter included the statement: 
9,.. there is a limit to the burden of funding for higher education which the taxpayer can bear ... It is 
absolutely essential that student numbers are now kept in line with the levels assumed in the 
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Government's plans... The planned efficiency gain has increased from an annual 3% in last 
year's plans to some 4% in 1994-95 and 1995-96 as a direct result of institutions' decisions to 
recruit above the planned levels in last year's settlement. No additional grant will be paid in 
respect of numbers in excess of the planned levels for the next three years' (DfE 1993, 
paragraphs 4,7 and 11). 
The message in the grant letter (DfE 1993) is that times are hard and getting harder for higher 
education in the Whitehall battle for departmental budgets and higher education will need to take 
its share of the pain. We do not see in this letter or its predecessor a Government seeking to 
micro-manage a higher education system. The management and regulatory role is left exclusively 
to the HEFCE. In hard times, the role of the HEFCE is to keep the higher education show on the 
road with the Government setting the overarching funding levels and then it is up to the HEFCE to 
devise, in partnership with the sector, policies to allocate the funding. 
It is interesting that in his statement in the HEFCE annual report for 1993-94 (HEFCE 1994), the 
Chief Executive, Professor Graeme Davies (now Sir Graeme Davies), took the view that the 
period of consolidation (a euphemism for no growth) led the Council inexorably into a planning 
role for higher education. He made this observation in the context of a planned cut of 10% in real 
terms for the period 1993-94 to 1995-96. The cut would have serious implications for the sector 
as whole, and for some institutions in particular, and what was in his mind was the need for the 
HEFCE to manage the financial perturbations that would flow from such a severe budgetary cut. 
But in reality what Graeme Davies meant by planning was the role of the HEFCE in taking tough 
decisions within formula funding. Some institutions would then need to have safety net funding to 
ensure financial viability and structural stability. It was the responsibility of the funding council to 
monitor institutions' finances to ensure they remained viable in the context of an effective return 
on the annual public investment by the state through the grant provided by the HEFCE. In part 
this was to ensure the protection of the public investment but it was also a reflection of the trauma 
that would result from an institution falling over. The public fallout would inevitably backlash on 
the Government and the fear of a domino effect throughout the sector was always a possibility. 
87 
If the HEFCE was planning it was really a very benign form of planning. It did not technically have 
any planning powers under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. For example, the HEFCE 
has no power to shift student numbers around the country to fill cold spots of higher education. 
The thrust of the HEFCE funding methodology was based fundamentally on historical allocations 
plus a competitive bidding process whether for teaching (at the margin) or research. And the 
rewards went to the bids that best matched the published criteria. There was for example no 
planning on a regional basis, a position that still exists for the HEFCE in 2003. 
Graeme Davies described the HEFCE as enlarging its role as a 'steering body' for higher 
education in the early 1990s (HEFCE 1994). It was able to steer through its regulatory powers, 
and in part through the promotion of good practice. HEFCE has never had the power to plan the 
activities of the higher education institutions because they are autonomous organisations only 
partly funded by the, HEFCE. The figures for 1992-93 show that HEFCE grants accounted for 
37% of the total recurrent income of universities and colleges in England ranging from 57% at 
Rose Bruford College to 14% at the London Business School (HEFCE 1994). The Council can 
use its policies and funding to regulate and influence the behaviour and activities of universities 
and colleges. The latest available data from the HEFCE for 2001-02 show that public funding 
ranges from 20%-90% of overall income for some higher education institutions in England. Data 
for public funding for 2000-01 which includes HEFCE grants, and funding from the Teacher 
Training Agency (TTA) and the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) shows that 39% of the total 
income of universities and colleges of higher education in England derives from public funding 
(HEFCE 2002a and HEFCE 2002b). 
There is only one higher education institution in England that receives no funding at all from the 
HEFCE - the University of Buckingham. All of the other universities and colleges of higher 
education receive some measure of state funding through the HEFCE. Notwithstanding the 
conditions of grants from the HEFCE, which act as a form of regulation on the higher education 
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sector, there is no evidence that any higher education institution in England is intending to break 
away completely from state funding. 
If the HEFCE is not strictly a planning body but fundamentally a funding body how do we 
reconcile this interpretation of its role with the introduction of the Maximum Aggregate Student 
Number (MASN) from 1994-95? The introduction of the MASN was a consequence of the 
Government's policy of consolidation and was introduced by the Government, and implemented 
by the HEFCE, as a mechanism for controlling public expenditure. The Government wished to 
cap the recruitment of students and the MASN was the mechanism through which this policy was 
achieved. Any institution recruiting more than 1% above their MASN would receive a financial 
penalty. This was a policy applied across the sector and never intended to target specific 
institutions. So it was not planning in the sense of targeting regions or institutions or subject 
areas. It was a mechanism to retain a hold on the number of students receiving publicly funded 
tuition fees. But the MASN operation reflects the growing regulatory role of the HEFCE. Once the 
demand and supply for higher education had reached an equilibrium the MASN regulator was no 
longer needed and therefore the HEFCE Board of Council decided on 23 January 2002, after 
consultation with the higher education sector, to end the MASN restriction on student numbers 
(HEFCE 2002d). 
The letter of guidance (grant letter) to the HEFCE of 29 November 1994 covered higher 
education funding for the three-year period 1995-96 to 1997-98 (DfE 1994). The headlines from 
this letter are that the Government had decided to extend the period of consolidation by a further 
year to 1997-98 and the efficiency gain would continue to be imposed on the sector at a level of 
3%. This represented a cumulative reduction in resources of 9% over the three-year funding 
period. It is worth noting that this grant letter, while acknowledging the iterative development of 
the HEFCE methodology for assessing the quality of teaching, no longer encouraged the Council 
to link quality judgements to funding. Perhaps an indication that in a hostile financial climate it 
would have been unwise to push this policy in the face of opposition from the sector. Clearly, the 
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HEFCE was in no rush to make the funding link, partly because not all parts of the sector had full 
confidence in the assessment methodology, and partly the unwillingness of the sector to accept 
such a link. But this is a good example of the HEFCE simply ignoring the earlier exhortations of 
Ministers and steering away from what could have led to a major row with the higher education 
sector. 
What is interesting from reading the HEFCE annual reports over the first half of the 1990s 
(HEFCE 1994 and HEFCE 1995) is the way the Council accepts the Government policy of 
consolidation and efficiency savings. It recognises the difficulties faced by the sector but never 
criticises Government policy. The Council can be viewed as being very much in the role as the 
Government's agent in the allocation of funds. It is hard to discern from these HEFCE annual 
reports any sense of angst at the developing financial crisis, rather an acceptance that the sector 
can simply keep on surviving in the face of year on year cuts. 
The 1994-95 annual report (HEFCE 1995) was the last for Graeme Davies in his role as Chief 
Executive and his statement in the report was notable for his comments on the relationship 
between the Council and the institutions of higher education. He stated: 
'Some may feel that universities and colleges as independent bodies should be left to run their 
own affairs without external involvement. The past year has shown that such an attitude can no 
longer be seriously entertained. Higher education institutions are indeed independent, but they 
also receive large amounts of public money and, rightly, are increasingly accountable for their 
actions'(HEFCE 1995, page 4). 
What lay behind these comments in a rather strange valedictory message to the sector? Greame 
Davies had successfuliy merged the UFC and PCFC but presided over a period of cutbacks. The 
fundamental reason for his bullish statement was his irritation over the way the Council felt it had 
been treated over the introduction of the TQA exercise. The assessment of the quality of teaching 
was a requirement placed on the HEFCE under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. To 
make swift progress HEFCE decided from the start to manage the assessment process within the 
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HEFCE and the Council established a Quality Assessment Division (QAD) for this purpose. 
Graeme Davies could have taken the option of commissioning this work from an agency outside 
of the HEFCE but he went for an in-house operation. Some parts of the sector were consistently 
opposed to the TQA process (principally on grounds of cost, interference, and bureaucracy) and 
in a time of financial stringency it used the TQA process to focus its angst on the Council. 
Graeme Davies was by temperament and disposition a conciliator. He found the teaching quality 
battles wearing and arguably at times he felt buffered more by the sector than the Government. 
The bite in the grant letter of 28 November 1995 was the prospective cut in capital provision for 
the sector. Capital funding for the financial year 1996-97 was reduced by 31 % from the 1995-96 
allocation and a 52% cut was projected over the next three years. Institutions were now expected 
to finance capital projects through private sector schemes in line with the Government's private 
finance initiative (DfEE 1995). The period of consolidation, continued and in many respects this 
grant letter was a holding letter for higher education as the Department for Education and 
Employment had in 1995 already begun a review of higher education, a review which eventually 
went beyond the boundaries of the Department to result in the Government establishing the 
National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education under the Chairmanship of Lord Dearing 
(NCIHE 1997). 
The HEFCE annual report for 1995-96 reflected the parlous state of the finances of the higher 
education sector. The culmination of under-funding was highlighted by the Chairman, Brandon 
Gough. In his opening statement he wrote: 
While many were expecting a tight settlement for 1996-97, few could have forecast the large 
reduction in capital grant. The resulting cut in total funding added considerably to the financial 
pressure on institutions. The latest returns to the Council indicate that, unless urgent offsetting 
action is taken, the sector as a whole will move from a wafer-thin surplus into deficit in 1996-97' 
(HEFCE 1996, pagel). 
These were strong words for an HEFCE Chairman but Brandon Gough was an accountant of 
international reputation and he knew a looming crisis when he saw one. The institutional returns 
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were judge and jury and higher education had reached breaking point. The Dearing Inquiry was 
the cross-party pressure valve set up to explore the options for the future funding of higher 
education and to come up with a solution after the general election in 1997. 
Sir Brian Fender had watched, as a Vice-Chancellor at the University of Keele, with some interest 
the battle fought by his predecessor over teaching quality assessment and soon after joining the 
HEFCE as Chief Executive he moved swiftly to support the establishment of a new single quality 
assurance agency that combined audit and subject assessment. Therefore, the TQA would move 
out of the HEFCE to an independent agency - The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA) - which was established in 1997. This was a tactical move by the HEFCE as 
there was never any sympathy for the TQA system in the higher education sector and its close 
association with the work of the HEFCE had the potential to sour the relationship between the 
funding council and one of its key stakeholders, the higher education institutions. 
The grant letter of 26 November 1996 (DfEE 1996) was a holding letter pending the 
recommendations from the Dearing Committee. In the short-term however, the Government, in 
recognition of the financial crisis, provided an additional El 00 million in 1997-98 and 1998-99 to 
maintain financial health and quality across the sector. The efficiency gains continued at a rate of 
0.5 % in 1997-98,2.5% in 1998-99, and 4.5% in 1999-2000. In reality the only figure of concern 
to the Council and institutions was the 0.5% cut for 1997-98 as the funding for future years would 
be influenced by the Dearing recommendations. Strangely, the grant letter returned once again to 
the issue of the Government expecting the Council to link funding for teaching to the teaching 
quality assessments. No doubt the Government felt it was timely to remind the Council of this 
option given the creation of the new single agency for quality assurance on 1 April 1997. History 
would show that a change of management for quality assurance had little effect on the desire of 
the HEFCE to link funding to teaching quality judgements beyond the threshold withdrawal of 
funds for unsatisfactory provision. 
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The HEFCE annual report for 1996-97 was infused with the spirit of the Dearing Inquiry and 
indeed its title 'Promoting the Learning Society' (HEFCE 1997) chimed neatly with the Dearing 
Report. The mood of the report is very much in tune with Dearing in the emphasis on promoting 
the status of learning and teaching, working through the policy implications of widening 
participation, and meeting the demand in the community for lifelong learning. 
The new Chairman of the HEFCE, Sir Michael Checkland, welcomed publicly the additional 
funding of E165 million announced by the Government for 1998-99 in the wake of the Dearing 
Report published in July 1997 (HEFCE 1997). The severity of the financial position was 
underlined by the annual report's reference to institutions' financial forecasts which showed that 
over half of them expected to be in deficit by the end of 1999-2000. And only a few institutions 
would have an operating surplus of higher than 3% in 1996-97. The 3% figure was. the minimum 
level the HEFCE believed institutions would require to cope with the management of change 
effectively (HEFCE 1997) 
Mindful of the UCC financial debacle in the 1980s when the UGC failed to see the crisis coming 
(Shattock 1994), the HEFCE and its predecessor funding councils, the UFC and PCFC, had 
strong finance and audit departments in place to monitor the financial health of institutions, with a 
role for the Council to mitigate the difficulty faced by the higher education sector through a range 
of measures including safety net or moderation funding, as well as external financial advice to 
support restructuring in some institutions. 
What can be concluded about the overall shape of higher education, its funding, and the role and 
relationship of the Government and HEFCE in the period before the Dearing Report in 1997? In 
the five-year period 1992-1997, higher education limped along financially towards the impending 
crisis which was acknowledged by Dearing and used by the incoming Labour Government in 
1997 as the benchmark from which things could only get better (NCIHE 1997). Professor Peter 
Scott has written about Conservative Governments stumbling through and creating higher 
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education policy in the 1980s in a fit of absent-minded n ess (Scott 1995). The period of the early 
1990s was by any absolute and relative measure a period of neglect. The period 1992-1997 was 
one of no growth through a consolidation of student numbers. 
The role of the HEFCE in the five-year period 1992-97 should be seen in the context of the way it 
managed both the unification of the binary divide and ensured that through its good management 
and monitoring the system actually remained cohesive and did not fall apart through chronic 
underfunding. And this is part of the role of the HEFCE that has gone unnoticed for the obvious 
reason that institutions that are in financial difficulty are unlikely to seek publicity not least 
because of the damage to their commercial and academic reputations, and the HEFCE must 
maintain the confidentiality of its relationship with individual institutions. It is the confidential work 
behind the scenes with institutions to ensure financial viability and sustainability that is an 
important part of the work of the HEFCE. In this period the Government had no success n tryi 
; 
ng 
to persuade the HEFCE to impose a link between the teaching quality assessment judgements 
and funding for teaching. There were repeated attempts in the annual grant letter to the HEFCE 
but the Council resisted the pressure from the Government. 
HEFCE 1997- 2003 
The Labour Party won the election in June 1997 and the Dearing Report was published in 
July 1997 (NCIHE 1997). In terms of manifesto commitments, Labour had at its 1997 annual 
conference announced the target of an additional 500,000 student places in further and higher 
education by the year 2010. 
The grant letter received from the DfEE on 26 November 1997 (DfEE 1997) covered only one 
year of funding for higher education - 1998-99. The Government decided to postpone any 
announcement of forward budgetary planning until the completion of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR) by summer 1998 which provided an opportunity for the new 
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administration to review public expenditure. The grant letter confirmed the Government's 
intention, subject to legislation, to introduce the E1,000 student contribution up front for the fee for 
full-time students. The letter confirmed the earlier commitment by the Government on 
23 September 1997 (DfEE 1997) to provide an additional: E165 million for higher education in 
1998-99. This additional funding had the effect of reducing the real term reduction in funding per 
student to just under 1 %. On the back of the Dearing recommendations, the Government adopted 
a short-term financial fix to avert a crisis in funding. 
This first grant letter from the new Labour Government (DfEE 1997) started to pick up some of 
the themes from Dearing including asking the Council to encourage higher education institutions 
to develop learning and teaching strategies. The language of the letter from the Department for 
Education is important. The Council was merely'asked to encourage' higher education 
institutions. The Secretary of State for Education also welcomed the intention of the HEFCE to 
work with the representative bodies (CVCP and SCOP) to establish the Institute for Learning and 
Teaching in Higher Education (ILTHE). On widening participation, the WEE expressed concern 
about the levels of participation from the lower socio-economic groups and encouraged the 
HEFCE 'to give priority in additional student places to those institutions with a commitment to 
widening access' (DfEE 1997, paragraph 27). The grant letter also returned to the desire of the 
Government to see the Council finding ways of linking funding to the teaching quality judgements. 
In many respects this letter, from a Labour Government, was not different in tone from those 
received in the previous five years from the Conservative Governments. But that can be 
explained by the desire of the Government to review public expenditure through the CSR by 
summer 1998, and the imperative of introducing a relatively small addition of public funding (El 65 
million) to shore up higher education funding. Over the eight years prior to 1998-99 the unit of 
public funding for higher education had fallen by 35% in real terms (HEFCE 1998 page 22). And 
the Government had still to resolve where it intended the growth to take place to meet the target 
of the additional 500,000 students. 
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The HEFCE annual report for 1997-98 (HEFCE 1998) is particularly upbeat in tone in its support 
for Dearing and recognition of the additional funding from the Government. Enhancement funding 
for learning and teaching is provided by the HEFCE through: the Teaching and Learning 
Technology Programme (TLTP); Fund for the Development of Teaching and Learning (FDTL); the 
research programme with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC); funding for the 
QAA; and, support for the ILTHE to promote effective teaching and learning. Prompted by the 
Dearing Report (NICHE 1997), we see the Council developing new policies to promote the status 
and quality of learning and teaching. 
The grant letter received by the HEFCE on 8 December 1998 (DfEE 1998) announced the 
outcome of the CSR. The Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett, believed he had 
delivered a favourable settlement for higher education in the CSR but he also expected a great 
deal in return for the additional investment. He expected the sector to deliver on widening access, 
and improve quality and standards. It was a definition of the 'something for something' approach 
to increased public funding that was being applied to higher education. The grant letter committed 
an additional: E280 million in 1999-2000 and an extra E496 million in 2000-2001. The tap on 
student growth had been turned back on and the extra funding would provide an additional 
36,000 students in 1999-2000 and 61,000 extra in 2000-2001 compared to planned numbers in 
1998-99. 
In many respects the grant letter (DfEE 1998) represents a stock check of Government priorities 
including references to the employability of students, quality and standards, increasing 
participation and widening access. New areas of interest slip in with a reference to the promotion 
of knowledge transfer and the need to develop the commercial exploitation of university research. 
The thrust of the grant letter was that 'the outcome of the [CSR] means that for 1999-2000 and 
2000-2001, the sector would retain all the income from student contributions to fees and receive 
extra public funding on top' (DfEE 1998, paragraph 50). But there was a sting in the tail on the 
student contribution to fee income. The grant letter stated: 
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'The Secretary of State has made it clear that he does not expect institutions to charge 'top-up' 
fees, Under the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 the Secretary of State has the power to 
impose a condition on the Council's grant for 1999-2000, requiring it in turn to place a condition 
on the funding it allocates for 1999-2000 to institutions providing higher education that they 
should not charge 'top-up'fees. The Secretary of State is considering whether to attach a 
condition of grant for 1999-2000' (DfEE 1998, paragraph 52). 
The statutory authority of the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 supported the role of the 
HEFCE as a regulatory body and in turn restricted the autonomy of individual universities and 
colleges to set their own fee levels. 
If one reviews the annual grant letters from the DfEE in comparison with the policies of the 
HEFCE as set out in the Council's annual reports, there is a strong relationship between both 
documents. And this is not really surprising for a number of reasons. The only funding that the 
HEFCE has available to it is the Government funding. Therefore, the HEFCE has relatively little 
room for creating separate policy opportunities because the funding is not available. The HEFCE 
has always accepted that it had to work within an overarching policy framework established by 
Government. But what the HEFCE has uniquely is the special relationship that exists between the 
Council and the higher education sector. In developing its policies the HEFCE works in 
partnership with the sector. Every HEFCE policy has a peer-review input either through the 
advice of the HEFCE strategic committees and through sector wide consultation. And the sector's 
representative bodies - UUK and SCOP - are also consulted as policies are developed by the 
funding council. 
It is a complex set of relationships that that the HEFCE has to juggle. It has to work in partnership 
with the higher education sector, and a range of other stakeholders, while simultaneously 
satisfying its political masters. It has to develop policies to implement Government strategy while 
at the same time not being seen as the poodle of Government. It needs the confidence of the 
sector and the Government to be able to maintain its credibility. 
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There are areas where the HEFCE has effectively developed its own polices without any obvious 
impetus from Government. Such examples include the decision of the HEFCE to fund a 
permanent funding stream for'reach-out to business and the community'which operates 
alongside funding for teaching and research. The 'reach-out' funding is designed to support 
knowledge transfer. Another example is the Council's 'Teaching Quality Enhancement Fund 
(TQEF) to enhance the quality of learning and teaching. And the RAE is a scheme created and 
managed by the four UK funding bodies and the higher education sector through peer review. 
The HEFCE also has the responsibility for linking RAE judgements to funding. 
To help the sector to respond to change and to manage change, particularly in the era of lifelong 
learning, the Council established the e-university project. Although there had never been any 
mention of this initiative in the grant letters from the Department for Education it featured as a key 
driver for higher education, along with a new qualification, foundation degrees, in David Blunkett's 
speech on the future of higher education at the University of Greenwich in February 2000 
(Blunkett 2000). The purpose of the e-university project was to enable the UK higher education 
sector to compete globally in the field of e-learning with any major virtual or corporate university. 
The opportunity for the HEFCE to create and deliver its own policy agenda is defined by the 
overall pot of funding available to HEFCE. It is difficult for the HEFCE to top-slice the teaching or 
research budgets at times of financial stringency. And the sector does not want the HEFCE to 
top-slice from the teaching and research budgets. Vice-Chancellors would much prefer to receive 
the block grant to give them as much freedom as possible in the allocation of funds within their 
institutions. 
The grant letter covering funding for 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 was received by the HEFCE on 
23 November 1999 (DfEE 1999). A further E295 million was made available in 2001-2002 
compared with 2000-01 which represented a cash increase of 5.4%. Expansion of student 
numbers would continue through an additional 52,000 places but the Government now expected 
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much of the growth to come through part-time and sub-degree courses with a strong vocational 
focus with half of the sub-degree expansion to take place in further education colleges. 
The personal statement from Sir Brian Fender in the 1999-2000 HEFCE annpal report (HEFCE 
2001) in many ways sums up his approach as Chief Executive. It was not good enough for the 
HEFCE 'to keep a steady hand on the tiller', the Council and its staff needed to add value to the 
rest of the higher education sector. Sir Brian Fender's vision was that the HEFCE Executive 
should be a knowledge-based organisation. It would add value by using its unique overall control 
and knowledge base to manage the system, and to identify and disseminate good practice 
(HEFCE 2001). 
The grant letter received by HEFCE on 29 November 2000 (DfES 2000) announced, for the first 
time in a decade, a real term increase in funding per student in 2001-02. The increase in funding 
7 mi on between 2001-02 to 2003-04) was designed to deliver the vision for higher 
education set out in the Greenwich speech by David Blunkett (Blunkett 2000) with a particular 
focus on: research; widening participation; the e-university; foundation degrees; and, rewarding 
and developing staff in higher education. This grant letter confirms the Government's commitment 
'... that 50% of those between the ages of 18 and 30 should have the opportunity to benefit from 
higher education by the end of the decade' (DfES 2000, paragraph 17). The particular worry for 
the Government in the grant letter was the spectre of non-completion. Widening participation was 
a key element of Government policy for higher education but it would not bear fruit if it led to an 
increase in the number of students failing to complete their courses. Blunkett wrote: 
'I therefore expect to see the Council bear down on the rate of drop out ... and bringing pressure to bear on those institutions whose performance falls significantly below their benchmark' 
(DfES 2000 paragraph 11). 
The relationship between the annual grant letter from the Department for Education and the 
Council's subsequent actions are not necessarily a direct relationship of cause and effect. The 
grant letter travels through many drafts within the iterative policy making process in the 
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Department and in that process the HEFCE is consulted and invariably sees and has an 
opportunity to comment on a final draft version. 
Sir Brian Fender finished his period of office as Chief Executive of the HEFCE in 2001. In. his 
latter years he had presided over a sustained period of growth after many years of under-funding. 
It is impossible to measure the significance of his stewardship to the growth in public funding for 
higher education over his period of office as there are simply too many factors intertwined to 
isolate one sphere of influence. Sir Brian Fender had the benefit of coinciding with the post- 
Dearing funding settlement. It is arguable any Chief Executive would have seen the same upturn 
in funding. What was the alternative? A higher education system reaching a point of financial 
crisis. Sir Brian Fender reduced the temperature of the teaching quality battles to some extent by 
moving TQA out of the HEFCE Executive to an independent agency, the QAA. He developed a 
permanent third stream of funding which further linked the sector with the world of business 
through the medium of knowledge transfer. And he helped to create the e-university. He also took 
the Council beyond the shores of the UK by promoting higher education in a global context, 
making alliances with overseas Governments, sharing good practice, and starting the journey 
through which universities and colleges would start to measure their effectiveness against global 
standards of excellence. Sir Brian Fender left a strong legacy for his successor Sir Howard 
Newby. 
The first grant letter dated 29 November 2001 (DfES 2001 and Appendix C) from the new 
Secretary of State, The Rt. Hon Estelle Morris MID, had as its opening sentence: 
'The Government has said that by the end of the decade, 50% of young people should have the 
opportunity to benefit from higher education by the time they reach 30 years of age. This is both a 
historic commitment and a challenging target' (DfES 2001, paragraph 1). 
In paragraph four of the same letter the Secretary of State for Education emphasised that she 
would 'judge the Council's performance by the extent to which the targets are met' (DfES 2001, 
paragraph four). The grant letter was infused with requests from the Secretary of State for 
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Education for progress reports from the Council on a range of issues including: increasing and 
widening participation; fair access; non-completion rates; and, increasing the number of students 
from non-traditional backgrounds. The Council had never received a grant letter dealing with 
accountability at such a fine level of specificity. Here was a Secretary of State for Education intent 
on examining the detail of progress as well as the strategy. In a sense the Government was 
giving the impression that it no longer trusted the HEFCE or indeed the higher education sector to 
manage the execution of Government strategy without recourse to constant checking and 
measuring. 
So what was driving this level of detailed control of the HEFCE? To some extent contemporary 
history can help us form an assessment. Estelle Morris resigned as Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills, in part as a consequence of a detailed operational decision made by an 
independent agency - the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) - with responsibility for 
maintaining the quality and standard of the A-level qualification (Sunday Observer 2003). It is 
arguable that Estelle Morris felt she was under pressure to deliver from the Downing Street 
Delivery Unit led by Professor Michael Barber and her performance was inextricably linked to the 
performance of the HEFCE and other non-departmental Government bodies. The danger with an 
obsession with detail and micro-management is that if things start to go wrong you can very 
easily become a target of guilt by association. The advantage of the hitherto relatively general 
grant letters (letters of guidance) to the HEFCE was that Ministers could distance themselves 
from detailed operational issues while focussing on the bigger funding picture. 
The 2003 White Paper and HEFCE Strategic Plan 2003- 2008 
With Sir Howard Newby as the new HEFCE Chief Executive from Autumn 2001, the Council had 
throughout 2002 been working on its draft strategic plan for 2003-08 (HEFCE 2003a). The key 
elements of the draft document had been unveiled and discussed at the HEFCE annual 
conference in Manchester in April 2002. However, the DfES was at the same time working on its 
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policy statement on student support which had over 2002 broadened into a strategic policy 
document on the future of higher education. Indeed, the catalyst for the White Paper (DfES 
2003b) had been the constant press for additional funding for higher education allied to an ever 
increasing demand from some parts of the sector for top-up fees. 
The HEFCE Board of Council had effectively signed off on its Strategic Plan 2003-2008 at its 
meeting on 19 September 2002 (HEFCE 2002c) and the draft plan was ready to go out to the 
higher education sector for consultation in October 2002. However, the Council decided to hold 
fire on publication until the WES had published its strategic document on the future of higher 
education. The argument for delay centred on the need to ensure that the HEFCE document took 
into account the broader strategic imperatives within the White Paper (DfES 2003b), and the 
funding implications. From the Council's perspective it made little sense to go out to consultation 
without full knowledge of the Government's position. It was a pragmatic as well as a political 
decision to wait until the Government had published the White Paper. But of course the 
Government had the advantage of knowing the mind of the HEFCE before it published so it had 
every opportunity to meld its own proposals to the thinking of the HEFCE document. The key 
themes covered in the draft HEFCE strategic plan (HEFCE 2003a) were: 
0 Widening and increasing participation 
0 Enhancing excellence in learning and teaching 
0 Enhancing excellence in research 
0 Enhancing the contribution of higher education to the economy and society. 
When the White Paper was published in January 2003 (DfES 2003b) there was a remarkable 
measure of symmetry between the Autumn 2002 draft HEFCE strategic plan (HEFCE 2002c) and 
the chapter headings in the White Paper. All of the key themes from the HEFCE draft paper were 
included in the White Paper. It is hardly surprising that there is symmetry between the two 
documents. Indeed it would look odd if there had been clear blue water between the thinking of 
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the WES and the HEFCE. And of course the Department was able to take advice from the 
HEFCE, and in particular its Chief Executive, Sir Howard Newby, as the drafting progressed 
throughout the autumn and final weeks, days and hours of January 2003. Policy consultation 
within the DfES is not isolated from the world outside of the Department. Apart from the Whitehall 
influences - notably the role of the Treasury - the White Paper touches on the work of a number 
of other Whitehall departments, as well as the activities of the research councils, regional 
development agencies, and many other agencies and organisations. Government departments 
consult widely in preparing policy documents not least to ensure that policy can be implemented 
that bit quicker if you have already consulted the key players. 
The 2003 White Paper 'The Future of Higher Education' (DfES 2003b) could hardly be described 
as an executive summary at 105 pages. The White Paper deals head on with the key issue of 
, 
top-up fees. Subject to legislation, the Government announced in the White Paper that from 2006 
higher education institutions would be allowed to seek an annual fee contribution from each 
student of up to E3,000 per year for each course. However, institutions would be required to draw 
up an access agreement to improve access for students before they could charge the differential 
fee. The access agreement would be overseen by the appointment of an independent access 
regulator who would take advice from the HEFCE but would operate independent of the Council 
(DfES 2003b and WES 2003d). 
In many respects the White Paper (DfES 2003b) provides an enviable agenda of activity for the 
HEFCE as the majority of actions in this document flow in the direction of the Council. This may 
indicate that the DfES has a high measure of trust in the ability of the Council to deliver on a 
demanding and complex agenda for higher education over the rest of the decade. It would appear 
that the Government views the HEFCE as a safe, trusted, and professional pair of hands. Indeed, 
if one contrasts the 2001 and 2003 grant letters to the HEFCE we can see that the former has a 
distinct emphasis on HEFCE accountability compared to the latter (YES 2001 and DfES 2003a). 
103 
The White Paper (DfES 2003b) is far more detailed than a strategic plan and reads more like an 
operating plan. The way forward on a whole range of issues is set at a very fine level of 
specificity. For example, in the section on delivering excellence in learning and teaching the 
document specifies that there will be 70 centres of teaching excellence created and there will be 
up to 50 teaching fellowships allocated annually. This is very fine grained and in many respects 
the sort of detail that has previously been within the purview of the HEFCE. Does it matter? Well 
it does in the sense that traditionally the Government has set the overarching framework, 
strategy, and funding for higher education and then left the policy development and 
implementation to the HEFCE. The sector was then clear that it had to work with the HEFCE and 
vice versa to turn ideas in workable propositions. This left a measure of discretion in policy 
formation and implementation to the HEFCE and the sector. If the WES continues its strategy of 
setting the fi. ne grained policy for higher education as well as the national areas of priority then 
this has imp! ications for the future role of the HEFCE. Does the HEFCE want a role that has more 
of a focus on regulation than on policy creation and policy development? If policy gravitates 
increasingly towards the WES then this will have implications for the way the HEFCE is viewed 
by the higher education sector: the HEFCE will be viewed less as a buffer and increasingly as a 
delivery unit and regulator for the Government's policies. 
The YES married the annual grant letter for 2003-04 (DfES 2003a) with the publication of the 
White Paper on 22 January 2003 (DfES 2003b). In effect the grant letter was delayed by two 
months, not an insignificant matter given that the HEFCE had to publish the funding allocations to 
institutions for 2003-04 by March 2003 (HEFCE 2003b). As one would expect, the grant letter 
mirrors those aspects of the White Paper that would come into effect in the three-year funding 
period from 2003-4 to 2005-06. What is particularly interesting about the grant letter is the way 
the Government's thinking has moved on in just one year. In the November 2001 grant letter 
(DfES 2001) the HEFCE was to be judged by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills on 
the success of the Council in meeting targets in relation to increasing participation in respect of 
the 50% target. The White Paper takes a different approach in describing the objective of the 
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Government 'to continue to increase participation towards 50% of those aged 18-30... ' (DfES 
2003b, page 7). So we are moving towards the 50% target which is a different proposition than 
the policy of the Government only twelve months previously and arguably indicative of the 
changing priorities of the new Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Charles Clarke. It would 
appear that the 50% target is no longer the primary policy objective for the new Secretary of State 
for Education and Skills, or indeed the Government, 
The 2003 grant letter (DfES 2003a) is surprisingly silent on the 50% target and indicates that 
even within Whitehall a year in policy making is very long time. It would appear that the 
Government is less committed to the target of 50% and has moved on in its thinking to focus on 
the achievement of excellence across the full range of higher education activities in the context of 
global competition. Indeed, the impact of globalisation on higher education was a constant theme 
in the writings and speeýhes of Sir Howard Newby in his time as President of UUK, and Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of Southampton, in the period before he took office as Chief 
Executive of the HEFCE. 
The 2003 grant letter (DfES 2003a) carried forward the funding settlement described in the White 
Paper (DfES 2003b). The impact on sector and institutional funding for 2003-04 is described in 
detail in the HEFCE recurrent grant publication published in March 2003 (HEFCE 2003b). The 
headlines are a 10.9% increase for research and 3.4% for teaching (including funding for 
rewarding and developing staff) and represents a favourable settlement for the sector as whole 
relative to previous settlements over the past decade. 
The 2003 grant letter (DfES 2003a) provides a high level of specificity in terms of what the 
HEFCE is required to do, and the funding implications. The HEFCE is in some respects in new 
waters in its relationship with the DfES. In a sense the Department is continuing the pattern of 
taking a much closer interest in the delivery of higher education policies. Following the general 
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election in 2001, and the re-election of the Labour Party, the Government had a focus on the 
delivery of public services, particularly education, health and transport. 
The regulatory role of the HEFCE 
The literature review in chapter two indicated that the role of the funding body had moved from 
being exclusively a provider of funds for higher education to a role which has seen the Council 
move along a continuum from provider to regulator. If the Council has a key role in regulating the 
activities of our higher education institutions how does it undertake this role? 
The definition of Government regulation as used by Neave and Van Vught (1994) has a focus on 
the ability of one organisation to influence the behaviour of another organisation. They state that 
'Government regulation can be described as the efforts of Government to steer the decisions and 
actions of specific societal actors according to the objectives the Government has set and by 
using instruments Government has at its disposal' (Neave and Van Vught 1994, page 4). 
The primary mechanisms for regulation of the higher education sector by the HEFCE are the 
financial memorandum between each institution and the HEFCE, and the conditions of grant 
imposed by the HEFCE. The financial memorandum brings together a range of financial and 
other regulations that effect the funding and operation of the activities of universities and colleges 
of higher education. For example, if an institution in receipt of funds from the HEFCE wishes to 
engage in either short or long-term borrowing then it has to seek permission from the HEFCE. 
The Council also requires institutions to have as part of their mission and objectives a strategy for 
widening participation. Institutions are also required as a condition of grant to make an annual 
subscription to support the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (HEFCE 2003d). 
The HEFCE also requires, through the annual monitoring statements provided by institutions, 
statements from each university or college on the following areas of activity: 
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0 Corporate planning 
Financial forecasts 
0 Student number forecasts 
0 Widening participation 
Learning and teaching 
0 Business and the community 
9 Rewarding and developing staff 
0 Race equality. 
(HEFCE 2003c) 
The Council also regulates the higher education system through the setting of the fee levels for 
full-time undergraduate courses. In this context, Professor Steven Schwartz, the Vice-Chancellor 
of Brunel University, has argued that as the HEFCE effectively controls the supply of full-time 
undergraduate funded students in England as well as the price it will pay to higher education 
institutions, then there is no prospect of any meaningful market competition for teaching 
undergraduates in higher education (Schwartz 2003). 
The impact of regulation comes through the financial power of the HEFCE. If an institution seeks 
to disregard the conditions of HEFCE grant then it stands to lose funding. Therefore, the HEFCE 
is able to regulate the higher education system through financial levers. And the financial levers 
are buttressed in some instances by legal authority. For example the power of the Teaching and 
Higher Education Act 1998 provides the authority for the HEFCE to place a condition of grant on 
institutions to Prevent them charging top-up fees. Even if this situation changes as a result of the 
2003 White Paper on Higher Education (2003b), the Government and HEFCE will still be 
regulating the amount of the top-up fee with an upper limit of E3000. In the context of the 
prospective expansion of top-up fees, regulation will also take place through the new access 
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regulator (OFFA) which will ensure that institutions have in place access agreements before they 
can charge top-up fees (DfES 2003d). 
The financial levers of the HEFCE are arguably seen at their most extreme in the case of 
earmarked funding for special funding initiatives. The funds for special initiatives are earmarked 
within the grant allocations to higher education institutions and are provided in return for activities 
that will deliver specific policy objectives. In a review of the impact of regulation in higher 
education, the Government's 'Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) made the point that the 
HEFCE was increasing the proportion of its overall funding through the more closely monitored 
and regulated special initiatives. The figures quoted for the three year period 
1999-2002 state that the block grant had fallen from 89% to 83% over this period (BRTF 2002, 
page 18). The data published by the HEFCE for the academic year 2003-2004 show that special 
funding represents 18% of the total HEFCE budget (HEFCE 2003b). 
In the light of the Government's review of regulation, the Department for Education and Skills 
established in March 2003 a 'Better Regulation Review Group' (BRRG) with Professor David 
Vandelinde, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Warwick, as Chairman of the Group. The main 
purpose of the BRRG is to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy in higher education. 
The ability of the HEFCE to audit the use of the funds provided by the Council for teaching, 
research and other activities also represents a powerful tool of regulation. It is the combined 
impact of the accountability of the universities and colleges of higher education for funding from 
the HEFCE that represents an overarching form of regulation on the higher education sector. 
Higher education is highly regulated. There is a tension in the rhetoric of the White Paper (DfES 
2003b) which speaks of 'freedoms and funding' opportunities for higher education institutions 
while at the same time restricting the ability of institutions to charge any level of fee for the full- 
time undergraduate courses. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has described the role of the HEFCE in the period 1992 to 2003. The HEFCE is a 
non departmental public body enshrined in legislation and established by the Government. The 
Government does not have the power to allocate funds to any particular institution or subject 
area. However, the Government does have the power to set the overall funding levels and an 
overarching framework for policy development in higher education. This is achieved through 
White Papers, Ministerial statements, and principally through the letters of guidance or what is 
more commonly known as the annual grant letter to the HEFCE. 
So where does this leave the HEFCE in the context of the relationship between the Government 
and higher education? The funding council has legal independence under the Further and Higher 
Education Act 1992 but receives all of its funding from its parent Government department, the 
DfES. The HEFCE strategic planning process operates quite openly in the. context of the 
Government's strategy for the funding of higher education. 
The HEFCE has a statutory duty to advise the Government on the needs of the higher education 
sector. This advice is given in confidence to the Government within the comprehensive spending 
review. The HEFCE is uniquely placed within the higher education sector to give this advice as it 
alone knows the financial position of each institution and therefore the overall financial state of 
the sector. And it is the knowledge base of the HEFCE that in part provides its power base within 
the higher education system. The HEFCE is a funding and regulatory body which provides grant 
for teaching and research on the basis of policies developed in partnership with the sector. This 
dissertation has argued that the HEFCE is also a regulatory body because it regulates the public 
investment that the Government is willing to provide for higher education. The HEFCE regulates 
through its power to attach conditions of grant to funding, and through its power of accountability. 
109 
It is the key role in the implementation of Government policy that falls to the HEFCE. But should 
the HEFCE be viewed as purely the administrative arm or agent of the DfES? Although the most 
recent White Paper (DfES 2003b) is at a level of specificity unseen before in higher education 
policyýmaking, it stills leaves a huge amount of work for the Council and the sector in the 
development and implementation of policy. The policy creation process that unfolds through the 
iterations between the HEFCE and the sector unfold within the context of the expectations of the 
Government. But where the funding is ultimately allocated throughout the higher education 
system is purely the responsibility of the HEFCE. For example, the Government will provide the 
funding for additional student places or for research but it will be the HEFCE that has to devise 
the policy to allocate the additional funding. 
The one role that the HEFCE clearly does not have is that of a planner of the higher education 
sector. The Council has no planning powers within existing legislation, For example, the HEFCE 
does not have the power to target certain areas of the country in an attempt to influence the 
supply of, and demand for, higher education. 
And what of the role of the HEFCE as a mediator between the DfES and higher education 
institutions? What is it supposed to mediate? The DfES sets the overall funding levels for higher 
education. Increasingly, the DfES sets the levels of funding for activities within the overall funding 
for teaching and research. There is little evidence that the HEFCE seeks to openly oppose the 
wishes of Government. The one example of where the HEFCE consistently ignored the wishes of 
Government was on the linking of TQA judgements to funding allocations. Increasingly, the 
HEFCE can be perceived as the policy development and policy implementation body for the 
Government strategy in support of national areas of priority. The symmetry may of course reflect 
a common approach to meeting the challenges associated with globalisation, and the key role of 
the higher education sector in the knowledge economy and knowledge society. 
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In terms of power relationships, the Government has power over the HEFCE in two respects: 
firstly, the DfES sets the overall funding levels for higher education; secondly, the DfES sets the 
HEFCE running costs which affect its ability to grow as an organisation to set and deliver on its 
own agenda. That relationship of power is translated by the HEFCE over the higher education 
institutions. Universities and colleges of higher education may well be independent autonomous 
institutions but they are dependent significantly on public funding for their economic survival. 
There is a compact between the Government and higher education institutions through which the 
Government provides funding as an investment in return for teaching and research. And the 
regulator and manager in this relationship is the HEFCE. The HEFCE also acts as the honest 
broker in the funding and management of the higher education system. It can only remain in this 
role as long as it has the confidence of both sides of the equation, with the Government on one 
side and the higher education institutions on the other. When that trust is removed by either side 
the HEFCE could no longer operate in its broker role. The HEFCE needs to be viewed by all 
parties as effective, efficient and transparent in the delivery of its policies through its funding 
levers. 
The HEFCE was created by Government but in the historical context of the roles previously 
played out by the UGC and UFC. Increasingly, it has had to operate within a strategic framework 
that is more defined than has hitherto been the case. The challenge for the Council lies in its 
ability to add value to the aims and objectives of the Government as set out in the 2003 White 
Paper (DfES 2003b). The devil is always in the detail and the HEFCE needs to ensure that its 
own policies for the implementation of the White Paper touch all parts of the higher education 
sector in a way that recognises the diversity of the sector but ensures that the funding allocations 
build a strong system within which the whole is far greater than a sum of the parts. 
The next and final chapter of this thesis brings together the key issues raised through the case 
histories of the roles of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE in relation to the research questions in 
chapter one. A discussion of the role of the funding body in the changing relationship between the 
state and higher education will be reflected in the context of the research questions, aim of the 
thesis, and the framework for research as set out in chapter one. 
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Chapter Six 
Discussion and conclusion 
Introduction 
The purpose of the final chapter of this dissertation is to: draw together some of the key themes 
explored in the case histories of the UGC, UFC and HEFCE; relate the evidence to the research 
questions; review Berclahl's (1959) five tests for university autonomy; and, finally to suggest 
areas for further research. 
There is a single aphorism that aptly describes the fundamental shift in the relationship between 
the state and higher education in England in the past quarter of a century: it was once the role of 
the state to provide for the purposes of universities; it is now the role of universities to provide for 
the purposes of the state. Why this has occurred and the mechanisms that support this 
conceptual inversion have been explored in this dissertation. 
This dissertation has examined the relationship between the state and higher education in the 
context of the changing role of the funding body for higher education. Through an historical 
approach, the direction of movement from provider to regulator has been reviewed in the context 
of the developing role of the state from facilitator to interventionist. 
In a global knowledge economy driven by the knowledge society, the contribution of universities 
and colleges of higher education has become critical to the development and survival of UK PLC. 
The language of higher education has changed in the past quarter of a century. Higher education 
has become less of a public good and more of a public investment. Governments and students 
have become investors in higher education and the funding body has become the guardian and 
regulator of the public interest and public investment in higher education. The management of 
E5.5 billion of public investment in 2003-04 has taken the primary role of the HEFCE as a 
provider of funds along a continuum to a point at which it regulates the activities of individual 
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universities and colleges of higher education in the overall management of the higher education 
system. Funds are provided increasingly by the HEFCE -on a 'something for something' basis. 
Greater regulation has created a compliancy culture within higher education as universities and 
colleges of higher education have become dependent to. varying degrees on the funds from the 
state. 
This dissertation has explored the concept of the changing role of the funding body from provider 
to regulator, an area indicated in, but not covered substantively by, the literature. There is no 
detailed analysis in the literature on the role of the UFC and the HEFCE and this dissertation 
seeks to go some way towards filling that deficit. As the dissertation has stated earlier, an 
objective of the research was to fill a gap in the academic literature by providing new insights to 
the changing role of the funding body. 
The Changing role of the funding body 
Shattock (1994) argues that until the mid 1970s in England there was clarity and transparency 
about the roles of the Government, funding body, and the universities. The roles were separate 
and distinct to ensure institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Government provided for an 
expanding higher education system. The universities made their case to the UGC which as the 
honest broker made the case to the Government for the necessary funds to meet the needs of 
the higher education sector. The unit of resource was sacrosanct in this arrangement. There was 
little point in increasing student numbers unless there was a corresponding increase in funding for 
teaching and research. 
The UGC represented for most of its life an age in which the Main Committee of the UGC 
understood the relationship with the Government to be one in which there were three powerful 
forces in higher education: the Government; the UGC; and, the universities and colleges of higher 
education. The UGC did manage the university sector and did take hard decisions to rationalize 
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funding, particularly in the early 1980s. In many respects the UGC was a rational planner in its 
approach to the management of the university sector. Rationality for-the UGC meant a stable 
planning environment through which growth could be achieved to support enhanced quality in 
higher education. The rational planning model of the UGC was not compatible with the ravages of 
inflation in the 1970s and the policies of the Conservative Government of the early 1980s. The 
UGC looked unlikely to provide the appropriate administrative vehicle for the great leap forward in 
student numbers for higher education from the 1980s onwards. 
The UGC lived most of its life in an atmosphere within which the Government of the day was 
prepared to foot the bill for higher education but did not try to manage higher education. The UGC 
and the higher education sector accepted the right of Government to set national policy but it was 
then clearly within the ambit of the UGC to construct policies and funding mechanisms, in 
collaboration with the higher education sector, to deliver Government policy. The dominant ethos 
of the UGC until the 1970s was that of an organisation that sought to 'encourage and guide' 
universities and colleges to accept policies that would serve not only their own development but 
also the needs of Government. From a Government perspective, the UGC did not present an 
image of a funding body that could manage a higher education system as it moved swiftly to an 
age of mass higher education. The ethos of the UGC was to maintain elite traditions and paralle 
funding levels and this approach was always going to create a tension with a Conservative 
Government determined to reduce levels of public expenditure, and determined to reduce the unit 
of resource for higher education on both sides of the binary divide. 
The failure of the UGC in 1986 to spot the financial debacle at University College Cardiff (UCC) 
should not be underplayed in any assessment of the downfall of the UGC. If it failed to anticipate 
a financial crisis at one university then there would be doubts in Whitehall whether the UGC had 
the staff and mechanisms in place to identify other potential problems. The Government wanted 
an active manager of the higher education sector and the UGC was unlikely to achieve this 
objective. 
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The decision of the Government to create a single funding body for the polytechnic side of the 
binary divide made it inevitable that a similar body would be created through legislation for the 
university sector. The UFC is the link between the UGC and the HEFCE. While the independence 
of the UFC was enshrined in legislation, it was more accountable to Government than its 
predecessor the UGC. It may have had legal independence but it was by no means independent. 
The UFC was established by the Government as an organization that had legal independence 
through the Education Reform Act 1988 but was arguably less independent in respect of the 
overarching policies for higher education. The needs of the Government were prescribed in the 
annual letters of guidance from the Department for Education. The UFC's funding exercise for 
teaching in the period 1991-92 to 1994-95 demonstrates the willingness of the UFC Council to 
move at a stroke from the stable planning mechanism of the UGC to a radical funding scheme 
designed to accelerate mass higher education through a decline in the unit of resource. The UFC 
was not established as a funding body that would cause difficulties for the Government. On the 
contrary, it was established by the Government to manage and control the higher education 
sector and to exercise control over the public investment in higher education. The abortive 
attempt of the UFC to introduce the market into the teaching aspect of the UFC grant was 
indicative of the desire of the Government to stir up the waters of higher education and 
demonstrate that the state was now firmly in charge of the strategic development of higher 
education. 
The failure of the UFC to implement a bidding system for teaching from 1991-92 was a watershed 
for higher education. This represents arguably the last instance of the higher education sector 
standing collectively to successfully thwart the wishes of the funding body and the Government. 
However, the knowledge in the sector that the Chief Executive of the UFC, Sir Peter Swinnerton- 
Dyer, had little confidence in the UFC's experimental teaching funding policy must surely have 
been a significant factor in the approach adopted by the university sector (Swinnerton-Dyer 
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1991). The backlash on the higher education sector was a series of cuts in public expenditure for 
higher education in the 1990s all imposed by the UFC and the HEFCE without any public criticism 
of the Government by the funding council. 
With the end of the binary system in 1992 came the unified higher education sector in England 
under the funding control of the HEFCE. Although the Council's independence from Government 
is also enshrined in legislation in the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, the HEFCE is more 
accountable to the DfES than any of its predecessor bodies. Throughout the past decade (1993- 
2003) we have witnessed a ratcheting up of the influence of the DfES over the strategic 
development of higher education. The letters of guidance to the HEFCE have become 
increasingly prescriptive, and the recent White Paper (DfES 2003b) is at a level of specificity 
never seen before in higher education. Where once the Government was content to set the 
overarching agenda and leave the policy development and implementation to the HEFCE, there 
is now a new scenario in which the YES seems intent on sharing responsibility with the HEFCE 
for policy implementation. 
By the time the HEFCE was established in 1992, there was already in place a firm tradition 
through which the funding council understood that it was an agent of the Government and clearly 
operating within the overarching framework of Government funding and strategy for higher 
education. For the first five years of its life the HEFCE was occupied predominantly with holding 
together a higher education sector facing a financial crisis. 
The letters of guidance from the Government have served as the letters of instruction for the 
HEFCE since 1993. It has traditionally been the role of the HEFCE to take the funding provided 
by Government, absorb the national priorities of the Government for higher education, and then in 
consultation with the higher education sector, create policies to underpin the allocation of funds to 
individual institutions. And this still serves as the primary role of the HEFCE. However, the 
evidence suggests that there has been an accumulation of regulatory powers by the HEFCE 
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through which it has gained control over the affairs of the universities and colleges of higher 
education. Higher education institutions have become compliant to the demands of the funding 
council. 
The HEFCE has always had a key role in creating and implementing policies for higher 
education. But the evidence suggests a change in the role of the Government in the formulation 
of higher education policy. The Department for Education and Skills has given notice through the 
White Paper on The Future of Higher Education (DfES 2003b) that it intends not only to set the 
funding levels and areas of national priority for higher education but it is now drilling down to 
specify the policies the HEFCE will adopt to deliver national priorities. This is a distinct change in 
the relationship between the Department and the HEFCE. Is this an aberration or a sign of things 
to come? 
With the arrival of Estelle Morris as Secretary of State for Education and Skills, the letters of 
guidance to the HEFCE become infused with the imperative of progress reports on a range of the 
HEFCE's activities. It is a micro-management obsession with progress chasing. It is arguable that 
the drive within Whitehall to ensure the delivery of the key public services is behind the new 
approach from the DfES. Ministers wish to know exactly what is happening so that they can 
report on progress to the Downing Street delivery unit. It is the level of accountability that has 
changed dramatically in the past few years. 
The fact that the key advice to Ministers from the HEFCE on the Comprehensive Spending 
Review is confidential prevents the Council divulging publicly the arguments it places before 
Government in support of a healthy, vibrant and financially sustainable sector. What is also not 
public is the advice provided by the HEFCE to Government in advance of the publication of the 
White Paper (DfES 2003b). It is surely not a co-incidence that in many respects the White Paper 
published in January 2003 mirrored the policies agreed by the HEFCE the previous Autumn 2002 
(HEFCE 2002c) in the development of its draft strategic plan. 
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The traditional mediating role of the Council is played out in two parts: initially behind the scenes 
in the discussions with Government; and then in the period of consultation with the academic 
sector. Notwithstanding the granularity of the recent White Paper, account needs to be taken of 
the need to translate White Papers and Ministerial statements into effective, efficient and 
transparent policies that will stand the test of judicial review. This requires a tremendous amount 
of creativity by the HEFCE in partnership with the academic community. 
How will the HEFCE respond to the new approach by the DfES? The HEFCE Executive has been 
in place for just over a decade. If it has ambitions, then those ambitions will focus on a measure 
of independence from Government but also on its ability to grow and prosper as an organization. 
It will not serve the ambitions of the HEFCE if it is seen as exclusively an agent of the 
Government and therefore it needs to demonstrate to the higher education sector that it can 
represent the needs of the sector to Government, and gain extra funding as a result. However, 
the White Paper has demonstrated an enviable agenda for the HEFCE, and operating as the 
willing agent of Government may serve the Council well in its ambitions to provide a secure 
environment for HEFCE careers. 
As his evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry into Higher Education 
demonstrates, the current Chief Executive of the HEFCE, Sir Howard Newby, does not feel 
constrained by the policies of the Government to the extent that he cannot speak out publicly 
about what his Council believes to be the best approach to ensuring a sustainable higher 
education sector (Newby 2003). In many respects, the HEFCE would be of little value to the 
Government or higher education sector if it failed to operate effectively as an independent 
organisation. And this is a real issue for the Government. If it continues to take a micro- 
management approach to the strategic development of higher education then it may lose the 
benefit of what it and the sector value the most -a funding council that is owned by neither side 
of the equation but is willing to speak truth unto power, and take decisions that may displease its 
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political masters from time to time but are transparent and subject to debate and mediation in the 
light of an open and mutually beneficial dialogue with the higher education sector. 
The HEFCE is a willing regulator. It has absorbed the demands of the Government over the past 
decade and used the power of financial regulation to exercise control and influence over the 
higher education sector. If an institution is in financial difficulties it knows it can turn to the HEFCE 
for assistance. Notwithstanding the principle of the block grant, funds are provided increasingly by 
the HEFCE on a 'something for something' basis. Control through financial regulation is absolute 
and accountability is mandatory. 
The sole responsibility that lies beyond the legal and funding authority of the HEFCE is the ability 
to effect systemic change in higher education by operating in planning mode. For example, the 
HEFCE does not have the legislative power to direct funding to specific regions of the country to 
alleviate cold spots in the provision of higher education. If the HEFCE has ambitions to increase 
its sphere of influence in higher education then it will need what it does not have at the moment - 
planning powers enshrined in legislation. One of England's senior Vice-Chancellors has remarked 
in private that 'higher education in England is over-regulated but under-planned'. The implication 
is that there is far too much attention spent on a range of issues such as teaching quality 
assessment and far too little time on addressing the fundamental issue of planning a diverse and 
sustainable higher education system in a globally competitive environment. 
What is crucially important is the ability of the HEFCE to take long-term decisions to ensure the 
sustainability of the higher education system in England. Governments do engage with strategies 
beyond the medium-term but politicians come and go while funding bodies, universities and 
colleges have a wider span of existence. The role of the HEFCE is to look beyond tomorrow to 
ensure that each part of the higher education jigsaw is well placed to deliver beyond the sum of 
the parts. This is a considerable duty placed on the HEFCE and a duty of care that it has 
undertaken remarkably well in the past decade. Given the severity of the financial crisis that has 
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swept over the higher education sector in the past quarter of a century it is a tribute to the sector 
and the funding council that the financial crisis at UCC in the mid-1980s (Shattock 1994) stands 
out as the single public example of a major financial crisis in a higher education institution. 
Mediating role of the HEFCE in the period 1992- 2003 
Almost by definition the HEFCE has a mediating influence on higher education. It is legally 
independent and has exclusively the power to make the state funding allocations to individual 
higher education institutions. In that important sense it keeps the politics out of higher education. 
Notwithstanding the increasing tendency of Government to micro-manage higher education 
policies, the HEFCE still has a substantive role in advising the Government and the higher 
education sectoý. Sometimes regulators undertake their work in the shadows and there is 
evidence that the HEFCE played a significant role in the development of the thinking behind the 
higher education White Paper (YES 2003b). The White Paper replicates the key areas set out by 
the HEFCE in its draft strategic plan which was ready for publication in October 2002 but delayed 
tactically by the HEFCE to ensure symmetry between the Government and the HEFCE strategic 
vision for higher education (HEFCE 2002c). The world of higher education cannot see the role the 
HEFCE plays in speaking truth unto power, or indeed its confidential advice to the Government 
on the Comprehensive Spending Review. The world cannot also see the confidential role of the 
HEFCE in supporting those institutions that need financial support, advice and guidance. 
Traditionally, the mediating role of the HEFCE has been in the implementation of policy, no 
inconsiderable task given the myriad of polices that have had to be created to meet the 
increasing state pressure on the higher education sector in respect of the Government's national 
priorities. The mediating role of the HEFCE takes place in consultation with the higher education 
sector. 
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The changing relationship between the DfES and the HEFCE could be influential in the role of the 
contemporary and future role of the Council. This dissertation has indicated that the HEFCE was 
involved in the preparation of the DfES White paper on Higher Education (DfES 2003b). A 
number of the key themes in the HEFCE Board paper on the strategic vision of the Council 
(HEFCE 2002c) turned up subsequently in the White Paper. If the DfES and the HEFCE are 
forming a much closer relationship then this will have implications for the Council's perception of 
its own role as a buffer body between the Government and the higher education sector. Buffer 
bodies challenge the views of both sides of the buffer. But that would not appear to be happening 
in the HEFCE relationship with Government. 
The Council is growing ever closer to the DfES in policy creation, policy development, and policy 
implementation. Within this Pew arrangement can the Council realistically argue that it has the 
independence to represent the needs of the higher education sector to the Government? 
Mediation can still take place between the WES and the HEFCE, and between the HEFCE and 
the higher education sector, but the framework within which any mediation takes places has 
changed in recent years. The WES and the HEFCE look increasingly like one united voice in the 
policy making machinery of the state, and micro-management and regulation of the higher 
education sector. 
The danger for the HEFCE is that if the Government continues to define policy at the level of 
specificity in the White Paper (DfES 2003b) then the higher education sector will begin to doubt 
the independence of the HEFCE to create its own strategy and policies for higher education. 
Should this happen then the sector will look increasingly to Government and less to the HEFCE 
for strategic leadership. The HEFCE would then be perceived increasingly as the regulator of the 
public investment and less of an innovator or strategist. 
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Berdahl's tests for university autonomy 
When Berdahl published in 1959 his analysis of the relationship between British universities and 
the state, he argued that against his five tests for university autonomy, the state had not sought to 
control or influence the universities. In a sense Berdahl's tests set a benchmark for the state and 
higher education relationship. If, as this dissertation has argued, the role of the state 
(Government and funding body) has changed considerably over the past decade in respect of the 
pressure exerted on the higher education sector for the purpose of delivering Government 
objectives, then arguably it should be possible to map Berdahl's tests against policies proposed 
by the Government and implemented by the HEFCE. 
Berdahls' five tests are: 
'The admission and examination of students 
The curricula for course of study 
0 The appointment and tenure of office of the academic staff 
0 The allocation of income among different categories of expenditure 
0 The final authority in determining the proper subjects of research' (Berdahl 1959, page 
162). 
It is not possible within the scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed analysis for each of 
Berclahl's (1959) five tests. However, it is possible to draw attention to the key areas where there 
is evidence that the state has sought to influence or control the activities of higher education 
institutions in England. 
Under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, the Secretary of State for Education is 
debarred from making terms and conditions which refer to: specific institutions; particular courses 
of study or programmes of research, including the way they are taught, supervised or assessed; 
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student admissions; or the selection and appointment of academic staff (FHE Act 1992, section 
68). 
On the admission and examination of students, each higher education institution is required by 
the HEFCE, as a condition of grant, to have a widening participation strategy in which the higher 
education institution sets out its strategy for increasing and widening participation, and its access 
arrangements. While the HEFCE does not seek to approve an institution's targets in these areas 
the very act of asking for the information from institutions could influence the behaviour and 
policies of an institution (HEFCE 2001b). Additionally, the HEFCE publishes benchmark data for 
access indicators which cover the percentage of full-time undergraduate entrants to universities 
or colleges of higher education from the state or private sector. Given the Government's key 
policy objectives in widening and increasing participation, and equitable access to all higher 
education institutions (YES 2003b and WES 2003d), the process of publishing benchmark data 
could influence the admissions policies of universities and colleges of higher education. 
The Government's plans for the appointment of an access regulator for higher education could 
also impact on the admissions policies of institutions. Within the Government's proposals for new 
fee arrangements (DfES 2003b) institutions will not be able to set their own tuition fees (between 
: EO and: E3,000) without an access agreement approved by the Government's access regulator 
(DfES 2003d). However, the Government has stated publicly that an institution's admission 
policies will be outside of the remit of the access regulator (DfES 2003d). 
The performance indicator data published by the HEFCE also covers the non-completion rates at 
individual institutions (HEFCE 2002e). It is arguable that institutions may be reluctant to admit 
particular students if they are concerned that some groups of students, particularly those without 
prior qualifications, may be less likely to complete the course of study. There is insufficient 
evidence to judge whether there is any potential for state influence over the examination of 
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students arising from the Government's plans for a review of the honours classification system 
(DfES 2003a). 
The curricula for courses of study could be influenced by the HEFCE performance indicators on 
employment outcomes (HEFCE 2002e). Institutions may feel under pressure to adjust the 
curricula, in the context of the skills agenda, to ensure that students have a better chance of 
gainful employment after graduation. The HEFCE and Government drive to increase and widen 
participation through the promotion of foundation degrees could also influence institutions if they 
are seeking to pursue growth in undergraduate student numbers. Both the HEFCE and DfES 
have made it clear that growth in student numbers from 2003-04 will focus on the development of 
foundation degrees (DfES 2003a). Foundation degrees are a new two year higher education 
qualification designed to '. _give people the intermediate technical and professional skills that are 
in demand by employers, and to provide a more flexible and accessible way of studying' (HEFCE 
2003g, page 7). 
The 2003 grant letter from the DfES to the HEFCE is infused with proposals that could influence 
the curricula including: foundation degrees; higher education in further education colleges; 
innovative and flexible programmes of study; two year honours degree courses; the skills agenda; 
and, credit systems in higher education (DfES 2003a). 
The appointment and tenure of office of the academic staff in part relates to academic freedom. 
Under the 1988 Education Reform Act, '... academic staff have freedom within the law to question 
and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, 
without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at 
institutions' (ERA 1988, section 202 (2a), page 194). This provision is carried forward within the 
Further and Higher Education Act 1992. 
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The DfES letter of guidance to the HEFCE in January 2003 invites the Council to consider 
relating extra funding to market supplements for rewarding staff performance (DfES 2003a).. The 
White Paper proposals for new professional standards for teaching could also impact on the 
appointment of academic staff. Although the state is using funding levers to enhance the quality 
of teaching, and status of teachers in higher education, there is no evidence that the state has 
interfered with an institution's internal procedures and policies for the employment of staff. 
Although the HEFCE allocates funding by means of the block grant principle, the annual funding 
allocations from the HEFCE are increasingly identified as discrete areas of funding in respect of 
teaching and research (HEFCE 2003b). The allocation of income among different categories of 
expenditure will be influenced by the earmarked grants allocated by the HEFCE for a range of 
activities including: widening access and improving retention; teaching quality enhancement; 
higher education reach out to the business and the community; rewarding and developing staff; 
and, the restructuring and collaboration fund (HEFCE 2003b). 
Berdahl's (1959) final test is in relation to the determination of the proper subjects for research. It 
is arguable that the timing, process and procedures of the RAE could have had an impact on the 
conduct of research. The research record of staff has the potential to affect the employment 
prospects of individuals. However, given the support for academic freedom within the legislation 
(ERA 1988 and FHE Act 1992) there is arguably less state influence in this area of activity than in 
the other four of Berdahl's tests reviewed above. 
The above analysis has demonstrated that in each of Berdahl's five tests there is both the 
potential and actuality of influence and control by the state over the autonomy of higher education 
institutions. Berdahl's conclusion that the state had not sought to control or influence the 
universities has been effectively turned on its head by the policies of the Government and the 
HEFCE, and through the public information provided in the institutional performance indicators 
(HEFCE 2002e). 
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So we come full circle to a final reflection on why the Chief Executive of the HEFCE, Sir Howard 
Newby, argues publicly that the funding council is still effectively a buffer and mediating body 
between the Government and the higher education sector (Guardian 2003). The evidence in this 
dissertation would suggest that the role of the HEFCE could be better described as a funding and 
regulatory body for higher education that is part of the state apparatus for the funding, 
management and regulation of higher education, In a sense, Sir Howard Newby is seeking to 
defend the independence and professional integrity of the HEFCE. He is a key part of the 
relationship between the HEFCE and the Government, and a key part of the traffic of confidential 
advice from the HEFCE to the Government. This dissertation has acknowledged the 
independence of the HEFCE in the context of the confidential advice the HEFCE provides for the 
Government, and the key role of the HEFCE in the creation and implementation of policies that 
lead to the institutional funding allocations. This dissertation has also acknowledged the 
importance of perception. What does the sector perceive to be the relationship between the 
funding council and the Government? The MORI survey indicates that the sector views the 
HEFCE as a regulatory body that is an agent of the Government. The challenge for the HEFCE is 
twofold: it needs to find a way to make more transparent its independence from Government; 
and, it needs to make more transparent the added value it provides to higher education for the 
benefit of the higher education sector, and the Government. 
Further research 
It has not been possible within the scope of this dissertation to cover both sides of the binary 
divide and as the dissertation has acknowledged, the important role of the PCFC in the 
development and funding of higher education has not been covered. This is an area for further 
research through which one could examine the comparative approaches of the PCFC and the 
UFC to funding and planning in the period 1989-93. Did the two Councils adopt different funding 
policies for the universities and polytechnics, and if so why? The author would welcome the 
opportunity to develop his research interests in the state and higher education relationship by 
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broadening his research methodology to include the views of colleagues from the higher 
education sector to gain their perception of the changing role of the funding body, in particular the 
developing role of the HEFCE in its relationship with Government, in particular the Department for 
Education and Skills. 
Reflections on the research process 
The author has emphasized in the research methodology section in chapter one that the 
empirical authority for this dissertation is based exclusively on primary research documentation 
that is available to all other researchers. He has not sought to write a personal account of his time 
within the Department for Education, and the funding body (UGC, UFC and the HEFCE). 
However, the author acknowledges the relationship between his knowledge of higher education 
evinced through his career experiences and his ability to locate, analyse and interpret the 
documentation. The author believes that the research methodology used in this dissertation has 
enabled him to answer the research questions and make an original and substantive contribution 
to the research literature on the role of the funding body in the relationship between the state and 
higher education. 
Throughout the research process, the author has been supported and encouraged by his 
employer - the HEFCE. Indeed, his line manager, the Chief Executive of the HEFCE has taken a 
direct interest in, and been strongly supportive of, the author's desire to undertake and complete 
the research. There has never been any attempt by the HEFCE to interfere with any aspect of the 
research process. In fact there has been a genuine interest within the HEFCE, and more widely 
within the higher education community, that this research should be undertaken to inform the 
author's professional practice, and to inform the literature on change in higher education. 
The author has not attempted to write an 'insider' account in the style, for example, of Carswell 
(1985). The narrative and evidence is derived from the documentation and the interpretation is 
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the subjective judgement of the author. The author has not used information available to him from 
the confidential papers he has seen and private meetings he has attended. However, the author 
accepts that it could be argued that his extensive knowledge of the policies and personalities in 
higher education have helped him to undertake the research, particularly in his knowledge of and 
ease of access to key documentation. Therefore, it is the judgement of the author that he has 
written an 'inside' account of the changing role of the funding body: an account written by 
someone within the funding body but scrupulous in ensuring that his interpretation is based on 
the publicly available documentary evidence. 
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Appendix A 
Chronological history of the intermediary funding body between the Government and 
higher education institutions 
1. The University Grant Committee was established on 14 July 1919. 
2. The University Grant Committee (UGC) was dissolved on 21 June 1989. 
3. The Universities Funding Council (UFC) was established on 1 November 1988 under 
section 131 of the Education Reform Act 1988. The Council assumed its full responsibilities, in 
succession to the University Grant Committee, on 1 April 1989. Accordingly, the terms of office of 
the last members of the UGC expired on 31 March 1989 but, to provide for the orderly winding up 
of the Committee's affairs, the secretariat of the UGC continued in existence until -14 July 1989. 
4. The Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) was established on 1 November 
1988 under section 132 of the Education Reform Act 1988. 
5. Both the UFC and the PCFC were dissolved on 31 March 1992 under the provisions of the 
Further and Higher Education Act 1992. 
6. The Higher Education Funding Council for Education (HEFCE) was established on 6 May 
1992 under Section 62 of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. The HEFCE assumed its 
full responsibilities for distributing grants to higher education institutions on 1 April 1993. 
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0 
S 
HIMM-EDUCATION FUNDtNG 1993-24 TO 1,995-96 
Following the Secretary of State's announcement 
writing to give you further information on the 
for higher education. Detailed figures are set 
to this-letter. All the figures will be subject 
approval in the usual way. 
STUDENT NUIMERS 
today, r I Am 
planned funding 
out in the Annex 
to Parliamentary 
2. The number of students in higher education has risen faster 
than projected In the Higher Education white Paper last year. our 
14test. estimate is; that the participation rate reached around 28t 
for Great Britain in 1992-93. In order to allow for the-rising 
numbers of entrants enrolled. in recent years,, the figures for 
student numbers underlying the spending plans announced, today 
provide for an increase in full-time equivalent students in 1993- 
94 of 66,000 or 8.51. Given that we are already overshopýting 
proJe7t, ptions made as recently as May 1991 and that the- qpvernm ent 
is'plAnning a signýficant increase in the number of place: ý in 
further. education, the Government has based its future funding 
provisioh on the assumption that there will be: a period of 
consolidation over the next three years. This will be followed 
by renewed growth in participation rates to reach our published 
projectýOn of one third by the year 2000. Government funding for 
the Funding Council will be based on this assumption about 
student numbers for the next three years irrespective of actual 
enrolments. 
 '4 O($' 
'RECURPJENT FUNDING 
I. -- I 
3. The f igures, in the Amex are for total resources I including both Publ licly-funded tuition fees and grant. we will announce the fee rates for 1993-94, and the consequent distribution of resources between fee and grant, in due course. We will wish to discuss with the Council the implications of the assulaed student nunbers and the revised fee levels for its funding methodology. 
4. The Secretary of State looks to institutions to make further 
efficiency gains while maintaining financial viability. In the light of the Governmentla policy on public sector pay, the funding assumes that pay settlements will provide for increases 
of no more than lk* in 1993-94. 
S. Against this background,, and subject to what is said below, it is for the Council to determine what priority to give to 
specific needs in the light of the total provision available and 
to determine the balance of funding between institutions. 
LINE ADMSTtfms 
19 
6. The recurrent and capital baselines reflect the fact that 
the Council is responsible for universities and colleges in 
EngliýLnd only, as well as the transfer of responsibility from the 
Department for funding the Open University, the Royal College of 
Art and Cranfield Institute of Technology. The recurrent baseline 
takes account of the HEFCE's share of the transfer to the 
Research Councils announced last year in respect of the new dual 
support boundary. 
PAY 
7. As set out in the Secretary of State's announcement, E50m of 
grant will be hold back against the delivery for staff employed 
in the REPCE sector of pay settlements between zero and Ik%, in 
line with the policy announced by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer today. This holdback will apply to all pay 
settlements in the sector, not just those. for academic staff. It 
will not bear on instalments, of grant payable during the months 
April to July 1993. Instead we shall invite the Council to 
ascertain from institutions in July whether they have made pay 
settlements for their staffs in line with the policy, in 
consequence of national negotiations or otherwise. 
S. If the Council is able 
such settlements for all thi 
payable from August 1993 to 
Otherwise those instalments 
institutions which have not 
policy. 
to report that institutions have made 
ir staff, instalments of grant 
March 1994 will include the C50m. 
will be reduced in respect of those 
settled within the pay restraint 
9. The plans take account of assumptions about the iTapa*ct Of 





LENGTE OP CouRsES 
10. The Higher Education White Paper last year set out the Government's view that there is no case for an increase in the average length of courses. Recent indications are that average course length is increasing - partly because numbers on degree courses have'been expanding faster than numbers on diploma courses in the former PCFC sector, and partly because of the 
introduction of longer degree courses. 
11. The Secretary of State Is initial gýuidance asked the Council to provide incentives for two-year full-time vocational diploma 
courses. We look to the Council to develop these as a matter of 
priority. The Secretary of State is also concerned about* the 
trend towards longier degree courses, because such a trend 
reduces the number of people who can enter higher education 
within the resources available. He therefore seeks advice from 
the Council on funding measures which would remove any incentive 
to lengthen degree courses at the expense of student numbers% It 
would be helpful to know, in particular, if any such measures 
could be implemented in time for funding allocations in 1993-94. 
PART-TIME STUDY 
4 
12. The funding proVlSion alloWS for further growth in part- 
time student numbers. As the Secretary of State indicated in his 
initial guidance, we look to the Council to develop ways of 
stimulating part-time study through its funding. 
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 
13. Many of the vocational diploma courses will be in 
engineering and technology. We plan to increase the differential 
between the fee levels for classroom-based and workshop-based 
courses so as to increase the relative incentive to develop-the 
latter. In addition, the Secretary of State wishes the Council 
to consider other ways to. encourage continuing expansion of 
engineering and technology at all, levels through its fundinq. I 
would welcome your early advice on this. 
INITIAL TEACHER TRAINING 
14. The settlement allows for transitional funding to assist 
institutions and schools with the adaptation of secondary phase 
teacher training courses to meet the criteria in DFE Circular 
9/92. 
TEACHING AND IJLXRNING TEC! HNI=S 
IS. The Secretary of State believes that significant 
improvements in productivity and in the quality of student 
learning can be achieved through innovative approaches'using 
modern technologies. He wishes the Council to build on existing 
initiatives in this area, to promote more cost-effective 
approaches to teaching throughout higher education* 
3 
lz ýy 1-1 
QUAL= ASSURANCE 
160 Provision of almost E2 million has been made for 
subscriptions to the Higher Education Quality council. This is on 
the basis that all institutions will subscribe to the HEQc, and 
that the total subscription income of the HEOC, including that from institutions funded through the other HE Funding Councils 
and, DENI,, will amount to E2.5 million. 
17. The Government has also decided to adopt the proposal, on 
which it consulted earlier this year, to transfer responsibility 
for funding validation costs for qualifying courses in publiclY 
funded non degree awarding institutions from the Awards Vote tO 
the institutions , E6.4 million has been included for this 
purpose. We would expect this sum to be allocated as a special 
factor in. 1993-94 and then absorbed into core funding for the 
institutions concerned. 
R , JESEARCH 
18. As indicated in the Secretary of State's initial guidance, 
we will wish to consider the Council's proposals on the split 
between funding for teaching and research in 1993-94. We would 
not expect the proportion of funds allocated for research to be 
changed significantly in 1993-94. 
RUNNING COSTS 
19. The Annex to this letter identif ies the sum of EIO -I 
million for Council running costs in 1993-94. This sum will be 
earmarked in the grant paid to the Council. it will be for the 
Council to fund quality assessiment and other activities within 
this total. 
CAPITAL FUNDING 
20. Goverment financing for capital spending for higher 
education will be E319.0 million, E322.3 million and : E329.4 
million over the next three years. I should be grateful if you 
would let me have by the end of this month the council's views on 
the distribution of this sum between equipment, major building 
projects and minor works, together with details of long-term 
'major capital projects. 
22. The Secretary of State has announced tpdaythat the 
Goverrunent, intends to change the rules relating to borrowing and 
asset disposals by universities and colleges. it intends - in 
line with the recommendations of the Pearce Report - to allow 
institutions to borrow on the security of Exchequer-funded 
assets, subject to rules set by the council to maintain financial 
viability; and to relax the conditions under which the proceeds 
of disposal of such assets may be reapplied. we will be in touch 




22. We will write to you about -the provision for Access Funds for the 1993-94 academic year in due course. 
CONCLUSION 
23.1 am also enclosing a copy of the charts which we shall be 
using in our briefing today. We look forward to discussing the 
various issues raised 'in thi's letter with you. 
I 
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29 November 2001 
HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING AND DELIVERY TO 2003-04 
Introduction 
1. The Government has said that by the end of the decade, 50% of young people should have 
the opportunity to benefit from higher education by the time they reach thirty years of age. This 
is both a historic commitment and a challenging target. But it is a necessary target if Britain's 
productivity gap is to be narrowed, and its shortage of high-level skills is to be overcome. The 
aim to widen participation is an integral part of the strategy to promote economic prosperity and 
sustain intemational competitiveness. The steps towards the target will be set out 
' 
in a delivery 
plan, which will also be used to monitor progress. More than ever before, I am looking to the 
Council to work in partnership to help turn the plan into reality. 
2. Doing more of the same will neither increase nor widen participation. Less than one in five 
young people from lower socio-economic groups currently enter higher education compared 
with almost half of people from the middle classes. Therefore a broader range of young and 
mature people must see higher education as the next natural step in their lifelong learning. We 
must raise aspirations and improve. achievement amongst those who have not hitherto seen 
higher education'as an option for them, particularly the lower socio-economic groups. This is 
not about lowering standards in higher education but about widening opportunities for a 
broader range of students. 
I All of this needs an effective partnership between this Department, the Council; the 
Leaming and Skills Council, the Teacher Training Agency and educational institutions from 
secondary schools through to universities and colleges. I am looking to the Council to. 
collaborate closely with the Leaming and Skills Council in taking forward the activities 
that will help both the Government and the Council achieve their objectives and targets 
for higher education; 
develop new and more effective ways of working with all of its main partners to increase 
participation in higher education which will lead to a better skilled and more highly 
educated work-force, and a healthier and stronger society; 
o help support increased diversity among higher education institutions; and 
department for 
education and skills 
INVMTOR IN PEOPA creating opportunity, releasing potential, achieving excellence 
encourage the participation in higher education of a wider range of students compared 
to the present. 
4. Over the next twelve months, I expect to agree with the Council targets over the spending 
review period and beyond that will underpin the achievement of the Government's goal for increased and widened participation. The targets will focus on outcomes, including 
participation rates. The Council should demonstrate the policies it will introduce to ensure those targets are met year by year. The Council should arrange quarterly meetings with the Department regularly to review progress against these targets. I will judge the Council's 
performance by the extent to which the targets are met. 
Hiqher Education Fundinq 
5. Last year, the Government announced increases in publicly planned funding which 
provided the sector with the first real terms increase in the unit of funding per student for over a decade. Save for technical adjustments, the figures announced for 2002-03 stand. Funding for 2003-04 will be reconsidered in the Spending Review that is currently underway. I will let you know shortly of the split of total sector funding between the HEFCE and the TTA. 
6.1 do not expect institutions to charge additional tuition fees above the regulated level ("top- 
up" fees). Under the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998, this has been a condition on 
the Council's grant for the past three financial years, requiring it in turn to place a condition on 
the funding it allocates to institutions providing higher education that they should not charge 
"top-up" fees. The same condition will be imposed on the Council's grant for 2002-03. 
Student numbers 
7. The plans for student numbers set out in the. Grant Letter issued in November 2000 still 
apply. To put those plans into practice, I expect the Council to devise a mechanism of targets 
for the sector. In doing so, the Council will want to consider whether maximum student 
numbers for each institution are still useful. I should be grateful for advice from the Council 
once the consultation on the Council's discussion paper on supply and derhand for student 
places is complete. I also expect the Council to consider its policy towards institutions that fail 
to recruit as many students as expected, and therefore lose block grant income. There may be 
Merit in strategic partnerships or collaborations between institution§ as a positive measure that 
will, among other objectives, strengthen their position in the recruitment of students. 
B. The Council should also encourage higher education institutions to be more flexible in the 
ways higher education is offered to students. Some universities and colleges survey students 
and potential students to see whether courses might be offered part-time, out of normal hours, 
in the workplace, or in some other way. I should like to see this practice more widespread. 
9. There has been an encouraging start to implementing foundation degrees. The Council 
should now build on this bearing in mind where foundation degrees might have greatest effect: 
part time courses have, for example, proved more popular than full time courses. This 
supports the Government's initial assumption that foundation degrees would be particularly 
attractive to people who need to continue to work while studying. Other courses reporting the 
highest levels of recruitment have clearly identified niche markets and successfully engaged 
employers from an early stage. 
Taking Forward Priorities 
Wideninq Participation 
10. An important element of progressing towards the 50% participation target will. be ensuring 
that all institutions have sound widening participation plans which include targets which are 
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monitored and *th action taken quickly where necessary to ensure the targets are met. 
II. As the Council's recent paper on supply and demand in higher education made clear, reaching the Participation target means that students with no previous family background of higher education will need to be encouraged to consider entering higher education. That will 
require higher education institutions to collaborate closely with schools and colleges to raise both aspirations and standards of achievement. The necessary collaboration and joint 
strategic approach between the further and higher education sectors at a local level must be 
underpinned by cooperation between the LSC and the Funding Council nationally. I know HEFCE and the LSC have begun to establish effective working relationships. I encourage both bodies to pay attention over the coming year to developing joint ways of working both nationally 
and locally, and I ask the Council and the LSC to make sure their funding policies promote 
rather than obstruct widening participation. 
12. We need to ensure fair access to higher education. That means reducing the wide 
variation in perforTnance between institutions with respect to the Council's three access 
performance indicators. We have made available funds specifically to help certain institutions to address these issues on the understanding that, over time, they will meet an increasing 
proportion of the costs. I look to the Council to agree demanding targets with the institutions in 
receipt of this funding. I also look to the Council to propose to the Department, by January 2002, a target for fair access that applies to the sector as a whole. 
11 Getting additional students to participate in higher education is only the first step in 
expanding participation. Last year, my predecessor asked the Council to bear down on the 
rate of non-completion. He acknowledged that, despite an impressive completion rate for the 
sector as a whole, there were unacceptable variations between institutions. We received an interim report on progress in this area from the Council in May 2001. Through this progress 
report, I know that proposed activities to support student retention are now an integral part of 
the Widening Participation Strategic Plans of each higher education institution and that these 
are further reinforced through the activities of the Action on Access team. 
14. Institutional strategic plans present the Council with an invaluable opportunity to identify 
good practice in terms of student retention and I expect these examples of good practice to be 
disseminated across the sector. I expect the Council to work more closely with those 
institutions whose performance indicator for non-completion is significantly below their 
benchmark. I attach particular importance to student retention as an indicator of the successful 
implementation of the Government's policies. I therefore look forward to receiving a further 
report from the Council by January 2002, in the form of a longer-term strategic plan on 
retention, with clear annual milestones for the period 2002 to 2010. This plan will also contain 
a sector target for non-completion. 
15. Maintaining a focus on retention will be important as institutions increase the number of 
students from non-traditional backgrounds and I will expect the Council to provide quarterly 
progress reports to this Department during the forthcoming year, addressing progress made 
both by individual institutions who are failing Short of the benchmark, and by the sector as a 
whole. 
16. The Funding Council should continue to work with institutions to help and support those 
students who may well find financial or other pressures adversely affecting their ability to 
continue in higher education. As you know, I am currently reviewing the student support system 
with one aim being to simplify the present arrangements for students with dependants, or 
facing hardship. Access and Hardship Funds will continue to play an important role in helping 
us to widen access as we expand numbers, and to provide support particularly for those 
students from low-income backgrounds. My officials have been discussing responsibility for 
the Access and Hardship Funds for higher education students in further education institutions 
with the Council and arrangements are almost concluded. 
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17. We need to maintain our policy of providing targeted support for vulnerable students, both 
to encourage more of them to apply for higher education and to retain them once there. An 
increased number of Opportunity Bursaries (8,000 new Bursades) will be available for students 
entering higher education in 2002 and institutions should ensure that they are widely promoted 
as part of their Excellence Challenge activities, Institutions are asked to ensure that 
Opportunity Bursary students are given appropriate support to ease their transition into higher 
education. 
18. Institutions are well placed to advise students on the support they are entitled to and to 
provide some of that support, through access bursaries as well as tuition fee waivers and 
general financial help. The role of student services staff in helping students manage their 
finances better and ensuring they receive the help they need at the right time is key to the 
success of our access and retention policies. 
19. We have recognised that there is a need for improved welfare and pastoral services in 
higher education to support a more diverse student population. I am aware of the work you are 
currently sponsoring with Bradford University in the context of developing staff to support 
disadvantaged students. In a complementary exercise, the Department and the Funding 
Council have agreed terms of reference with the sector for a project to identify and disseminate 
best practice in providing welfare and pastoral services. I expect to see the outcomes of this 
work by July 2002.1 am also aware that higher education institutions are reporting a growing 
number of students with mental health problems. I -expect the review of welfare services to 
develop guidance to help institutions identify and support students with these difficulties. 
20. The provision of high quality careers services attuned to the needs of the 21st century will 
support widening participation. The Funding Council will also recognise the link between the 
support that such services can provide and reducing non-completion rates, particularly 
amongst students from non-traditional backgrounds. The Council will want to consider how it 
can encourage institutions to improve their careers education, information and guidance so that 
high quality, accessible advice is available to all those who seek it, as recommended by Sir 
Martin Harris in his review of higher education Careers Services. Sir Martin set Autumn 2002 
as the target for having his recommendations in place; I support that aim. 
Qualitv and Standards 
21. As we continue to promote our widening, participation and access policies, academic 
standards and the quality of the student experience must be maintained and enhanced. The 
quality of teaching is the chief factor in determining whether students gain from higher 
education and I look to the Council to continue to invest in programmes designed to raise the 
quality of teaching in higher education. 
22.1 recognise the important contribution of the further education sector to the achievement of 
our widening participation and access alms, and I note the significant amount of higher 
education that is being delivered in further education colleges. I look to the Council, both 
through quality assessment and development funding, to continue to ensure that the 
experience of higher education students studying in further education seftings is comparable to 
that available in our universities and colleges of higher education. 
23. The Council should continue to work with the Quality Assurance Agency to develop quality 
assurance methods that are not unnecessarily burdensome, which ensure that high standards 
are maintained, which root out weaknesses wherever they occur and ensure that swift action is 
taken to address them. I ask the Funding Council to submit a strategic plan by July 2002 that 
will set out what needs to be done by the Council and the higher education sector to enhance 
teaching quality. 
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SuPport for Research 
24. The Government is committed to strengthening research excellence and supporting world- 
class research'. Research is a driver of productivity growth and international competitiveness 
and is critical in developing the highly skilled people the nation needs in the knowledge 
economy. I would like the Council to continue to work to encourage research excellence in 
English higher education institutions and to further improve the quality of research. To help 
achieve this, the Council should at least maintain its funding for research in real terms, based 
on 2001/02 spending, in 2002/03 and 2003/04.1 know the Council is considering how to 
implement the outcome of the Research Assessment Exercise held earlier this year in 
distributing funding for research in 2002/03.1 recognise the Council will want to continue to 
fund adequately the best research. 
25. The Govemment aims further to develop excellence in arts and humanities research and 
postgraduate study, and I look to the Council to at least maintain in real terms the funding it 
provides to the Arts and Humanities Research Board. From next year, funding for arts and 
humanities research that used to come to the AHRB from the British Academy will be 
channelled through the Council. As you are aware, continuing from 2001/02, stipends for new 
postgraduate research students in the arts and humanities are to be raised in line with those for 
science, increasing to E9,000 by academic year 2003/04. 
Links *th Industrv and the Communit 
26. Universities and colleges have close links with their communities. Often they are one of the 
larger employers. They provide highly trained people for businesses and they contribute to 
local and regional economic growth through making available the results of research, expertise 
and technical know-how in a variety of ways. 
27. The Council should ensure that the knowledge and expertise of English HEls is available 
and used beyond academia: in small and large businesses, in the public sector, and in the 
wider community, There needs to be a continuing increase in the number of external links and 
in the effectiveness of those links. 
28.1 welcome the Council's work, and its co-operation with the LSC, towards introducing New 
Technology Institutes (NTIs) from next autumn. ElOrn in the financial year 2002-03 and E15m 
in 2003-04 has been allocated from the Capital Modernisation Fund towards establishing NTIs, 
with the expectation that the private sector members of the NTI consortia contribute significant 
additional funding. These funds will be distributed between the HEFCE and LSC in accordance 
wfth the bids from the successful consortia to be announced in Spring 2002. This will enable 
both Funding Councils to move towards the target of training up to 10,000 full time students a 
year through the institutes by 2004-05. The higher education places in NTIs will be covered by 
the Council's additional student number allocation process. 
29. This is a welcome enhancement of "third stream" funding which is increasing the 
responsiveness of higher education to the needs of business and the community. In my speech 
to the CBI earlier this month, I announced that we would be working with the Council to put in 
place arrangements that would enable us to embed vocational and transferable skills more 
widely across higher education provision. I am grateful to the Council for working with us to 
develop proposals for a Work-Related Skills Co-Ordination Team. I look forward to information 
on its progress and achievements, and how you intend to underpin its activities in the 
institutional planning process, particularly through institutions' Leaming and Teaching and 
Human Resource strategies. 
e Universities and hiqher education capital 
30. Over the past year the Government has provided E14rh of the E62m allocated at the last 
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spending review for the start up and capital costs of the e-Universities project up to 2003-04. For the remaining two years of this funding I recognise that the Council's involvement in the 
project will be primarily through channelling funds through the e-Learning Holding Company to 
then pass on to the main vehicle for delivery, UK eUniversities Worldwide Ltd. The Council 
should ensure effective mechanisms are in place to secure value for money and fulfilment of 
the aims and objectives for which the project was originally set up. In particular 
9 securing the viability of eUniversities as a self-financing business and 
ensuring that the social inclusion agenda remains a priority, primarily through the 
development of undergraduate courses to reach those in this country who find it difficult 
to access the more traditional campus-based university. 
I ask the Council to provide me with a progress report on this innovative project by the end of 
July 2002. 
31. The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 
2001 together give students and staff with disabilities the right to expect reasonable access to 
institutions' facilities and services. My predecessor announced last year funding totalling E56 
million over the two years to 2003-04 for use on improving access and to help provide 
specialist equipment and support. The E56 million additional funding for improving access and 
specialist equipment and support vAll 
* 
help higher education institutions meet their obligations to 
students and staff and to comply with the phased implementation dates set out in disability 
legislation. I will expect the Council to report on the first year's progress by March 2003. 
32. The Resource Accounting regime- under which we now operate means that all NDPBs' 
capital expenditure will, in future, to be consolidated into Departmental accounts. This change 
has been discussed with HEFCE officials in the course of agreeing the new End Year Flexibility 
arrangements that are now in place. We will, however, need jointly to consider what further 
needs to be done to accommodate this change and in particular to facilitate more effective 
planning and forecasting. At this stage it seems likely it can be addressed by HEFCE sharing 
with us their capital expenditure plans at the start of the financial year, supplemented by 
updates as these plans inevitably evolve. However, the detail of that will need to be resolved 
between HEFCE and DfES officials. 
33. For each of the capital streams, 1, continue to expect the Council to ensure that systems are 
in place to motivate higher education institutions to make effective use of capital investment in 
support of their objectives. In particular, the Council should encourage and support the use of 
sound investment appraisal and procurement processes, including public-private partnership 
and PFI where these seem likely to offer value for money. The Council should continue to 
provide recurrent funding to support the costs of PPP/PFI. 
Pay and Personnel 
34. Last year, this department allocated E50 million in 2001-02, Ell 10 million in 2002-03 and 
E170 million in 2003-04 for both academic and support staff pay, in part to recruit and retain 
high quality academic staff in strategically important disciplines or areas and to help modernise 
the management processes in the sector. In return for an investment of this size, I will be 
loOking for evidence of real improvements in recruitment, retention, human resource 
development and staff management. The Council is monitoring the impact of this investment 
through the human resource development plans that each institution has to submit to release 
funds. I look forward to a report on the Council's assessment of these plans by October 2002. 
35.1 also look to the Council to monitor and report progress on the timely and complete 
implementation of the recommendations of the Follett Review into the appraisal, disciplinary 
and reporting arrangements for senior NHS and university staff with academic and clinical 
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duties. The Council should report on progress by the end of June 2002. 
36.1 am determined that equal opportunities for higher education staff must improve. The 
Equality Challenge Unit should ensure that institutions deliver the improvements in monitoring 
and performance that they have agreed to in their equal opportunities policy statements. I look 
forward to seeing evidence of rapid progress towards greater equality of opportunity for all 
groups of staff. 
37. As in previous years it is a condition of grant that the Council enables institutions to meet 
any additional costs for medical and dental schools arising from the Government's award to 
NFIS clinicians following the Doctors' and Dentists' Review Body recommendations. 
Other Issues 
Excellence Fellowships 
38. At the beginning of November, Mrs Hodge announced the start of a consultation on a pilot 
scheme of awards for teachers in schools and further education colleges - the Excellence 
Fellowship Awards. There is much to be done, quickly, if first awards are to be made in 
September 2002/03. We have agreed a management fee of E30,000 for you to manage this 
programme on behalf of this department. 
Dance and Drama 
39. The department will continue to fund the dance and drama awards at the current level and 
will enhance the funding by an inflationary factor of 2.5% next year. As part of the forthcoming 
review of the scheme, we will review the level of provider funding jointly with the Council. 
Council Administration Costs 
40. The Council's administration costs are included in the recurrent provision shown in the 
annex. Figures for 2002-03 include provision for the additional costs associated with special 
initiatives to promote access to higher education and outreach to the community, and initiatives 
to improve recruitment of new lecturers. Provision for administration costs will be: 
Financial Year 2001-02 2002-03 
HEFCE administration costs (: Em) 14.6 14.9 
I ask the Council to continue to improve the efficiency and economy of its administration and to 
seek increased value for money. As usual, the Department will discuss with Council officers 
the allocation of administration costs in the coming year. The Council will also need to submit a 





PUBLICLY PLANNED FUNDING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN ENGLAND (E million) 
Financial year 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
2000-2001 grants to HEFCE & TTA 4587 
SR outcome grants to HEFCE & TTA1 4,800 4,988 
Public contributions to fees 489 491 502 
Student contributions to feeS2 355 375 397 
OST funding for HEIF 20 20 40 
Total 5,451 5,686 5,927 
Capital grants for: 
IT and other capital 106 154 206 
research 150 154 158 
Access and Hardship Funding 103 108 115 
Total 6V810 6,102 6,406 
Student numbers (FTEs in thousands) 1087 11101 1,115 
1 Includes transfer from British Academy to AHRB of E25.121 m for 2002-03 and F. 27.401 rn for 2003-04. 
2 The forecast income that universities and colleges will receive from student conhibutions to tuition f6es, after means testing. The 
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mith Street Westminster London SW1 P 38T 
5 dfes. ministers@dfes. gsi. gov. uk 
)n Charles Clarke MP 
February 2003 
HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING AN 
In my letter of 22 January, I set out th 
departments in English higher educat 
significant -increases in res-aarbh fundi 
and the extra-fundipg that will be mad: 
in 'Investing in Innovation' last July. I 
best of the research -departrnents rate 
provide them with additional funding,. 
this addipona-I fqp-dip-g should begin. I 
fu-, Ning should -beýjn in 2003-04. As t EýO million to be distributed among th( 





DELIVERY TO 2005-06 
importance I attached to supporting the best research 
n institutions, against the baitkground of the 
. g that I have made available in. the period to 2005-06, 
availabl-O through the Research Couneth as set out 
? isked the Council to devise a method to identify the 
15* in the Research Assessment E. Xbrcise, and to 
understand there was some uncertainty about when 
am, happy to confirm what I set outv in my. 16tter: the 
the additional sum is concerned, I had in. mind some 
dep 
' 




education and skI 
creating opportunity, releasing poten ial, achieving excellence 
OF 
LIBRARY 
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